I've just skimmed over most of the paper "On Message Integrity in Symmetric Encryption". I've included (the last) part of the abstract below: We show that generic compositions of ...
After much deliberation, I've decided to use a normal Encrypt-then-MAC scheme instead of an authenticated encryption mode such as GCM as authenticated encryption primitive. This is due to the lack of ...
I read that the Encrypt-then-MAC paradigm is provably secure. From what I understand, when using for example AES for encryption and HMAC_SHA256 for MAC generation (and the keys $K_1 \neq K_2$), this ...
My question rather splits into two sections: Is AES correctly and security implemented in the .net Framework? Are there any reviews of implementation mistakes that would weaken the security of AES ...
Consider the following authenticate-and-encrypt scheme that uses AES-128 in CBC mode for encryption and AES-128 - based CMAC for authentication: Two keys are derived from the master key k (16 byte): ...
Since EAX is very flexible with regard to the length of the calculated MAC (what they call "tag" is the MAC value right?), and the EAX paper as well as other documentations carefully avoid suggesting ...
Does Encrypt-then-MAC provide equal confidentiality, integrity and authenticity as other constructs such as EAX? If yes, how do I go about using it? My current understanding is: E = ...
Most of the time, when some data must be encrypted, it must also be protected with a MAC, because encryption protects only against passive attackers. There are some nifty encryption modes which ...