What is preimage resistance, and how can the lack thereof be exploited? How is this different from collision resistance? Are there any known preimage attacks that would be considered feasible?
After reading some excellent papers on SipHash, I understood that good non-cryptographic hashes such as MurmurHash and CityHash are not secure for MAC usage, due to a certain type of DDos attack ...
Would it be difficult to find $\:$ cost,salt,input,password0,password1 $\:$ such that bcrypt(cost,salt,password0,input) = bcrypt(workfactor,salt,password1,input) and $\:$ password0 != password1 $\:$ ...
Since EAX is very flexible with regard to the length of the calculated MAC (what they call "tag" is the MAC value right?), and the EAX paper as well as other documentations carefully avoid suggesting ...
On page 7 of NIST's views on SHA-3's security requirements and Evaluation of attacks, I see that, at least at this point, NIST planned on offering SHA-3 having eTCR security (defined on page 3): ...
For MD5 two different inputs are known that produce the same 128 bit hash value. However, these inputs are artificially created for this specific purpose. For normal, real life inputs I believe no ...
According to the original paper, Lamport one-time signature scheme uses two one-way functions: $F$ and $G$. The former one, $F$, is used to create a public key by hashing elements of the private key ...
Is it possible to generate signature only from Public key. See example below where i have valid signature but what if I change hash ? Is then any way to do this? Public key(160 bytes): ...