A chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis in which the cryptanalyst gathers information, at least in part, by choosing a ciphertext and obtaining its decryption under an unknown key.

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Chosen Ciphertext Attack on the Public Key in PGP

In Secrets & Lies (2000), Schneier describes a chosen ciphertext attack on the public key under PGP: "Since RSA and ElGamal are malleable, known changes can be made to the symmetric key that ...
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Is a chosen ciphertext attack on PGP still possible?

In a paper from 2002 (pdf), Jallad et al describe a chosen ciphertext attack on PGP by taking advantage of the CFB mode that the block ciphers use under PGP. It's quite a devastating attack. Is this ...
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What is the random tape?

I am reading the paper "Toward plaintext-aware public-key encryption without random oracles" by Bellare and Palacio. So I can't understand what is the tape and random tape?
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CPA on theoretical OTP with CBC mode

Body of question Note: this is THEORETICAL exercise. I understand OTP and CBC does not get along. I have to find a CPA on CBC enc-mode using OTP as the encryption algorithm, s.t a new key is ...
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How do you prove an encryption scheme is IND-CPA or IND-CCA?

I know for proving a scheme is not IND-CPA or not IND-CCA you can construct an Adversary which has an unfair advantage in an experiment/game, but how would you prove a scheme is IND-CPA or IND-CCA?
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Proving CCA security for scheme constructed from secure PRP

We have a $PRP : \{0,1\}^{3n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{3n}$ and encryption scheme constructed from this $PRP$. $E_k(x\|r\|0^n)$, where $r$ is randomly chosen from $\{0,1\}^n$ and $0^n$ is a block of ...
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Why is padded RSA not CCA-secure?

Why is the padded RSA construction given in the picture not CCA secure?
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Are the definitions of IND-CCA secure and of IND-CCA secure under standard model identical?

Suppose there is a public key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem and let this cryptosystem be IND-CCA secure under standard model. Does this statement mean that the given ...
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What is the meaning of IND-CCA secure under standard model? [duplicate]

I notice that in many research papers (viz. "Universal hash proofs and a paradigm for adaptive chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption" by Cramer and Shoup) the authors showed that their ...
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Stripping off message authentication or signature

If attackers can strip off RSA / EC / -DSA digital signature and conduct CCA on AES-CTR or CBC payload, why can't they do the same for AES-GCM?
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Easy explanation of “IND-” security notions?

There are many schemes that can advertise themselves with certain security notions, usually IND-CPA or IND-CCA2, for example plain ElGamal has IND-CPA security but doesn't provide IND-CCA security. ...
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Does length prepending fix the key reuse problems with CBC and CBC-MAC?

As I hope everybody is well-aware, re-using the key for CBC-MAC and CBC is a really bad idea. Now, there's also the paradigm to prepend the message length to the CBC-MAC (as "associated data") to ...
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CCA on PKCS#5 using error feedback

My question is about attacking PKCS#5 with CCA using the error feedback. What we learnt in class about PKCS#5: CBC requires padding to whole block boundary PKCS#5: standard padding If ...
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Breaking One Time Pad with CCA

I was taught that: although OTP is CPA secure, it is not the case with CCA. I'm trying to figure how to break OTP with CCA by showing how it fails the IND test. ...
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Using same encryption key in different schemes

Is it safe to encrypt possibly same plaintexts with 2 different algorithms using same secret encryption key? This question is similar to this question except they use 2 keys. More formally: $E_k(m) = ...
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Given a linear block-cipher,how can an attacker decrypt any plaintext value encrypted,using 128 chosen ciphertexts

Given the linear block cipher $\operatorname{LinearCipher}(k, p) = c$ $$\operatorname{LinearCipher}(k, p_1 \oplus p_2) = \operatorname{LinearCipher}(k, p_1) \oplus \operatorname{LinearCipher}(k, ...
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LR-Oracle Experiment in Lindell and Katz

In reference to the LR-Oracle experiment in “Introduction to Modern Cryptography” (2nd edition) by Lindell & Katz, Definition 3.23 states a scheme $\pi = (Gen,Enc_K,Dec_K)$ is CPA secure for ...
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Why Boneh-Franklin BasicIdent IBE is not chosen-ciphertext secure? Why use random oracle?

I don't know why BasicIdent is not chosen-ciphertext secure. If there are anybody who knows well, please explain it to me with example. Moreover, I don't know random oracle and its usage for security ...
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What is the difference between RCCA and CCA2?

Well, I know it's easy to tell CCA1 from CCA2, but I failed to find the difference between RCCA and CCA2. What is the difference?
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What do you mean by Ciphertext indistinguishability [duplicate]

Wiki definition : A cryptosystem is considered secure in terms of indistinguishability if no adversary, given an encryption of a message randomly chosen from a two-element message space ...
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How do I prove that a bit by bit PKE scheme (that is IND-CPA secure) for an n-bit message is not IND-CCA-2 secure?

Gen generates Pk and Sk (l bits each), Enc encrypts m (length l) but by bit using each bit of Pk respectively, Dec decrypts ciphertext bit by bit using each bit of Sk respectively. How do I prove this ...
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Confused about how chosen ciphertext attacks work?

When performing a CCA, the adversary gets the public key. At some point, he will send a message m to the challenger, and the challenger will send back either $E_{pk}(m)$ or $E_{pk}(r)$, where r is ...
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Cracking a hash which descends to a single value after repeated hashes

Assume I have a hash function (such as the one below) and a cipher, and I know that if I repeatedly hash any string over and over again, it will eventually descend to one unique value. Is there any ...
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Creating own ciphertext after a padding oracle attack?

I've written a script that breaks a cipher text based on a padding oracle for an assignment, but was wondering how I would continue on to create my own cipher text with any plain text I desired? ...
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How can a Encrypt-And-MAC scheme be insecure if the encryption is CCA secure?

I was presented with this seemingly paradoxical information, and am hoping someone can explain what I'm missing here. I have an encrypt-and-mac scheme here.If I want to transmit message m to Bob, I'd ...
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hybrid PKE scheme CCA2 insecurity

I'm reading "An Efficient CCA2-Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem in the standard model" by Rastaghi which states: As we know, in hybrid PKE schemes XOR alone cannot perfectly hide ...
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Fixed-points in block ciphers; why don't they indicate a vulnerability?

I've seen a few questions here on fixed-points in ciphers, most asking about the possibility and existence. Most of the answers however pointed out that fixed points are not exactly a security threat. ...
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Chosen plain text and chosen ciphertext definitions clarification

I am trying to understand a concept of CPA and CCA attack and I cannot get one thing from the definition. If an attacker can execute a CPA attack for something like Send 100 dollars to attacker that ...
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Can RSA be securely used for “blind decryption”?

Assume we have the following setup: A client with trusted storage and computing capabilities (e.g. a smartcard) A server with trusted computing and short-term storage capabilities (e.g. RAM + CPU, ...
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Is there a partially homomorphic quantum secure public key cryptosystem with IND-CCA1 security?

I recentely asked "IND-CCA1 RSA padding?" about whether there is a IND-CCA1 secure variant of RSA. The original version of the question also allowed usage of ECC which would allow usage of ElGamal, ...
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IND-CCA1 RSA padding?

I've found a way to complete a task which I'd solve with passwords or by sending keys over the wire (otherwise) by using RSA's homomorphic property. I'm restricted to RSA (any padding; for hardware ...
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Is constructing IND-CCA2 public key encryption schemes particularly easy with the KEM/DEM approach?

After the introduction of McBits, I was interested what security notions are neccessary for IND-CCA2 security of integrated encryption schemes (IES, following the key encapsulation mechanism / data ...
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What are the practical implications of ciphertext distinguishability?

Commonly there are four ways to "break" a secrecy-focused cryptosystem: Recover the secret key Recover the message Distinguish an encryption from random noise Distinguish the encryption of two ...
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Can you explain Bleichenbacher's CCA attack on PKCS#1 v1.5?

I've studied that the Bleichenbacher's CCA attack on PKCS#1 v1.5. is a base to many versions of attacks in the area. I'm trying to understand that attack, but every explanation I saw starts with the ...
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Secure ElGamal with OAEP

Is it possible to make ElGamal IND-CCA2 using OAEP or OAEP+? (OAEP+ from: "OAEP Reconsiderd" by Shoup) The reason I ask is that I recently answered this question and it came to my mind that OAEP or ...
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IES: What security has the asymmetric primitive to provide?

I think most of us know the notion Shoup introduced of KEM/DEM (Key encryption material / data encryption material) which is used for example by the (famous) ECIES, where the key is the hash of some ...
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Is ElGamal IND-CCA1?

We all know that textbook ElGamal falls due to chosen ciphertext attacks, because of its multiplicative homomorphic property ($E(A)*E(B)=E(AB)$). However these attacks require the ciphertext ($E(A)$ ...
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ElGamal against chosen ciphertext attacks

In Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman's book An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography, the authors make the following remark: An attack in which Eve has access to an oracle that decrypts ...
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Can a homomorphic encryption scheme be made CCA2 Secure?

Is it possible to modify a homomorphic encryption scheme so that it can be CCA2 secure? From the definition of a homomorphic scheme, it seems that it is malleable, which would result in lack of CCA2 ...
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Secret key and Decryption oracle in the revised Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation

Recently, Fujisaki and Okamoto provided a revised version of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [1], a generic transformation for achieving IND-CCA2 security in the Random Oracle model. This new ...
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How to make PKCS conformation oracle for trying Bleichenbacher’s RSA attack?

I was trying to understand Bleichenbacher’s CCA attack and thought of work it out in python. Can some one throw some light on the the logic behind the oracle used to check PKCS conformation? Will a ...
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How does cryptanalysis of the Playfair cipher work?

I have a set of Playfair-enciphered data that I'm trying to crack without the key. I know I need to analyse bigrams; I've currently worked out what decrypts to th, ...
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What is the right notion of security to use for file encryption?

It seems that several file encryption systems do NOT use authenticated encryption. (E.g. gpg --symmetric and boxcryptor as far as I can determine). I understand that this is generally considered ...
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Does failure of indistinguishability of encryptions imply lack of CPA-security?

Suppose we have an encryption scheme that fails the indistinguishability of encryptions test. That is, given messages $m_0, m_1$ and a ciphertext $c_b = Enc_k(m_b)$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$, the ...
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CCA secure or not?

Let $F : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n $ be a PRF. And let the encryption function be $Enc{_k}(m) = r || (F{_k}(m) \bigoplus r \bigoplus 0^n)$ , where r's value is random. Is this ...
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CCA-attack is possible in RSA, but how the decryption key $d$ is known to anyone

CCA-attack is possible in text-book RSA, but how the decryption key $d$ is known to anyone, as it is kept secret with receiver.
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Definition of ciphertext security

If I got it right, chosen ciphertext security implies also CPA security. In other words, attacker can submit plaintexts to the challenger (along with ciphertexts). I do not understand why ...
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Definition of the Decryption oracle

In the context of public-key encryption, what would be a formal definition of the decryption oracle? I know the informal definition (i.e., a function that is available to the adversary and that ...
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Chosen plaintext vs Chosen ciphertext

What is the difference between chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attack? In both of these adversary has access to paintext-ciphertext pairs.Then where lies the difference?
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Secure double encryption using CPA and CCA

Do you mind if you give me any hints, links or ideas about how to improve the security of double regular encryption and decryption, by using CPA game and CCA game, it sounds interesting question, and ...