Key/IV pairs should not be reused for either AES-CTR and AES-CBC - or for any other symmetric cipher for that matter. As a cipher is a Pseudo Random Permutation (PRP) inserting the same input will result in identical output. If you perform that operation you will leak information to an attacker; the attacker can distinguish data with the same contents.
CTR is a streaming mode for block ciphers. In AES-CTR the key stream depends only on the key and the IV. The key stream is then XOR-red with the plaintext. This means that in addition to the above issue, you will very quickly find additional information about the plain text if you XOR the ciphertexts together. To be precise, it will be very easy to retrieve partial or full plain text from only a small set of ciphertexts. The key would be still safe, but the plaintext is not.
Reusing the key for any cipher should be no issue as long as the IV is unique enough. In the case of CTR the IV should be unique enough to make sure that the counter does not repeat. Please read into CTR mode to see what that means when generating an IV. Make sure that you understand what IV/nonce means for your specific implementation to, the terms can be mixed up and may be used differently from one implementation to another.
Using a 16 byte value that is indistinguishable from random to an attacker should indeed preclude any attacks on the block cipher mode.