While a known plaintext attack successfully finds the keys, nobody has been able to put forward a general solution to this cipher. Is that possible?
You really have to go back in time to learn that ChaoCipher has been subject to some cryptanalysis before the description of the algorithm/device was published. As an example: Here’s one of the oldest papers I found related to the cryptanalysis of the ChaoCipher which was first published in 2003… long before the algorithm was published in 2010 and long before the cipher was subject to a complete break.
If you do a bit of research, you’ll find a few more papers. Most cryptanalytic looks at ChaoCipher have shown ample weaknesses in the distribution, producing anomalies which could be exploited.
Having used the algorithm description to code a C version, I quickly discovered it works somewhat like a substitution cipher that incorporates a primitive version of an lfsr which scrambles the S-box. Nothing you would want to use in times of modern cryptography. It’s more like a most-primitive rotor machine.
Anyway… getting back to the core of your question: is it possible that no one has created a general “this breaks it from every side” solution?
Sure! One reason can be found in the fact that a known-plaintext-attack counts as a complete break (and in this case, a practically feasible one too). Finding additional attack vectors can be fun as a hobby, or it may be something you might want to check on while writing a thesis about ChaoCipher… but it’s not that interesting for most cryptanalysts to dive in deeper when a cryptographic algorithm already was subject to a complete break. Instead, cryptanalysts will be more interested in finding weaknesses in more modern (currently used) ciphers. Compared to modern cryptography, ChaoCipher can’t hold up.
On the other hand, there are ample websites that talk about its internals… leaving the chance that one day, someone may find ways to break it from all sides – after investing enough time and efforts.