A chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis in which the cryptanalyst gathers information, at least in part, by choosing a ciphertext and obtaining its decryption under an unknown key.

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Is the CBC weakness in XML Encryption a new discovery? Are other applications vulnerable?

The RUB in Germany reports that XML encryption is broken. This is essentially the W3C standard for protecting XML documents from prying eyes. Does this mean that an attacker can only see a single ...
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How does a chosen ciphertext attack work, with a simple example?

Can someone please explain - using a simple example - how a chosen ciphertext attack works?
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Can you explain Bleichenbacher's CCA attack on PKCS#1 v1.5?

I've studied that the Bleichenbacher's CCA attack on PKCS#1 v1.5. is a base to many versions of attacks in the area. I'm trying to understand that attack, but every explanation I saw starts with the ...
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How does a padding oracle attack work?

I am unsure of how a padding oracle attack works. What I am not getting is how changing one bit at one time allows one to exploit(get keys) ASP.NET machines. Can anyone explain this?
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Can RSA be securely used for “blind decryption”?

Assume we have the following setup: A client with trusted storage and computing capabilities (e.g. a smartcard) A server with trusted computing and short-term storage capabilities (e.g. RAM + CPU, ...
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552 views

AES-CTR mode and the Biclique Attack

The biclique attacks that break AES (Biclique Cryptanalysis of the full AES) appear to require decryption oracles to work, presumably because the key schedule of AES is weaker in the decryption ...
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414 views

Easy explanation of “IND-” security notions?

There are many schemes that can advertise themselves with certain security notions, usually IND-CPA or IND-CCA2, for example plain ElGamal has IND-CPA security but doesn't provide IND-CCA security. ...
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The REACT transform and Replayable CCA

Before stating my questions, let us recall the REACT transform [OP01], which enables to construct a CCA-secure hybrid PKE scheme, $\varepsilon'_{pk}$, from an OW-CPA PKE scheme ...
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Secret key and Decryption oracle in the revised Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation

Recently, Fujisaki and Okamoto provided a revised version of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [1], a generic transformation for achieving IND-CCA2 security in the Random Oracle model. This new ...
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The difference between these 4 breaking Cipher techniques?

I'm trying to understand the difference between the following and what they actually mean : Known plaintext attack Known ciphertext attack Chosen ciphertext attack Chosen plaintext attack Any ...
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What is the difference between RCCA and CCA2?

Well, I know it's easy to tell CCA1 from CCA2, but I failed to find the difference between RCCA and CCA2. What is the difference?
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How does cryptanalysis of the Playfair cipher work?

I have a set of Playfair-enciphered data that I'm trying to crack without the key. I know I need to analyse bigrams; I've currently worked out what decrypts to th, ...
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361 views

Why do we encrypt-then mac but sign-then-encrypt?

This question was asked in comments on my answer to should we sign then encrypt or encrypt then sign. I think posing the question as a separate entity is best, so: The general advice for applying ...
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What are the practical implications of ciphertext distinguishability?

Commonly there are four ways to "break" a secrecy-focused cryptosystem: Recover the secret key Recover the message Distinguish an encryption from random noise Distinguish the encryption of two ...
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Common modulus attack on RSA when the 2 public exponents differ by a single bit

This is an exam question an i have no idea how to recover the message m. John wants to send an encrypted message to mary who has a pair of RSA keys, However, John does not know Mary's public key and ...
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452 views

Can a homomorphic encryption scheme be made CCA2 Secure?

Is it possible to modify a homomorphic encryption scheme so that it can be CCA2 secure? From the definition of a homomorphic scheme, it seems that it is malleable, which would result in lack of CCA2 ...
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Why isn't the IND-CCA property inherited when sending redundant ciphertext?

Suppose that in order to avoid loss in transmission, a secret key encryption scheme $(Gen, Enc, Dec)$ is modified to be $(Gen, Enc', Dec')$, such that the message m is encrypted independently ...
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AES-CTR vulnerability to cryptographic oracle

I am new to cryptographic issues and from what I googled so far I could not retrieve the information I need. Consider the use of AES-128 in CTR mode. Let M be the set of possible plaintexts, for ...
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ElGamal against chosen ciphertext attacks

In Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman's book An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography, the authors make the following remark: An attack in which Eve has access to an oracle that decrypts ...
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Chosen plain text and chosen ciphertext definitions clarification

I am trying to understand a concept of CPA and CCA attack and I cannot get one thing from the definition. If an attacker can execute a CPA attack for something like Send 100 dollars to attacker that ...
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Is there a partially homomorphic quantum secure public key cryptosystem with IND-CCA1 security?

I recentely asked "IND-CCA1 RSA padding?" about whether there is a IND-CCA1 secure variant of RSA. The original version of the question also allowed usage of ECC which would allow usage of ElGamal, ...
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Creating own ciphertext after a padding oracle attack?

I've written a script that breaks a cipher text based on a padding oracle for an assignment, but was wondering how I would continue on to create my own cipher text with any plain text I desired? ...
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Does Linear Cramer-Shoup have pseudo-random ciphertexts?

"Linear Cramer-Shoup" is defined on pages 4 and 5 of $\:$ eprint.iacr.org/2007/074.pdf . Are the ciphertexts in Linear Cramer-Shoup computationally indistinguishable from uniform under a ...
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Can you help with that definition for a CCA?

The following is a definition taken from Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Katz and Lindell. I'm having a hard time understanding some basic concepts! Can you please help me? ...
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Chosen plaintext attack on textbook RSA decryption

Let $(n,d)$ be an RSA private key and $(n,e)$ the corresponding public key. Generate a secret random $r$ from $(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*$ Compute $C’ = C (r^e) \bmod n$ Submit $C’$ as a chosen ...
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Security proof of FO(Fujisaki-Okamoto) hybrid encryption

The proof of FO hybrid encryption is hard to understand. $\:$ Especially, how does the challenger respond to the decryption queries when the challenger can only have some encryption queries? Can ...
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Secure ElGamal with OAEP

Is it possible to make ElGamal IND-CCA2 using OAEP or OAEP+? (OAEP+ from: "OAEP Reconsiderd" by Shoup) The reason I ask is that I recently answered this question and it came to my mind that OAEP or ...
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Does CCA security imply authenticated encryption?

Does CCA security imply authenticated encryption?
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Security model for privacy-preserving aggregation scheme.

Suppose that $S=(E,D)$ is an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Now I want to design a protocol $P$ such that given inputs $x_1,x_2,..,x_n$, the adversary $A$ (who can decrypt) can only learn ...
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Cracking a hash which descends to a single value after repeated hashes

Assume I have a hash function (such as the one below) and a cipher, and I know that if I repeatedly hash any string over and over again, it will eventually descend to one unique value. Is there any ...
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Fixed-points in block ciphers; why don't they indicate a vulnerability?

I've seen a few questions here on fixed-points in ciphers, most asking about the possibility and existence. Most of the answers however pointed out that fixed points are not exactly a security threat. ...
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Chosen plaintext vs Chosen ciphertext

What is the difference between chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attack? In both of these adversary has access to paintext-ciphertext pairs.Then where lies the difference?
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RSA Blind Signature Attack

In Information Security Class I learned a non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack using "blinding" but I just can't follow the proof and therefore can't reconstruct it. From what I've found out, it ...
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How can a Encrypt-And-MAC scheme be insecure if the encryption is CCA secure?

I was presented with this seemingly paradoxical information, and am hoping someone can explain what I'm missing here. I have an encrypt-and-mac scheme here.If I want to transmit message m to Bob, I'd ...
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How to make PKCS conformation oracle for trying Bleichenbacher’s RSA attack?

I was trying to understand Bleichenbacher’s CCA attack and thought of work it out in python. Can some one throw some light on the the logic behind the oracle used to check PKCS conformation? Will a ...
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Definition of the Decryption oracle

In the context of public-key encryption, what would be a formal definition of the decryption oracle? I know the informal definition (i.e., a function that is available to the adversary and that ...
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What is a Message Transmission Scheme?

I've been given as an exercise to show an encryption scheme that is CCA-secure but is not a secure message transmission scheme. What is a message transmission scheme, and how does it differ from a ...
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Given a linear block-cipher,how can an attacker decrypt any plaintext value encrypted,using 128 chosen ciphertexts

Given the linear block cipher $LinearCipher(k, p) = c$ $$LinearCipher(k, p_1 \oplus p_2) = LinearCipher(k, p_1) \oplus LinearCipher(k, p_2)$$ where $k$ and $p$ are 128-bits. If an attacker uses a ...
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What is the right notion of security to use for file encryption?

It seems that several file encryption systems do NOT use authenticated encryption. (E.g. gpg --symmetric and boxcryptor as far as I can determine). I understand that this is generally considered ...
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Chosen Ciphertext Attack with a theoretical decryption machine

Say we have an encryption algorithm that encrypts data blocks of 128 bits size, and makes them cipher blocks $C = E(P)$ without chaining. Also assume there is a linearity rule for XOR: For every pair ...
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LR-Oracle Experiment in Lindell and Katz

In reference to the LR-Oracle experiment in “Introduction to Modern Cryptography” (2nd edition) by Lindell & Katz, Definition 3.23 states a scheme $\pi = (Gen,Enc_K,Dec_K)$ is CPA secure for ...
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IND-CCA1 RSA padding?

I've found a way to complete a task which I'd solve with passwords or by sending keys over the wire (otherwise) by using RSA's homomorphic property. I'm restricted to RSA (any padding; for hardware ...
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1answer
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Is ElGamal IND-CCA1?

We all know that textbook ElGamal falls due to chosen ciphertext attacks, because of its multiplicative homomorphic property ($E(A)*E(B)=E(AB)$). However these attacks require the ciphertext ($E(A)$ ...
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Do Chosen-Chiphertext attacks only apply to public-key cryptosystems?

Do Chosen-Chiphertext attacks (CCA-1/2) only apply to public-key Cryptosystem?
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Confused about how chosen ciphertext attacks work?

When performing a CCA, the adversary gets the public key. At some point, he will send a message m to the challenger, and the challenger will send back either $E_{pk}(m)$ or $E_{pk}(r)$, where r is ...
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Security of CFB on a public channel

Given a server that broadcasts all received data to all connected peers (except the sender), two participants can have an encrypted conversation using a self-synchronizing method like CFB and some ...
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Does failure of indistinguishability of encryptions imply lack of CPA-security?

Suppose we have an encryption scheme that fails the indistinguishability of encryptions test. That is, given messages $m_0, m_1$ and a ciphertext $c_b = Enc_k(m_b)$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$, the ...
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Secure double encryption using CPA and CCA

Do you mind if you give me any hints, links or ideas about how to improve the security of double regular encryption and decryption, by using CPA game and CCA game, it sounds interesting question, and ...
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hybrid PKE scheme CCA2 insecurity

I'm reading "An Efficient CCA2-Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem in the standard model" by Rastaghi which states: As we know, in hybrid PKE schemes XOR alone cannot perfectly hide ...
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Comparing plaintext to contents of ciphertext

Given an authenticated mode of encryption, when comparing a plaintext string against the contents of a ciphertext, which approach is typically considered safer? Encrypt the plaintext and compare ...