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In this paper, the authors construct an encryption scheme that is supposed to be resilient to tampering and leaking (as opposed to just leaking).

Specifically this scheme:

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If you look at the update procedure they simply multiply the current secret key $g^s$ and multiply it by $g^{Bu}$

If you tamper with this updated secret key you get a mutated secret key $T(g^{s+Bu})$. How do we know this new mutated secret key does not depend on the random subspace $B$ (in some arbitrary way) ?

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