The attacker can specify his own plain text and encrypt or sign it.

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11
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3answers
3k views

Is using a predictable IV with CFB mode safe or not?

While writing this answer, I noted that NIST SP 800-38A says that (emphasis mine): "For the CBC and CFB modes, the IVs must be unpredictable. In particular, for any given plaintext, it must not be ...
10
votes
3answers
2k views

In what way is XXTEA really vulnerable?

I'm looking at using the XXTEA algorithm to encrypt a small amount of data (say, less than 32KB) in the context of a software licensing algorithm. That is, we wish to make it difficult (not ...
10
votes
4answers
15k views

What is the difference between known-plaintext attack and chosen-plaintext attack?

I am very confused between the concept of known-plaintext attack and chosen-plaintext attack. It seems to me that these two are the same thing, but it definitely is not. Can anyone explain to me how ...
8
votes
1answer
816 views

If RSA is only used to encrypt symmetric keys which are random, what's wrong with textbook RSA?

IND-CPA is used to protect against frequency analysis AFAICT. But if RSA is only used to encrypt symmetric keys (AFAICT) then what's wrong with using only textbook RSA because random keys are very ...
8
votes
1answer
513 views

Importance of block size in CBC mode

Why is it necessary to use a sufficiently long block size when implementing a CBC block cipher with a truly random initialization vector? In ECB mode it's easy to get information about the message if ...
7
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2answers
905 views

Practical necessity of semantic security under chosen plain text attack (CPA) in CBC mode

I was not able to understand why we practically need a CPA security in Cipher Block Chaining. (which insist on having a random IV), let say if the encryption is not CPA secure i.e , the adversary can ...
7
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1answer
552 views

AES-CTR mode and the Biclique Attack

The biclique attacks that break AES (Biclique Cryptanalysis of the full AES) appear to require decryption oracles to work, presumably because the key schedule of AES is weaker in the decryption ...
7
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1answer
408 views

Easy explanation of “IND-” security notions?

There are many schemes that can advertise themselves with certain security notions, usually IND-CPA or IND-CCA2, for example plain ElGamal has IND-CPA security but doesn't provide IND-CCA security. ...
6
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1answer
4k views

The difference between these 4 breaking Cipher techniques?

I'm trying to understand the difference between the following and what they actually mean : Known plaintext attack Known ciphertext attack Chosen ciphertext attack Chosen plaintext attack Any ...
6
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2answers
7k views

How does a chosen plaintext attack on RSA work?

How can one run a chosen plaintext attack on RSA? If I can send some plaintexts and get the ciphertexts, how can I find a relation between them which helps me to crack another ciphertext?
6
votes
3answers
104 views

Why is it good to split a CTR-mode counter into nonce and counter?

When discussing the CTR mode of block ciphers, Wikipedia says the following: Simply adding or XORing the nonce and counter into a single value would completely break the security under a ...
6
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2answers
464 views

For public-key encryption, why does COA resistance imply CPA resistance?

My professor told me: If a public-key crypto-system is secure against ciphertext-only attacks, then it is also secure against a chosen-plaintext attack. Why is this true? Is there a proof that ...
6
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1answer
418 views

Message space in security definitions

What is the message space in the following example and how does a message space relate to a security definition? I mean, what difference does it make to such a definition if your message space is ...
6
votes
1answer
625 views

Proof that padded RSA is CPA-secure

I'm referring to page 383 of J. Katz and Y. Lindell's Introduction to Modern Cryptography. The book presents a padded RSA: ${\bf Key Generation:}$ same as Textbook RSA (given security parameter ...
5
votes
3answers
306 views

What are the practical implications of ciphertext distinguishability?

Commonly there are four ways to "break" a secrecy-focused cryptosystem: Recover the secret key Recover the message Distinguish an encryption from random noise Distinguish the encryption of two ...
5
votes
1answer
768 views

Why is asymmetric encryption IND-CPA?

According to Wikipedia, the IND-CPA game is: The challenger generates a key pair PK, SK based on some security parameter k (e.g., a key size in bits), and publishes PK to the adversary. The ...
5
votes
2answers
246 views

Is the reduction from left-or-right IND-CPA to real-or-random IND-CPA tight?

A modern trend in cryptography consists of defining security as rigorously as possible, and then designing schemes which are secure according to those definitions. Proving security comes in the form ...
5
votes
2answers
145 views

Security game oracle queries

Concerning private key (symmetric) IND-CPA game definition: Attacker $A$ queries the encryption oracle polynomial number of times. $A$ sends the challenger $C$ a message pair $m_0$ and $m_1$. $C$ ...
5
votes
1answer
298 views

Attacking a hardware AES implementation if it leaks the intermediate round states

Let's say that we have a hardware AES implementation that, on request, will encrypt or decrypt a 16-byte block of data in ECB mode using a fixed key, but refuses to reveal its fixed key. In other ...
5
votes
1answer
48 views

How to show CPA attacker does not need access to encryption oracle after receiving cyphertext

In the private key CPA game, the attacker has access to an encryption oracle anytime during the attack. However, I have seen this statement in lecture notes I downloaded "You can prove that for ...
5
votes
1answer
140 views

Why is only one oracle + challenge-response phase sufficient for IND-CPA security?

The CRYPTUTOR wiki from UIUC uses the following definition of the IND-CPA game: We (privately) choose a key K according to the key generation algorithm: K $\gets \mathsf{KeyGen}$. We ...
4
votes
2answers
851 views

What is the smallest plaintext/ciphertext size for an algorithm like?

When I read about a choosen plaintext attack, for example on AES the block size is always 128 bits, does it mean the attacker will only supply 128 bits data words as "plain text" ?
4
votes
2answers
120 views

Challenge-Response Phases in IND-CPA

The IND-CPA game has two challenge-response phases A key is generated by running $Gen(1^n)$ and challenger selects a bit b {0,1} uniformly at random. Adversary gets input $1^n$. Can query the oracle ...
4
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2answers
82 views

Chosen plain text and chosen ciphertext definitions clarification

I am trying to understand a concept of CPA and CCA attack and I cannot get one thing from the definition. If an attacker can execute a CPA attack for something like Send 100 dollars to attacker that ...
4
votes
1answer
627 views

ECB weakness and its exploitation

Lets say that I have a server which encrypts information at the server side using ECB mode with the blocksize of 16. If the server appends data that I control with a secret and sends back the ...
4
votes
1answer
124 views

Why are security against eavesdropping and security against CPA equivalent in the setting of public-key cryptography?

Why are security against eavesdropping and security against CPA equivalent in the setting of public-key cryptography?
4
votes
1answer
2k views

Figuring out key in hill cipher (chosen-plaintext attack)

I have been wondering what approach to take in order to figure out what key was used to encrypt a message using the hill cipher. I know it is possible to obtain it even if it were just a ...
4
votes
1answer
74 views

Creating own ciphertext after a padding oracle attack?

I've written a script that breaks a cipher text based on a padding oracle for an assignment, but was wondering how I would continue on to create my own cipher text with any plain text I desired? ...
3
votes
2answers
165 views

Are all stream-ciphers IND-CPA?

A stream cipher usually generates a stream of pseudo-random bits which get XORed with the plaintext to form the ciphertext. The stream is generated using a given IV / nonce and a secret key. CTR-mode ...
3
votes
1answer
185 views

Is this really the correct way to do an IND-CPA test?

In a description of IND-CPA (indistinguishability under the chosen plaintext attack), I have been reading the following, simple test: The adversary can generate as many messages as he wants. Then, ...
3
votes
2answers
2k views

Which categories of cipher are semantically secure under a chosen-plaintext attack?

I am trying to get my head around the circumstances under which a cipher is (or is not) semantically secure under a chosen-plaintext attack. I can't seem to find a good reference explaining this. I ...
3
votes
1answer
606 views

How much data can I encrypt with AES before I need to change the key in CBC mode?

In my cryptography class, the instructor suggested that in order to give the attacker a minimal advantage of $1/2^{32}$, we have to change the key after $2^{48}$ blocks are encrypted. It seems that ...
3
votes
1answer
49 views

Affine cipher and plaintext attacks

Last year, a question concerning plaintext attacks was posted at Mathematics.SE: “Plaintext attacks: affine cipher”. I have no problem to see how to solve it when we are given two ciphertexts and ...
3
votes
1answer
158 views

Construct IND-CPA secure encryption scheme by combining two given schemes

I have two encryption schemes $\Pi_0, \Pi_1$, at least one of them is IND-CPA secure but I don't know which one. The task is to construct a scheme $\Pi$ that is guaranteed to be CPA secure and to ...
3
votes
1answer
656 views

Is CBC mode encryption vulnerable to a reordering attack?

I know that, if CBC-MAC is used in such a way that the tag is the concatenation of all the blocks' outputs (and not just the last one), it's insecure under CPA for the simplest case of 2 blocks ...
3
votes
1answer
48 views

Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?

There are a number of message authentication codes (MACs) used in practice. They are highly used in practice (f.ex. in TLS), but there's (at least) one application where they can't be used: Full Disk ...
3
votes
2answers
182 views

Security model for privacy-preserving aggregation scheme.

Suppose that $S=(E,D)$ is an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Now I want to design a protocol $P$ such that given inputs $x_1,x_2,..,x_n$, the adversary $A$ (who can decrypt) can only learn ...
3
votes
2answers
2k views

Chosen plaintext vs Chosen ciphertext

What is the difference between chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attack? In both of these adversary has access to paintext-ciphertext pairs.Then where lies the difference?
3
votes
0answers
47 views

LR-Oracle Experiment in Lindell and Katz

In reference to the LR-Oracle experiment in “Introduction to Modern Cryptography” (2nd edition) by Lindell & Katz, Definition 3.23 states a scheme $\pi = (Gen,Enc_K,Dec_K)$ is CPA secure for ...
3
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0answers
41 views

IND-CCA1 RSA padding?

I've found a way to complete a task which I'd solve with passwords or by sending keys over the wire (otherwise) by using RSA's homomorphic property. I'm restricted to RSA (any padding; for hardware ...
3
votes
0answers
30 views

Proving existence of an encryption scheme that has indistinghuishable multiple encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, but is not CPA-secure [duplicate]

I got stuck in trying to find a solution to the 3.7 exercise of the Katz-Lindell book. The exercise also assumes the existence of a pseudorandom function. The problem is that a multiple messages ...
2
votes
1answer
270 views

Building a combined encryption scheme from two encryption schemes that's secure if at least on of them is secure

Any thoughts on how this can be done? Let $\Pi_1 = (\mathrm{Gen}_1, \mathrm{Enc}_1, \mathrm{Dec}_1)$ and $\Pi_2 = (\mathrm{Gen}_2, \mathrm{Enc}_2, \mathrm{Dec}_2)$ be two encryption schemes for ...
2
votes
2answers
766 views

Why is an Encrypt-and-MAC scheme with deterministic MAC not IND-CPA secure?

I'm preparing myself to exam, but I have a lot of troubles with rigorous proofs. It's the task from two-years ago exam. At the bottom I reminded one definition. Let $(Gen_E,Enc,Dec)$ be an ...
2
votes
2answers
410 views

Is One Time Pad considered Chosen-Plaintext Attack Secure?

If we're considering Chosen-Plaintext Attack setting, then the adversary has access to the Encryption Oracle right, and we know that OTP is only considered secure if we use the key only once. How ...
2
votes
2answers
130 views

Given a pseudorandom function F, is $(F_k(r) \; | \; F_k(r + 1))$ also a PRF?

Given: F is a pseudorandom function, G is a pseudorandom generator with $l(n) = n+1$. The following schemes should be classified as being insecure, IND-COA secure, IND-CPA secure. To encrypt $m \in ...
2
votes
2answers
102 views

Are parts of a pseudorandom string also a pseudorandom string?

I am working on an exercise that encrypts a message using only the first $n$ bits of a pseudorandom generator's output $G(k)$, i.e. $F_k(m) := G(k)_{0...n−1} \oplus m$. $k$ is chosen uniformly at ...
2
votes
1answer
109 views

Finding key of AES in ECB mode

How many plaintext-ciphertext pairs would be needed to guess with probability, say $p=0.5$, the key $k$ of AES under ECB mode? Most of the articles that I found tried attacks on single ...
2
votes
1answer
93 views

What is the difference between CPA and IND-CPA?

I am writing a paper and I got comments from the reviewer that I don’t really understand. Is there any difference between a CPA (Chosen Plaintext Attack) and IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under ...
2
votes
1answer
54 views

Modified version of a CPA-secure encryption scheme

The following encryption scheme: choose a random string $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and compute the ciphertext $c= \thinspace <c_0, c_1>= \thinspace <r, F_k(r) \oplus m>$, assuming $F$ a PRF; ...
2
votes
1answer
67 views

On composition of encryption schemes

If we composed (as in function composition) multiple CPA-secure encryption schemes would the result also be CPA-secure?