So what I'm understanding about EKE is the fact that it depends on the fact that the public keys are completely randomized, therefore not verifiable plaintext. Otherwise it would be easy to run a dictionary attack against the protocol because the public keys are encrypted using the pre-known password.
Here's my problem: I noticed that in the CNG algorithm, the public key is a large byte array and it is completely randomized except for the first 6 bytes are always the same. From there on its completely randomized. This leads me to believe that if I wanted to run a dictionary attack against that, all I would need to know is what the first 6 bytes were and I could validate that I was able to decrypt that public key or maybe even brute force it.
To protect against this, I could easily truncate off the first 6 bytes and encrypt the rest of the completely randomized byte array with the password and then just add those 6 bytes back on either endpoint to calculate the secret key.
I'm pretty sure that's right but I'm discovering that cryptographic systems are fiendishly tricky and I wanted to run it past you guys to make sure I'm thinking about this correctly.