# Tagged Questions

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### What is the exact purpose of length padding in Merkle–Damgård hash functions? [duplicate]

Is a length padding technique in a hash function used to avoid length extension attacks ?
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### Different padding rules for Merkle-Damgard and Keccak/sponge function

We learned that length padding was used in Merkle-Damgard where after padding with zeros another block is added that contains the initial length of the input. This is supposed to prevent same hash ...
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### Generalize the Merkle-Damgard construction for any compression function

I am trying to figure out this question: Generalize the Merkle-Damgard construction for any compression func­tion that compresses by at least one bit . You should refer to a general input length ...
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### In Merkle Damgard Constructoin, why do we add another block with value of number of blocks? [duplicate]

I'm trying to understand how can we find collisions, in simpler Merkle-Damgard constructions. consider my question as, what are the collisions for these cases of Merkle-Damgard constructions: we pad ...
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### Merkle-Damgard transform: necessity of the Length block [duplicate]

The Merkel-Damgard transform append the message length (in blocks) to the message itself and then computing the 'chained hash' algorithm. Does the last block (which contains the length of the ...
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### Why is H(message||secret_key) not vulnerable to length-extension attack?

Given a Merkle-Damgård hash function $H$, I know that an attacker can forge a message protected by a MAC computed as $H(\textrm{secret_key}||\textrm{message})$. Why can't he perform the same ...
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### Finding a collision for a hash function

I'm trying to find a collision for the following (modified) Merkle-Damgard hash function. Suppose we already have a hash function $h : \mathbb{Z}_2^{2·n} \to \mathbb{Z}_2^n$ for fixed length bit ...
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### Is a second preimage attack on MD5 feasible?

What's the practical status of MD5 w.r.t. second-preimage? Integrity of a piece of data is protected by an MD5 hash, itself assumed genuine. The data (and thus the hash) is known to the adversary. ...
### Attacks of the MAC construction $\mathcal{H}(m||k)$ for common hashes $\mathcal{H}$?
Consider a common practically-collision-resistant hash function $\mathcal{H}$ (e.g. SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, RIPEMD-160), perhaps based on the Merkle–Damgård construction as are the first three. We ...