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This comes following a discussion with a colleague.

  • My plaintext file plain consists of a about 100,000 lines of "all work and no play...". It's size is: 2.2 MB.

  • Compressed it is: 5.4kB

  • I encrypt the original:

    openssl aes-128-cbc -in plain -out plain.ENC

    plain.ENC is marginally bigger than the original, which I would expect.

  • I compress the encrypted copy: gzip plain.ENC. But I observe that the compressed copy is now marginally larger than plain.ENC.

Assuming the entropy of the original file is on the order of ~1000-10000 bits, why is the corresponding ciphertext incompressable? My intuitive notion of the entropy of a string is the minimal number of bits required to produce that string. If the string is the 3 MB long cipher text, it was generated with a 1000-bit entropy string encrypted with an AES implementation (probably no more than a few thousand bits), as well as a few-hundred bit key. Intuitively, to me, the entropy of the cipher text should be no more than the sum of the entropies of the strings and procedures that generate it.

So, my question is: Is my intuitive notion completely wrong? If we extended the low-entropy file to be orders of magnitude larger, would we begin to observe compressibility in the ciphertext?

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Note that if you use a bad mode of operation (i.e. ECB mode) instead of CBC mode, you'll see quite good compressibility (it depends a bit on the alignment of your repeated string to the block borders). Also, welcome to Cryptography Stack Exchange. – Paŭlo Ebermann Jun 15 '12 at 21:00
Well, thanks for the welcome! – B. VB. Jun 15 '12 at 21:11
Compressing a ciphertext implies breaking the encryption. Since the best known algorithms for breaking AES are very expensive (about 2^128 operations), the best known algorithms for compressing the ciphertext are at least as expensive. – CodesInChaos Jun 15 '12 at 22:30
It would be a crappy encryption scheme that didn't hide the fact that the plauntext was so compressible. The whole point of encryption is to deny someone who has the ciphertext any information about the plaintext. (Other than that it can have no more entropy than the ciphertext has -- that's unavoidable.) – David Schwartz Jan 9 '13 at 14:37
up vote 9 down vote accepted

Well, your definition of entropy is known as Kolmogorov complexity, and it's not so much that it is incorrect, as it is that it is inapplicable to what gzip does.

For example, the value $\pi$ can also be generated by a short program; however, if you attempt to compress a 2.2Mbyte sample of the binary expansion, you'll also find that gzip will also not be able to compress it.

What we can tell from that is that gzip doesn't actually do a good job of estimating the Kolmogorov complexity. Now, this is not actually a major criticism of gzip; it is actually impossible to write a program that computes it (!).

Instead of attempting to wrestle with Kolmogorov complexity, what gzip (and every other compression algorithm out there) relies on to compress the data is heuristics. That is, it has a model of redundancies that appear in real plaintexts (such as repeated substrings), and is able to take advantage of those redundancies to shorten the length. Now, if that model corresponds to the text it is given, gzip can compress quite well; if the model doesn't correspond (and both the encrypted text and the binary expansion of $\pi$ fall in this camp), it can't compress at all.

And, no, encrypting more data would not make the result any more compressible.

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Thanks for the response. So, in principle, is the kolmogorov complexity of the ciphertext above approximately equal to the sum of the parts that generate it? In other words, is the apparent incompressability of the ciphertext just an artifact of the compression heuristics, and doesn't imply that it isn't indeed incompressible? Can a compression algorithm be crafted to exploit the fact that AES generated the ciphertext? – B. VB. Jun 15 '12 at 20:59
@B.VB.: Well, one would hope that we couldn't create a compression algorithm that could compress an AES-encrypted ciphertext with an unknown key. That would show that AES was insecure (because one of the things we hope about AES is that, without knowledge of the key, it looks like a random permutation); if the ciphertext were compressible, that would demonstrate that is not the case. – poncho Jun 15 '12 at 21:04
Perhaps I'm meandering a bit from the point, but AES relies on empirical evidence of it's security, right? So, the question I'm dying to know is: Is H(my_aes_ciphertext) (a) definitely less than len(my_aes_ciphertext) (b) approximately the same as len(my_aes_ciphertext), or (c) we're predicating the security of AES in part that H(my_aes_ciphertext) is uncomputable, even though (a) may be true? Thanks again, hope I'm not making too much of a clown out of myself. – B. VB. Jun 15 '12 at 21:19
@B.VB.: Well, no, this is mixing two different ideas. We know that an AES encrypted text is quite compressible to someone with arbitrary amounts of computer power (and hence it is strictly easier to solve than the general Kolmogorov complexity problem); however, what we hope is that it is infeasible to real world adversaries (and in particular, adversaries that have a limit on the amount of computation they can perform). – poncho Jun 15 '12 at 21:43

It won't compress because data that is encrypted with AES becomes pseudo-random-like and thus as close to maximum entropy as possible. As you pointed out, the clear text input is low entropy.

Additionally, entropy can be used as a way to detect clear text (given the clear text isn't pseudo-random itself). The output entropy from failed AES decrypts remains high unless the keys match. Even when the clear text has zero entropy (all zeroes), the failed AES decipher resultant data appears near 4.0 entropy, which is pretty cool I think. This is due to the key, substitution, and key schedule I believe.

(unprintable chars replaced with '?')

Entropy Result
3.875   <v????t@?V??????
3.125   plain text yay    <= success!
4.000   ??E???Yx?o?i????
4.000   ?Z?G^e?S?(?0?]J`
4.000   e? ?g?a??;)??? ?
4.000   ?OSF???-o??J????
4.000   ?0w??????????,??
4.000   ???????I^3"??c??
3.875   ??~?~97e_????r>?
3.875   Rk?IN??M???(??Vg
4.000   ?????)u?'?????ak
4.000   ??]9????c|?6???l
4.000   ??w???b??h<???;?
4.000   {#????q???~r?j?y
3.750   ?Q?????XV?n5Q?35

If the clear text is high entropy, it's harder to detect the right key. One way to compensate is to get the average entropy (nearly 4), and pick out the ones that are slightly lower than the average, but even then there would be some false positives.

That's my bastardization of it. Sorry it's off topic but I couldn't resist.

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The problem is that the actual entropy of the ciphertext isn't higher than the entropy of plaintext and key. It's just difficult to exploit this redundancy for compression. – CodesInChaos Aug 29 '12 at 10:31
The problem with saying 'AES encryption has high entropy' is that you need to define what you mean by entropy; it has low Kolmogorov complexity and potentially low Shannon entropy. The definition you're using is certainly an intuitive one (does it look random), but one I try to avoid while explaining something, because it's not well defined. – poncho Aug 29 '12 at 10:32

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