The attacker can specify his own plain text and encrypt or sign it.

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Are the following schemes based on a pseudo-random permutation secure?

I am currently working on the following task: Let F be a pseudorandom permutation. Consider the encryption scheme for the message space $\{0, 1\}^n$ defined as follows: $Gen(1^n)$ chooses ...
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72 views

Difference left-or-right CPA security, IND-CPA security

I am trying to understand the notion of left-or-right-CPA (LOR-CPA) security for private-key encryption schemes introduced in my lecture. If I understood it correctly so far, the only difference to ...
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62 views

LR-Oracle Experiment in Lindell and Katz

In reference to the LR-Oracle experiment in “Introduction to Modern Cryptography” (2nd edition) by Lindell & Katz, Definition 3.23 states a scheme $\pi = (Gen,Enc_K,Dec_K)$ is CPA secure for ...
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30 views

Is EFS vulnerable to Chosen plaintext attack?

I have some backed up files encrypted with EFS and I lost the EFS certificate thus unable to decrypt the files. I understand that EFS uses the user certificate public key to encrypt the symmetric key ...
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47 views

IND-CCA1 RSA padding?

I've found a way to complete a task which I'd solve with passwords or by sending keys over the wire (otherwise) by using RSA's homomorphic property. I'm restricted to RSA (any padding; for hardware ...
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48 views

Prove that the given scheme is CPA secure or not

Given: F is a length preserving PRP. Encryption scheme $\Pi$ for messages of n/2 bits where: $m\in\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ $k\in\{0,1\}^n$ Enc: Select a random string $r\in\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and output ...
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41 views

Recover secret $x$ when $c\equiv m^x \pmod p$ with public $p$ (modified)

Given an encryption system where $c\equiv m^x \pmod p$, $p$ is a known prime, 1. Is it possible to recover $x$ with a known plaintext attack? Given $(p,\text{factorization of }\varphi(p),m,c)$ 2. Is ...
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63 views

MITM Attack on Key Exchange Protocols

I was doing research on this attack and I am wondering, why is Diffie-Hellman always associated with such an attack? ​ Aren't other public key cryptography schemes vulnerable to the same kind of ...
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CPA-security proof of “l-padded RSA” encryption scheme

The 10.9 exercise from the Katz-Lindell textbook creates a lot of confusion, let me state it here. Consider the following experiment for an algorithm $A$ and a function $l$ with $l(n) \leq 2n-2$ for ...
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61 views

Ciphertext size of any CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme

I know that, for any CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme, the size of the ciphertext after encrypting a single bit is superlogarithmic in the security parameter. That is, for $(pk,sk) \leftarrow ...
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IES: What security has the asymmetric primitive to provide?

I think most of us know the notion Shoup introduced of KEM/DEM (Key encryption material / data encryption material) which is used for example by the (famous) ECIES, where the key is the hash of some ...
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39 views

Indistinguishability through a chosen plaintext attack

I have a question about how to go about doing an IND-CPA style attack. I'm supposed to think of this as two black boxes, where I do not know which box contains which function. What would I do with the ...
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CPA-security of a pseudorandom permutation encryption scheme

Let $F$ be a pseudorandom permutation, and define a fixed-length encryption scheme $(Gen, Enc, Dec)$ as follows: on input $m \in$ $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$, algorithm Enc ...