A cryptographic attack tries to theoretically and/or practically attack the security properties of a cipher and/or algorithm.

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What are possible caveats when generating a group for use as parameters for Diffie-Hellman key exchange?

As reusing a widely used group for Diffie-Hellman key exchanges might lead to far easier third-party key discovery through precomputation for that specific group, I would like to know what can ...
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1answer
52 views

How much information is revealed?

Let Alice pick $v_{1}$,$m_{1}$$\in \mathbb{P}$ and Bob $v_{2}$,$m_{2}$$\in \mathbb{P}$. Now Alice computes $v_{1}$$^{m_{1}}$ and so Bob does $v_{2}$$^{m_{2}}$ Then Alice exchanges $v_{1}$$^{m_{1}}$ ...
3
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2answers
101 views

Best attack on double DES followed by XOR with third key

What is the best attack here? $E_k(m)=DES_{k1}(DES_{k2}(m)) \oplus k3$
4
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1answer
85 views

How does the Flickr length extension attack work?

I am currently reading about the length extension attack on Flickr (pdf) but not understanding what's going on there. ...
1
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1answer
84 views

Cycling hashing in PBKDF's and their limitations in strength?

I hope this question isn't too similar to one that's already been asked. I also want to point out I know part the answer already, AFAIK: I just want some expert input on this. Let's model a hash that ...
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0answers
54 views

Semaev summation polynomials

I am little confused how this attack works. We have the points $P, Q$ such that $Q = nP$. We let $u_{1} $and $u_{2}$ such that $R(x,y)=u_{1}P+u_{2}Q$. Then if we find the solution $x_1,...,x_n$ of the ...
4
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1answer
89 views

Practical attack on an impractical implementation of Rijndael (AES?)

My understanding of the cryptanalysis of AES, is based on what I've read on Wikipedia and my intuition, I have nothing but self-taught education on the subject. So I want you to imagine: I have only ...
7
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5answers
256 views

Does frequent key change weaken encryption?

Following scenario: We are using OTR for communication between Alice and Bob which means after each successfull message exchange a re-keying happens for both parties leading to new AES-keys for the ...
5
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2answers
84 views

Do we have anyway of knowing if avoiding self-permutation in RC4 makes it any stronger?

OK, so lots of questions get asked about RC4 but I want to make mine specific and hopefully answerable. RC4 Design as I'm sure anyone reading this knows, uses self permutation in stage 1 of the KSA. ...
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0answers
63 views

Theoretical attacks on Block ciphers like Biclique attack on AES [closed]

Does anyone know theoretical attacks on block ciphers like AES, DES, etc? No matter what the ciphers are; I just want to get familiar with some theoretical attacks on block ciphers; Attacks like ...
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1answer
96 views

RSA Attack, known public key and ciphertext. Can decrypt the message m?

I'm stuck with this problem: Assume Alice and Bob are using RSA to communicate each other. Given Bob's public key $(217,7)$, Alice send the ciphertext $c=53$ to Bob through RSA encryption. Now, Eve ...
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0answers
16 views

HMQV and MQV group representation attack

Currently reading Krawczyk's HMQV paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/176 and trying to follow what he says about the group respetnation attack on MQV: It says that for any group of prime order $q$, ...
4
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0answers
39 views

Cost of attack on DSA with attack on DLP

Are there any (recent) estimates of cost of attack on DSA by solving the discrete logarithm? I'm especially interested in attacks that use Pollard's rho algorithm. Are there any optimized ...
2
votes
1answer
78 views

Attack on textbook RSA with small messages

We learned in class that if Alice wants to send a small message $m$, such that $m < N^{\frac{1}{e}}$, so we can break the system using $e$-th square of $m^e$. But what if Alice knows this flaw and ...
1
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1answer
20 views

What happens when domain parameter $q$ in DSA is not prime number

Suppose that attacker creates domain parameters $(p,q,g)$ where $q$ is not prime number (but $q$ still divides $p-1$) and that signer generates new key pair using these domain parameters. How exactly ...
6
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1answer
94 views

Are there any long term RC4 bias based exploits?

The RC4 cipher possibly exhibits low level bias in it's long run PRNG keystream. I'm specifically excluding short term bias attacks which I'm defining as outputs < 1024 bytes. Are there any real ...
1
vote
1answer
109 views

How long does it take to decrypt an RSA/ECB encrypted message?

I am working on assignment where I have specific scenarios and I am little bit struggling with this one. Alice sends and email to Bob.For this e-mail, she uses the following method of encryption: ...
2
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3answers
171 views

One Time Pads and reuse of the decrypted message?

How is it insecure when Alice encrypts a message with a One-Time-Pad to Bob, and Bob then uses the decrypted message from Alice as the next One-Time-Pad? For example: Alice sends Bob a message ...
2
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1answer
160 views

RSA 1024 bit forge a new matching signature from a chosen message

I have an RSA signature scheme with 1024-bit key where I know the following: Public modulus $N$ Public exponent $e=3$ A lot of signatures Summary: To compute a signature, an MD5 hash is ...
1
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0answers
27 views

ephemeral-ephemeral ECDH and MITM attack [duplicate]

ephemeral-ephemeral ECDH is it susceptible to MITM attack ? if yes, can you please give me a detailed answer ( Workflow that can be followed by the attacker) and how we can prevent this attack ...
1
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1answer
146 views

Shared modulus attack on RSA

Consider a scenario in which a group of people use a common modulus $n$ in the textbook RSA crypto system, where $n=pq$, $p$ and $q$ are large distinct prime numbers. Is there any chance for an ...
0
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0answers
37 views

Non CPA on custom MAC

While preparing for a crypto exam there is a task we don't really understand: task Let $E_K$ be a permutation $\{0,1\}^b \rightarrow \{0,1\}^b$ defined by a blockcipher with the key $K$. Let $M = ...
3
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1answer
63 views

Fixed-points in block ciphers; why don't they indicate a vulnerability?

I've seen a few questions here on fixed-points in ciphers, most asking about the possibility and existence. Most of the answers however pointed out that fixed points are not exactly a security threat. ...
2
votes
3answers
125 views

How much processing power should you assume an attacker has?

The answer to this question says that you should assume an attacker can do one billion operations per second: Key Size for Symmetric Homomorphic Encryption Over the Integers Is that a single attacker ...
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0answers
28 views

Open source code about the basic Quisquater-Piret DFA of AES-128 [closed]

Where can i find open source code about the basic Quisquater-Piret DFA of AES-128? Are there any websites sharing the code about such physical attacks?
2
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1answer
87 views

Is there really any way to nullify or avoid MITM attacks?

The question pretty much sums it up. Is there any way to make an attacker who is successfully performing an MITM attack to actually not be able to read or change the messages? Assuming there is no ...
5
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1answer
239 views

Can iterated hashing be used to mitigate collision and preimage weaknesses?

How much security does double hashing add regarding collisions and preimages? Is it helpful to iterate a hash function even more times than two? For example, can MD5 be fixed (in practice) by ...
0
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0answers
37 views

Is double encryption using AES using different key lengths (128 bit and then 256 bit) vulnerable? [duplicate]

I know that AES 256 bit is far more than enough to secure a file. I just want to know if there are any vulnerabilities or known attacks which can make such this combination less secure "double ...
2
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2answers
64 views

How badly does disclosing an M-bit prefix of an N-bit private key compromise security?

I apologize profusely for knowing nothing about cryptography, please go easy on me! I'm working on a project where I have a 2048-bit RSA private key and a public certificate generated from the ...
2
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0answers
43 views

What are the current known weaknesses/attacks on quantum key distribution?

I am writing a paper on the implementation of QKD in the future. I want to know if there are any viable attacks on the BB84 protocol or QKD in general? I know of the Photon Number Splitting attack or ...
2
votes
3answers
128 views

Attack on Double Encryption Scheme

In this protocol: A → B : { <[A, {K}pk(B)]> }pk(B) B → A : { <[B, {K}pk(A)]> }pk(A) I'd like to determine why this is insecure. How can the attacker learn the key K if A and B are both ...
3
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2answers
338 views

What are the implications of a birthday attack on a HMAC?

After collecting approximately $2^{n/2}$ message-tag pairs a collision can be observed. So two different messages (m1 and m2) will have the same tag. This paper states: Then, for any string x, ...
2
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2answers
86 views

Is this commutative encryption protocol secure?

My assumptions are: encryption must be commutative man-in-the-middle is not an issue I would like to implement the following scheme between 2 parties ($A$ and $B$) to exchange a key: Lets $C = P ...
6
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0answers
182 views

Is there any practical attack to create a printable chosen prefix MD5 collision?

I would like to create two ASCII text messages with the same MD5. Is this possible? If not, is there a similar but less strict attack that could work? Or to rephrase my last question: what are the ...
1
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1answer
90 views

ElGamal scheme attack when one message is known and ciphertexts are intercepted

Let $G$ be a finite cyclic group of order $p$ and let $pk = (g, h=g^a)$ and $sk=(g,a)$ be Bob's ElGamal public/secret key pair in $G$. To encrypt a message $m$, a random number $r$ is selected and a ...
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0answers
31 views

Voting protocol - How many dishonest tallying centres can the protocol cope with?

We have the voting protocol that is described here. I am looking at the following exercise: Determine how many dishonest tallying centres the protocol can cope with before the following properties ...
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0answers
46 views

Correlation attack on Lagged Fibonacci Generator

Say that one uses a known LFG (2 known lags $a$ & $b$, known inner state length $N$, known modulo $m$) to hide some text with a basic à la Vigenère cipher: $C_i=(P_i + {PRNG}_i) \bmod 26$. Say ...
2
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1answer
117 views

security in format preserving encryption

In format preserving encryption an attacker knows the format and data type of the plain text. The format of the plain text and cipher text are same. usually cipher text are unreadable form. then how ...
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2answers
233 views

OTP - Reusing key IS SECURE! PROVED! [duplicate]

EDIT: This is not a duplicate, in this I have explained WHY this should be secure and not if it is secure, so please stop down-vote if you haven't read everything. I have questioned before about my ...
2
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1answer
317 views

How multiplicative property of RSA can be exploited

It is known that RSA has the multiplicative property $E(m_1) \cdot E(m_2) = E(m_1 \cdot m_2)$ because $m_1^e \cdot m_2^e = (m_1 \cdot m_2)^e \pmod n$ But how can this property be used to break ...
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1answer
37 views

Identification by RSA

Suppose we have identification scheme as such: Bob takes random $r$, and encrypts it with Alices public RSA key $(n,e)$, sends $r^e$ to Alice. Alice decrypts $r$ and sends it back to Bob, becomes ...
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1answer
125 views

Key Confirmation Attack [Key Distribution Center (KDC)]

Okay this is how I understood it according to this: Alice $A$ establishes a connection to $KDC$ and prepares for session key Exchange $k_{ses}$ $A$ encrypts the request with her key $k_A(A, B)$ ...
4
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0answers
128 views

Statistical saturation attack on block ciphers

I was wondering if anyone around here could give me some explanation on this type of attacks. Pretty much the only thing that I could find is A Statistical Saturation Attack against the Block Cipher ...
1
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1answer
94 views

RSA padding confusion attacks

Server A produces signed messages on request. You can tell server A what type of RSA padding to use in the signature (either RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5 or RSASSA-PSS). Either way, the message will be signed ...
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1answer
125 views

Fault encryption attack on RSA [duplicate]

How to recover plaintext, if we know public key(RSA), correctly encrypted text and text encrypted with faulty public key, where one bit is changed?
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3answers
351 views

When is a cipher considered broken?

We've all read how some people claim AES is broken because there was supposedly a way to get the plain text from a cipher text faster than brute-force. But is this the definition? Is a cipher broken ...
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1answer
241 views

AES as Integer Program

I read that AES can be broken by solving a Linear Integer Program (IP). From a given encrypted text, how can one construct this IP? How big is the system?
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1answer
111 views

What aspect of elliptic curve encryption paradigms makes them especially susceptible to quantum based attack algorithms?

This was a statement made during a talk at today's DFN-CERT conference but unfortunately it wasn't explained further. Can anyone shed light on why elliptic curves are susceptible to quantum based ...
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1answer
122 views

Attacking multi block MAC constructions

For variable-length messages, there are three different ways to generate the tags. $Tag = MAC_k(\Sigma_i m_i)$. $t_i = MAC_k(m_i)$ and $Tag = (t_1, ..., t_l)$. $t_i = MAC_k(i||m_i)$ ...
0
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1answer
97 views

RSA: How effective is this keypair-trash attack [duplicate]

A question that could very well be part of xkcd's "what if?": Let's say Monica made a piece of software that sends all RSA keypairs to a central database after they're not used anymore. Something ...