An adversary model formally defines the power of the adversary. It includes specifics whether the adversary is deterministic/randomized, uniform/non-uniform, interactive/non-interactive and how he interacts with the security game.

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MAC security and adversaries with memory

The usual definition of MAC security is (roughly) that there is no "efficient" adversary that has non-negligible advantage in the "MAC game" where the MAC game is as follows: the challenger chooses a ...
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Times of nested algorithms in proofs of security

Proofs of security may be constructed such that an adversary $A$ is used to construct an adversary $A'$. The reduction/algorithm which uses $A$ has to perform a number of computations in order to ...
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Definition of cryptographic advantage vs. probability of success

In game-based security definitions, like for example the one defining IND-CPA security, a given cryptosystem is said to be secure if any probabilistic polynomial time adversary has only a negligible ...
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what is PFS game?

when i reading about this paper, in the Setup of SIM section 5.2, it says that "According to the definition of PFS game", i wonder what the definition of PFS game ...
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Automated security protocol verification tool for eCK model

I want a tool that (runs on Win7 and) can perform automated verification of a protocol in the eCK security model as described in Microsoft Research's paper "Stronger Security of Authenticated Key ...
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Relation between attack and attack model for signatures

I would like to know: What is the relationship between an attack and an attack model. For example, let $\Pi$ be the Lamport signature scheme. This signature has it's security based on the one-way ...
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What kind of adversary is a compromised party?

Imagine multiple parties executing a secure multiparty computation protocol to evaluate a function securely. Let Alice be one of the parties who is intended to get all the partial results and combine ...