The attacker can specify his own plain text and encrypt or sign it.

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2
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2answers
529 views

Using bcrypt for MAC - is it correct and secure?

Suppose there is a hashing function: $$ph = bcrypt(sha256(m + k), salt)$$ Here $ph$ is a password hash obtaining by applying $bcrypt$ on $sha256$ result of concatenating a message $m$ with a secret ...
1
vote
1answer
433 views

What is the random tape?

I am reading the paper "Toward plaintext-aware public-key encryption without random oracles" by Bellare and Palacio. So I can't understand what is the tape and random tape?
2
votes
0answers
24 views

Proving CCA security for scheme constructed from secure PRP

We have a $PRP : \{0,1\}^{3n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{3n}$ and encryption scheme constructed from this $PRP$. $E_k(x\|r\|0^n)$, where $r$ is randomly chosen from $\{0,1\}^n$ and $0^n$ is a block of ...
2
votes
1answer
45 views

How do you prove an encryption scheme is IND-CPA or IND-CCA?

I know for proving a scheme is not IND-CPA or not IND-CCA you can construct an Adversary which has an unfair advantage in an experiment/game, but how would you prove a scheme is IND-CPA or IND-CCA?
1
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2answers
149 views

How to crack unknown 8-bit encryption algorithm?

Can anyone tell me how to crack the encryption of 8 bit algorithm, when you have some clue that CBC mode is used, but the algorithm is secret. You also have some encrypted data (chosen plain text), ...
1
vote
1answer
52 views

Differences between OWP and OWF and their IND-CPA security

I am learning about one way permutations and one way functions and am not sure of the differences if there are any. Also in the random oracle model are they both IND-CPA secure?
3
votes
1answer
48 views

Is there any IND-CPA secure stream cipher with a “standard” hardness assumption?

I've read our recent question: "One-time pad using RSA and Diffie-Hellman functions" which asks about the security of a particular way to convert RSA and discrete exponentiation into a stream cipher. ...
0
votes
1answer
69 views

Breaking One Time Pad with CCA

I was taught that: although OTP is CPA secure, it is not the case with CCA. I'm trying to figure how to break OTP with CCA by showing how it fails the IND test. ...
3
votes
1answer
195 views

How to perform decryption in this single-bit PKE scheme?

Consider a cyclic group $G$ of order $q$, and let $g$ be a generator for $G$. Assume $(G, q, g)$ is public. Consider the following 1-bit public-key encryption scheme. To $generate (pk,sk)$: $x ...
1
vote
1answer
56 views

Are the following schemes based on a pseudo-random permutation secure?

I am currently working on the following task: Let F be a pseudorandom permutation. Consider the encryption scheme for the message space $\{0, 1\}^n$ defined as follows: $Gen(1^n)$ chooses ...
1
vote
2answers
58 views

Using same encryption key in different schemes

Is it safe to encrypt possibly same plaintexts with 2 different algorithms using same secret encryption key? This question is similar to this question except they use 2 keys. More formally: $E_k(m) = ...
2
votes
0answers
50 views

Prove that the given scheme is CPA secure or not

Given: F is a length preserving PRP. Encryption scheme $\Pi$ for messages of n/2 bits where: $m\in\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ $k\in\{0,1\}^n$ Enc: Select a random string $r\in\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and output ...
4
votes
1answer
49 views

How is McEliece chosen plaintext secure?

Suppose a challenger creates a McEliece encryption system where there is a public key consisting of a matrix $G$ representing some linear code, and a number $t$ for the number of errors. Then the ...
1
vote
1answer
40 views

How to test an encryption against different attacks [closed]

For the last while I have been reading up on cryptography and the different kinds of methods for encryption (public key, blocks, etc) and the attacks against them. This got me wondering how to ...
0
votes
1answer
86 views

Difference left-or-right CPA security, IND-CPA security

I am trying to understand the notion of left-or-right-CPA (LOR-CPA) security for private-key encryption schemes introduced in my lecture. If I understood it correctly so far, the only difference to ...
3
votes
0answers
65 views

LR-Oracle Experiment in Lindell and Katz

In reference to the LR-Oracle experiment in “Introduction to Modern Cryptography” (2nd edition) by Lindell & Katz, Definition 3.23 states a scheme $\pi = (Gen,Enc_K,Dec_K)$ is CPA secure for ...
3
votes
1answer
66 views

Affine cipher and plaintext attacks, how to find the base modulo?

Last year, a question concerning plaintext attacks was posted at Mathematics.SE: “Plaintext attacks: affine cipher”. I have no problem to see how to solve it when we are given two ciphertexts and ...
2
votes
0answers
42 views

Recover secret $x$ when $c\equiv m^x \pmod p$ with public $p$ (modified)

Given an encryption system where $c\equiv m^x \pmod p$, $p$ is a known prime, 1. Is it possible to recover $x$ with a known plaintext attack? Given $(p,\text{factorization of }\varphi(p),m,c)$ 2. Is ...
3
votes
0answers
31 views

Is EFS vulnerable to Chosen plaintext attack?

I have some backed up files encrypted with EFS and I lost the EFS certificate thus unable to decrypt the files. I understand that EFS uses the user certificate public key to encrypt the symmetric key ...
3
votes
1answer
251 views

Construct IND-CPA secure encryption scheme by combining two given schemes

I have two encryption schemes $\Pi_0, \Pi_1$, at least one of them is IND-CPA secure but I don't know which one. The task is to construct a scheme $\Pi$ that is guaranteed to be CPA secure and to ...
2
votes
2answers
175 views

Given a pseudorandom function F, is $(F_k(r) \; | \; F_k(r + 1))$ also a PRF?

Given: F is a pseudorandom function, G is a pseudorandom generator with $l(n) = n+1$. The following schemes should be classified as being insecure, IND-COA secure, IND-CPA secure. To encrypt $m \in ...
1
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0answers
32 views

What do you mean by Ciphertext indistinguishability [duplicate]

Wiki definition : A cryptosystem is considered secure in terms of indistinguishability if no adversary, given an encryption of a message randomly chosen from a two-element message space ...
5
votes
1answer
54 views

How to show CPA attacker does not need access to encryption oracle after receiving cyphertext

In the private key CPA game, the attacker has access to an encryption oracle anytime during the attack. However, I have seen this statement in lecture notes I downloaded "You can prove that for ...
3
votes
2answers
110 views

Are parts of a pseudorandom string also a pseudorandom string?

I am working on an exercise that encrypts a message using only the first $n$ bits of a pseudorandom generator's output $G(k)$, i.e. $F_k(m) := G(k)_{0...n−1} \oplus m$. $k$ is chosen uniformly at ...
2
votes
0answers
66 views

MITM Attack on Key Exchange Protocols

I was doing research on this attack and I am wondering, why is Diffie-Hellman always associated with such an attack? ​ Aren't other public key cryptography schemes vulnerable to the same kind of ...
1
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1answer
42 views

Probabilistic RSA, IND CPA

Suppose we have classic RSA scheme. Let $n=pq$, $e$ public, $d$ secret. Then message(M), not empty(not 0), is encrypted by choosing random $r$ and computing $A=(r^e)^e$ and $B=(Mr)^e$ $(A,B)$ is ...
0
votes
1answer
98 views

How to prove that a SKE scheme is IND-CPA secure

There's an IND-CPA SKE scheme 1 $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$. Scheme 2 is defined as $(\mathsf{Gen}', \mathsf{Enc}', \mathsf{Dec}')$, where $\mathsf{Gen}' = \mathsf{Gen}$, ...
5
votes
1answer
166 views

Why is only one oracle + challenge-response phase sufficient for IND-CPA security?

The CRYPTUTOR wiki from UIUC uses the following definition of the IND-CPA game: We (privately) choose a key K according to the key generation algorithm: K $\gets \mathsf{KeyGen}$. We ...
2
votes
1answer
162 views

Finding key of AES in ECB mode

How many plaintext-ciphertext pairs would be needed to guess with probability, say $p=0.5$, the key $k$ of AES under ECB mode? Most of the articles that I found tried attacks on single ...
5
votes
2answers
170 views

Security game oracle queries

Concerning private key (symmetric) IND-CPA game definition: Attacker $A$ queries the encryption oracle polynomial number of times. $A$ sends the challenger $C$ a message pair $m_0$ and $m_1$. $C$ ...
4
votes
1answer
81 views

Creating own ciphertext after a padding oracle attack?

I've written a script that breaks a cipher text based on a padding oracle for an assignment, but was wondering how I would continue on to create my own cipher text with any plain text I desired? ...
0
votes
0answers
39 views

Indistinguishability through a chosen plaintext attack

I have a question about how to go about doing an IND-CPA style attack. I'm supposed to think of this as two black boxes, where I do not know which box contains which function. What would I do with the ...
1
vote
1answer
90 views

How can IND-CPA encryption be identity revealing?

This is problem 10 of Chapter 4 "Symmetric Encryption" (pdf) from Lecture notes by Bellare and Rogaway: An IND-CPA secure encryption scheme might not conceal identities, in the following sense: ...
2
votes
1answer
102 views

What is the difference between CPA and IND-CPA?

I am writing a paper and I got comments from the reviewer that I don’t really understand. Is there any difference between a CPA (Chosen Plaintext Attack) and IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under ...
3
votes
2answers
125 views

Challenge-Response Phases in IND-CPA

The IND-CPA game has two challenge-response phases A key is generated by running $Gen(1^n)$ and challenger selects a bit b {0,1} uniformly at random. Adversary gets input $1^n$. Can query the oracle ...
2
votes
1answer
154 views

CPA and pseudorandom generator

Just started learning about Cryptography and Network Security in general, and I can't seem to grasp the understanding of the following question. Please correct me if I am misunderstanding anything. ...
2
votes
1answer
63 views

Modified version of a CPA-secure encryption scheme

The following encryption scheme: choose a random string $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and compute the ciphertext $c= \thinspace <c_0, c_1>= \thinspace <r, F_k(r) \oplus m>$, assuming $F$ a PRF; ...
1
vote
1answer
139 views

How to prove that the Permutation cipher is not CPA secure?

Encryption scheme is called a permutation cipher if every plaintext string with letters $a_1,\ldots, a_n$ is encrypted as $a_{\pi(1)}, \ldots, a_{\pi(n)}$ for some (not necessarily uniform) ...
4
votes
2answers
99 views

Chosen plain text and chosen ciphertext definitions clarification

I am trying to understand a concept of CPA and CCA attack and I cannot get one thing from the definition. If an attacker can execute a CPA attack for something like Send 100 dollars to attacker that ...
1
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0answers
94 views

CPA-security proof of “l-padded RSA” encryption scheme

The 10.9 exercise from the Katz-Lindell textbook creates a lot of confusion, let me state it here. Consider the following experiment for an algorithm $A$ and a function $l$ with $l(n) \leq 2n-2$ for ...
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0answers
63 views

Ciphertext size of any CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme

I know that, for any CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme, the size of the ciphertext after encrypting a single bit is superlogarithmic in the security parameter. That is, for $(pk,sk) \leftarrow ...
6
votes
3answers
140 views

Why is it good to split a CTR-mode counter into nonce and counter?

When discussing the CTR mode of block ciphers, Wikipedia says the following: Simply adding or XORing the nonce and counter into a single value would completely break the security under a ...
3
votes
0answers
48 views

IND-CCA1 RSA padding?

I've found a way to complete a task which I'd solve with passwords or by sending keys over the wire (otherwise) by using RSA's homomorphic property. I'm restricted to RSA (any padding; for hardware ...
3
votes
1answer
64 views

Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?

There are a number of message authentication codes (MACs) used in practice. They are highly used in practice (f.ex. in TLS), but there's (at least) one application where they can't be used: Full Disk ...
6
votes
3answers
334 views

What are the practical implications of ciphertext distinguishability?

Commonly there are four ways to "break" a secrecy-focused cryptosystem: Recover the secret key Recover the message Distinguish an encryption from random noise Distinguish the encryption of two ...
0
votes
0answers
105 views

CPA-security of a pseudorandom permutation encryption scheme

Let $F$ be a pseudorandom permutation, and define a fixed-length encryption scheme $(Gen, Enc, Dec)$ as follows: on input $m \in$ $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$, algorithm Enc ...
3
votes
0answers
31 views

Proving existence of an encryption scheme that has indistinghuishable multiple encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, but is not CPA-secure [duplicate]

I got stuck in trying to find a solution to the 3.7 exercise of the Katz-Lindell book. The exercise also assumes the existence of a pseudorandom function. The problem is that a multiple messages ...
2
votes
1answer
70 views

Improve security of transposition ciphers

As we know, breaking a Transposition Cipher is quite trivial and can be easily done by either exploiting single letter frequencies (not $d$-gram frequencies though, given that $2 < d < L$), or ...
1
vote
0answers
51 views

IES: What security has the asymmetric primitive to provide?

I think most of us know the notion Shoup introduced of KEM/DEM (Key encryption material / data encryption material) which is used for example by the (famous) ECIES, where the key is the hash of some ...
3
votes
2answers
205 views

Are all stream-ciphers IND-CPA?

A stream cipher usually generates a stream of pseudo-random bits which get XORed with the plaintext to form the ciphertext. The stream is generated using a given IV / nonce and a secret key. CTR-mode ...