The attacker can specify his own plain text and encrypt or sign it.

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26 views

CPA-security of a pseudorandom permutation encryption scheme

Let $F$ be a pseudorandom permutation, and define a fixed-length encryption scheme $(Gen, Enc, Dec)$ as follows: on input $m \in$ $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$, algorithm Enc ...
3
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0answers
24 views

Proving existence of an encryption scheme that has indistinghuishable multiple encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, but is not CPA-secure [duplicate]

I got stuck in trying to find a solution to the 3.7 exercise of the Katz-Lindell book. The exercise also assumes the existence of a pseudorandom function. The problem is that a multiple messages ...
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0answers
24 views

Improve security of transposition ciphers

As we know, breaking a Transposition Cipher is quite trivial and can be easily done by either exploiting single letter frequencies (not $d$-gram frequencies though, given that $2 < d < L$), or ...
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0answers
20 views

IES: What security has the asymmetric primitive to provide?

I think most of us know the notion Shoup introduced of KEM/DEM (Key encryption material / data encryption material) which is used for example by the (famous) ECIES, where the key is the hash of some ...
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2answers
90 views

Are all stream-ciphers IND-CPA?

A stream cipher usually generates a stream of pseudo-random bits which get XORed with the plaintext to form the ciphertext. The stream is generated using a given IV / nonce and a secret key. CTR-mode ...
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1answer
722 views

If RSA is only used to encrypt symmetric keys which are random, what's wrong with textbook RSA?

IND-CPA is used to protect against frequency analysis AFAICT. But if RSA is only used to encrypt symmetric keys (AFAICT) then what's wrong with using only textbook RSA because random keys are very ...
2
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1answer
121 views

Easy explanation of “IND-” security notions?

There are many schemes that can advertise themselves with certain security notions, usually IND-CPA or IND-CCA2, for example plain ElGamal has IND-CPA security but doesn't provide IND-CCA security. ...
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1answer
40 views

Determine if encryption is safe against CPA

The following encryption scheme encrypts each block of length $n$ of the plaintext separately: $c_i = k_1 \oplus F(k_2 \oplus p_i)$ Where $F$ is a strong pseudo-random permutation (i.e. it is easy ...
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4answers
85 views

One time pad in CBC mode?

I have been searching about if it is more secure to use CBC mode in OTP but I can't find anywhere where people have sad that it is more secure. Question: Is CBC mode in OTP more secure? Because I ...
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1answer
152 views

Building a combined encryption scheme from two encryption schemes that's secure if at least on of them is secure

Any thoughts on how this can be done? Let $\Pi_1 = (\mathrm{Gen}_1, \mathrm{Enc}_1, \mathrm{Dec}_1)$ and $\Pi_2 = (\mathrm{Gen}_2, \mathrm{Enc}_2, \mathrm{Dec}_2)$ be two encryption schemes for ...
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1answer
32 views

Does failure of indistinguishability of encryptions imply lack of CPA-security?

Suppose we have an encryption scheme that fails the indistinguishability of encryptions test. That is, given messages $m_0, m_1$ and a ciphertext $c_b = Enc_k(m_b)$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$, the ...
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1answer
46 views

On composition of encryption schemes

If we composed (as in function composition) multiple CPA-secure encryption schemes would the result also be CPA-secure?
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1answer
58 views

Chosen-plaintext attack

Let F be a block cipher with 128-bit block length. Consider the following encryption scheme for 256-bit messages: to encrypt message $M=m_1∥m_2$ using key $k$ (where $|m_1|=|m_2|=128$), choose random ...
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2answers
143 views

Is One Time Pad considered Chosen-Plaintext Attack Secure?

If we're considering Chosen-Plaintext Attack setting, then the adversary has access to the Encryption Oracle right, and we know that OTP is only considered secure if we use the key only once. How ...
2
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1answer
80 views

Is MCrypt's 8-bit OFB mode secure?

I just stumbled across a Stack Overflow post which points out that the libmcrypt library (notably used in PHP) implements a somewhat unusual set of block cipher modes: it calls the usual CFB and OFB ...
0
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1answer
78 views

What is the difference between chosen-plaintext attack and adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack?

I've just dived in cryptography and would like to learn basics of this science. Currently I can't understand the difference between these two types of attacks. As I understood from Bruce Schneier's ...
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0answers
42 views

Recover keys using statistical saturation attack

I am having trouble here performing this attack on a block cipher. This is my block cipher, it is a toy with really bad diffusion just for the sake of performing a successful attack ...
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2answers
154 views

Is the reduction from left-or-right IND-CPA to real-or-random IND-CPA tight?

A modern trend in cryptography consists of defining security as rigorously as possible, and then designing schemes which are secure according to those definitions. Proving security comes in the form ...
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1answer
89 views

Counter Mode (CTR) and mult-CPA

I am not sure if Counter Mode (CTR) encryption is mult-CPA (chosen-plaintext attack) secure or not.
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1answer
97 views

CPA security of a stateless and deterministic encryption system

Why can no stateless and deterministic encryption system be IND-CPA secure? Is there a formal proof for it?
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1answer
96 views

Definition of ciphertext security

If I got it right, chosen ciphertext security implies also CPA security. In other words, attacker can submit plaintexts to the challenger (along with ciphertexts). I do not understand why ...
0
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1answer
80 views

Proving that an encryption scheme is susceptible to certain attacks

I'm currently trying to prove the following: Where p is a prime number of cryptographic size, prove that: e(m) = am + b (mod p) where a and b are private is open to a known plaintext attack e(m) = ...
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2answers
141 views

How does RSA padding work exactly?

I've read everywhere online and people say plain text RSA is very unsafe. To make it safe you pad it but no examples are shown anywhere on how to do it. It's explained that random data is added to the ...
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1answer
115 views

Luby-Rackoff on Feistel ciphers [closed]

On page 46 of these lecture notes, it seems to say that if we have a Feistel cipher, and plaintexts $(L_0, R_0)$ and $(L_0^*, R_0^*)$ with corresponding encryptions, then we can determine the key? But ...
2
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2answers
578 views

Chosen plaintext vs Chosen ciphertext

What is the difference between chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attack? In both of these adversary has access to paintext-ciphertext pairs.Then where lies the difference?
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1answer
99 views

How does chosen ciphertext attack on Elgamal work?

Can it be proven that attacker can obtain the full message if he knows some plain-ciphertext pairs?
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1answer
272 views

Attacking a hardware AES implementation if it leaks the intermediate round states

Let's say that we have a hardware AES implementation that, on request, will encrypt or decrypt a 16-byte block of data in ECB mode using a fixed key, but refuses to reveal its fixed key. In other ...
2
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1answer
632 views

Ciphertext indistinguishability (IND-CPA) for symmetric cryptography

My understanding are these steps are necessary for symmetric cryptography to be IND-CPA: The adversary submits two distinct $M_0$, $M_1$ plain-texts to the challenger. The challenger selects one of ...
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1answer
167 views

Encrypting the same message using different schemes

$E_1$ and $E_2$ are IND-CPA secure encryption schemes. $E$ is defined as: $k_1,k_2 \leftarrow K_1 \times K_2$ . $E_{k_1,k_2}(m) \leftarrow E_{1,k_1}(m)||E_{2,k_2}(m)$. Hope the notations are in an ...
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1answer
166 views

What is difference among eavesdropper attack, multiple message attack and CPA attack?

What is/are difference(s) among eavesdropper attack, multiple message attack and CPA attack in context of symmetric key encryption? I only know that in eavesdropper attack there is an adversary ...
1
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1answer
120 views

IND-CPA Security

Given a key $K$ (the key is fixed) and a nonce $N$ (changes from one message to another) Using a secure Key derivation function (KDF) such as the ANSI-X9.63-KDF with SHA-1 option to derive a key for ...
7
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1answer
349 views

Importance of block size in CBC mode

Why is it necessary to use a sufficiently long block size when implementing a CBC block cipher with a truly random initialization vector? In ECB mode it's easy to get information about the message if ...
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1answer
2k views

The difference between these 4 breaking Cipher techniques?

I'm trying to understand the difference between the following and what they actually mean : Known plaintext attack Known ciphertext attack Chosen ciphertext attack Chosen plaintext attack Any ...
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3answers
2k views

In what way is XXTEA really vulnerable?

I'm looking at using the XXTEA algorithm to encrypt a small amount of data (say, less than 32KB) in the context of a software licensing algorithm. That is, we wish to make it difficult (not ...
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1answer
71 views

function of crypt called “ICE” [closed]

Using exeinfo, I have identified a function of crypt called ICE. What is it? How can I find ...
3
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1answer
440 views

ECB weakness and its exploitation

Lets say that I have a server which encrypts information at the server side using ECB mode with the blocksize of 16. If the server appends data that I control with a secret and sends back the ...
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1answer
99 views

Why are security against eavesdropping and security against CPA equivalent in the setting of public-key cryptography?

Why are security against eavesdropping and security against CPA equivalent in the setting of public-key cryptography?
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1answer
528 views

Is CBC mode encryption vulnerable to a reordering attack?

I know that, if CBC-MAC is used in such a way that the tag is the concatenation of all the blocks' outputs (and not just the last one), it's insecure under CPA for the simplest case of 2 blocks ...
2
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1answer
358 views

How can an encryption scheme be indistinguishable with multiple messages but vulnerable to an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack?

In order to be indistinguishable with respect to multiple messages, wouldn't the scheme need to be nondeterministic? How would this then possibly be vulnerable to an adaptive CPA?
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1answer
394 views

AES-CTR mode and the Biclique Attack

The biclique attacks that break AES (Biclique Cryptanalysis of the full AES) appear to require decryption oracles to work, presumably because the key schedule of AES is weaker in the decryption ...
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1answer
318 views

Definition of cryptographic advantage vs. probability of success

In game-based security definitions, like for example the one defining IND-CPA security, a given cryptosystem is said to be secure if any probabilistic polynomial time adversary has only a negligible ...
3
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1answer
159 views

Is this really the correct way to do an IND-CPA test?

In a description of IND-CPA (indistinguishability under the chosen plaintext attack), I have been reading the following, simple test: The adversary can generate as many messages as he wants. Then, ...
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1answer
367 views

Is my understanding of CPA indistinguishability experiment correct?

Following are steps to conduct Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) indistinguishibility experiment $PrivK_\mathcal{A,E}^{eav}(n)$. $\mathcal{A}$ is the adversary $\mathcal{E}$ is the encryption scheme ...
4
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1answer
607 views

Why is asymmetric encryption IND-CPA?

According to Wikipedia, the IND-CPA game is: The challenger generates a key pair PK, SK based on some security parameter k (e.g., a key size in bits), and publishes PK to the adversary. The ...
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2answers
161 views

The security of the AES secret itself

I am writing an application, running on a server, where multiple users access data from a database which is AES encrypted with a master secret. The master secret itself is initially randomly ...
3
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1answer
502 views

How much data can I encrypt with AES before I need to change the key in CBC mode?

In my cryptography class, the instructor suggested that in order to give the attacker a minimal advantage of $1/2^{32}$, we have to change the key after $2^{48}$ blocks are encrypted. It seems that ...
5
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1answer
460 views

Proof that padded RSA is CPA-secure

I'm referring to page 383 of J. Katz and Y. Lindell's Introduction to Modern Cryptography. The book presents a padded RSA: ${\bf Key Generation:}$ same as Textbook RSA (given security parameter ...
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1answer
83 views

Adversary Two Stages

I am read this paragraph and I have a doubt. "An adversary to PKC $\Pi$ is given by two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, $A = (A1; A2)$. In the first stage, the "find" stage, the ...
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2answers
478 views

Chosen Plaintext Attacks against an Affine Cipher

Assuming the ability to launch Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA), how many oracle calls an attacker needs to break the affine cipher? and how
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2answers
1k views

Which categories of cipher are semantically secure under a chosen-plaintext attack?

I am trying to get my head around the circumstances under which a cipher is (or is not) semantically secure under a chosen-plaintext attack. I can't seem to find a good reference explaining this. I ...