IND-CCA is definition used in cryptography to describe: indistinguishability under (non-adaptive) chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA1), and indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2).

learn more… | top users | synonyms

-2
votes
0answers
50 views

CCA security in double encryption [duplicate]

my friend and I are trying to reach out a convenient security solution for CCA when we encrypt the message m two times, first for m to get c and then for c to get C(so it is one inside other). I have ...
0
votes
1answer
115 views

Secure double encryption using CPA and CCA

Do you mind if you give me any hints, links or ideas about how to improve the security of double regular encryption and decryption, by using CPA game and CCA game, it sounds interesting question, and ...
1
vote
1answer
57 views
0
votes
0answers
73 views

CCA security of a system that splits messages and encrypts each packet

Propose a symmetric key based crypto-system for implementing a secure email system. This system is based on AES and CCA secure. Suppose that you have to encrypt a large message and that this message ...
1
vote
0answers
51 views

IND-CCA2 secure schemes without Plaintext Awareness?

I have been reading up on IND-CCA2 security and was wondering: Are there efficient IND-CCA2 secure schemes that do not require plaintext awareness? I'm guessing yes - could someone point me to these ...
6
votes
1answer
85 views

The REACT transform and Replayable CCA

Before stating my questions, let us recall the REACT transform [OP01], which enables to construct a CCA-secure hybrid PKE scheme, $\varepsilon'_{pk}$, from an OW-CPA PKE scheme ...
3
votes
1answer
98 views

What is a Message Transmission Scheme?

I've been given as an exercise to show an encryption scheme that is CCA-secure but is not a secure message transmission scheme. What is a message transmission scheme, and how does it differ from a ...
2
votes
1answer
74 views

Do Chosen-Chiphertext attacks only apply to public-key cryptosystems?

Do Chosen-Chiphertext attacks (CCA-1/2) only apply to public-key Cryptosystem?
3
votes
1answer
134 views

Security proof of FO(Fujisaki-Okamoto) hybrid encryption

The proof of FO hybrid encryption is hard to understand. $\:$ Especially, how does the challenger respond to the decryption queries when the challenger can only have some encryption queries? Can ...
3
votes
2answers
261 views

Can you help with that definition for a CCA?

The following is a definition taken from Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Katz and Lindell. I'm having a hard time understanding some basic concepts! Can you please help me? ...
0
votes
0answers
75 views

hybrid PKE scheme CCA2 insecurity

I'm reading a paper here say: As we know, in hybrid PKE schemes XOR alone cannot perfectly hide challenge bit to the CCA2 adversary The author does not define hybrid PKE schemes. What is ...
2
votes
0answers
69 views

partial-domain permutation and strong assumption

Quoting "Verified Security of Redundancy-Free Encryption from Rabin and RSA", Chapter 2 (on page 4): OAEP was proved IND-CCA-secure by Fujisaki et al. [28] under the assumption that the underlying ...
1
vote
1answer
163 views

Why is Blum-Goldwasser not IND-CCA-2 secure?

Consider the Blum-Goldwasser encryption scheme as described on Wikipedia. I was told that it was not IND-CCA-2 secure. I heard there was malleabilty, probably it has to do with XOR-ing. But I do not ...
1
vote
1answer
236 views

Does RSA-OEAP have integrity and authenticity properties?

RSA-OAEP is IND-CCA2 secure (indistinguishable under an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack). Does it also have the INT-CTXT (integrity of ciphertext) and INT-PTXT (integrity of plaintext) properties? ...
2
votes
1answer
177 views

RSA-OAEP versus RSA with Fujisaki-Okamoto construction

I was wondering why the Fujisaki-Okamoto construction (or one of its variants) is not (at least commonly) used with RSA to achieve CCA2 security? Does anyone know of any speed comparisons between RSA ...
5
votes
1answer
207 views

Why isn't the IND-CCA property inherited when sending redundant ciphertext?

Suppose that in order to avoid loss in transmission, a secret key encryption scheme $(Gen, Enc, Dec)$ is modified to be $(Gen, Enc', Dec')$, such that the message m is encrypted independently ...