2
votes
1answer
67 views

What's the advantage of using OFB/CFB/CTR modes over a stream cipher

As far as I understand: The primary disadvantage associated with stream ciphers is the need for a random and unique key for each run in order to protect against reused-key attacks. OFB/CFB/CTR block ...
2
votes
1answer
82 views

Message lengths with AES CTR mode?

Im working on my own AES implementation as a personal educational exercise (not for production use), and a book im using as a resource states: In the case of CTR, we are merely XORing the output ...
3
votes
2answers
268 views

Making counter (CTR) mode robust against application state loss

Counter (CTR) mode, which is a block cipher mode of operation, has some desirable qualities (no padding, parallel encryption and decryption), but at the cost of failing badly when non-unique counter ...
4
votes
2answers
209 views

CTR mode nonce with aggressive key rotation policy

I'm writing a small encryption library which will be required to use the shortest possible amount of overhead for describing ciphertexts. I want to use CTR mode with a 6-byte random nonce. Normally ...
4
votes
3answers
3k views

Which one of the Block Cipher modes is the best?

I have two questions regarding the Block Cipher Modes: Which one of the modes is considered the best? I know CBC has a problem of IV since the next block of the plain text is XORed with the result ...
5
votes
4answers
922 views

Is SHA-256 secure as a CTR block cipher?

Generate a 256-bit random nonce. XOR it with a 256-bit reusable symmetric key. This is x. We represent numbers in simple binary instead of a counting function. ...
4
votes
2answers
288 views

Is it safe to store initial counter value for AES-CTR alongside with ciphertext?

The initial counter value can actually be thought of as a sort of IV, which I assume is safe to transmit with the ciphertext, but I really want to be sure that this is indeed safe.