(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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4
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2answers
62 views

Is reusing keys for CBC and CBC-MAC secure when using encrypt-then-MAC?

I know reusing keys is a bad idea, especially for CBC and CBC-MAC, but the example for why on Wikipedia seemed to use encrypt-and-MAC. It seems obvious that the last block of encryption will be equal ...
1
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1answer
72 views

Why does a fixed key not make MACs like CBC-MAC or GMAC into secure hash functions? [duplicate]

Why does setting the secret key to a fixed, public value not make MACs like CBC-MAC or EMAC into secure unkeyed cryptographic hash functions? In other words, why is the resulting hash function not ...
0
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0answers
23 views

Poly1305 vs VMAC: is VMAC much better for long messages?

VMAC seems to me much more secure than Poly1305 on long messages (the security of the latter decreases linearly with increasing message length). Is this of practical relevance?
1
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1answer
46 views

Find the minimum Adversary's Advantage

I am wondering how to solve the problem below: Suppose we have a $MAC$ scheme $I=(S,V)$. There is another algorithm that can find a pair of texts $(m0,m1)$, with $m0≠m1$ such that $S(k,m0)=S(k,m1)$ ...
1
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1answer
20 views

Key Exchange MAC encryption order of events? Problem

I want to write the sequence of events of how a MAC encryption works for documentation at work. For this purpose I have a document (given by my boss to me) in German and I am trying to translate it ...
1
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2answers
84 views

MAC algorithm difficulties

Can anyone explain to me why this is a bad idea? I cannot see anything wrong with it except that key K should be different for MAC and AES. MAC algorithm consists of letting the MAC of message M ...
7
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1answer
87 views

Side channel security of HMAC in software

Assume we have a processor with a symmetric co-processor that supports AES. This processor does however not provide co-processor support for hash algorithms such as SHA-1 or SHA-256. I've got the ...
4
votes
1answer
57 views

Does key renewal increase complexity of MAC forgery?

Suppose I have encrypted messages sent to a device authenticated with a MAC keyed with a strong shared cryptographic key. This device can only process so many messages per unit of time. This ...
1
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0answers
13 views

Do Wegman-Carter authenticators allow key reuse if the authenticator result is kept secret?

Poly1305 (and GHASH) are secure authenticators, but only for one use. Thus, nonce reuse in Poly1305-AES, ChaCha20-Poly1305, and AES-GCM all reveal the authentication key. However, my understanding ...
2
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1answer
54 views

Preserving Confidentiality and Integrity in a Public channel

Let's say I've got two people that are trying to talk in a public channel $A$ and $B$ and they want to preserve their confidentiality and integrity. Which cryptographic algorithm would they want to ...
3
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0answers
61 views

Why reveal MAC-keys after using them?

As far as my understanding goes MACs are used to determine whether the received message comes from a source that has access to a MAC-key which is known by both parties. Some crypto protocols reveal ...
7
votes
3answers
451 views

What is the advantage of digital signatures over message authentication codes?

Studying for CISSP these choices seemed limited: What is the advantage of digital signatures over message authentication codes? Digital Signature provides integrity verification while ...
5
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1answer
38 views

What is the difference between MACTripleDES and TripleDES?

I was asked to encrypt/decrypt a string using MACTripleDES. Is there any difference between MACTripleDES and TripleDES? If, where exactly is the difference between both?
3
votes
1answer
94 views

Encrypt-then-authenticate variant used in IPsec

I am trying to understand the variant of Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA) that is used in IPsec. For this I have looked at this chapter. What I got so far is that the integrity and confidentiality ...
2
votes
1answer
32 views

Should I authenticate memory data which was loaded from authenticated disk file?

Encrypted fields are loaded from disk file to process memory only after file's HMAC validation is successful. Data is still encrypted in memory and will be decrypted later, on demand, when it needs to ...
2
votes
1answer
64 views

Is this MAC scheme secure?

Say we have a computationally secure Message Authentication Code scheme (Gen, Tag, Ver). Let $Tag'_k(m):=$ first half bits of $Tag_k(m)$. Let's assume the range of tags is $n$bits. Is (Gen, Tag', ...
4
votes
2answers
56 views

Is it OK to use a secret IV as key when creating keyed MD5 checksum for fixed-size data?

Is it OK to use a secret IV as key when creating keyed MD5 checksum for fixed-size data? Because data size is known, attacker cannot append anything. And I think it's hard to raise chosen-plaintext ...
4
votes
1answer
63 views

Is it wise to use HOTP (raw bytes) as a key for HMAC?

Assume I have client and server applications with a shared master secret KEY_SECRET already in place. Also assume that the client and server have an implicit shared ...
0
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0answers
53 views

Detecting Software Changes - Verifying untampered code

This question assumes an environment devoid of any internet connections, the software in questions operates in a non-connected environment on a single machine. I have a piece of software that may be ...
0
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0answers
37 views

Non CPA on custom MAC

While preparing for a crypto exam there is a task we don't really understand: task Let $E_K$ be a permutation $\{0,1\}^b \rightarrow \{0,1\}^b$ defined by a blockcipher with the key $K$. Let $M = ...
5
votes
1answer
155 views

Fast 128-bit MAC with second preimage resistance?

I have an application that needs a fast 128-bit MAC to guarantee message authenticity in a protocol. I would like to reuse this MAC value as a binding identifier, so that even those who know the key ...
7
votes
1answer
195 views

Where is CFB-MAC defined?

I can find descriptions of using CFB mode to create a MAC and even implementations, but cannot find any standard or papers analyzing its security bounds. Is there a standard for CFB-MAC? Where can I ...
3
votes
1answer
48 views

Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?

There are a number of message authentication codes (MACs) used in practice. They are highly used in practice (f.ex. in TLS), but there's (at least) one application where they can't be used: Full Disk ...
3
votes
1answer
605 views

Authentication using AES

I need to implement an authentication mechanism in an embedded environment which does not support floating point operations but has an AES accelerator module which allows for encyption/decryption ...
5
votes
1answer
104 views

Keys in HMAC and NMAC

I'm quite new to this topic and have several questions concerning HMAC and NMAC: Why does NMAC need two keys? How can it be attacked if we just used some sort of initialization vector instead of the ...
3
votes
2answers
69 views

Does AES(x || x) provide secure message authentication when message fits in a single block?

Suppose I have x = <64 bits of data>. I build a 128 bit block $P = x || x$, and transmit a message $M = AES(K, P)$. The receiver has the same $K$. The ...
4
votes
1answer
230 views

Ciphertext and tag size and IV transmission with AES in GCM mode

I am completely new to using AES in GCM mode of operation, and I have not a very large background in cryptography as well. I have been playing with OpenSSL trying to encrypt and decrypt some messages. ...
3
votes
1answer
71 views

Can I reduce the MAC size in TLS?

The MAC size is reduced to 80 bits in truncated_hmac extension , which says "forging of MAC values cannot be done off-line: in TLS, a single failed MAC guess will cause the immediate termination of ...
4
votes
1answer
95 views

Parallel authentication of encrypted data. What AE type to choose?

I've got a system with a slow data transfer channel. Transferring a message through several channels does increase the transfer speed significatnly. AES-CBC+HMAC is good except that verifying the MAC ...
1
vote
1answer
109 views

How is wpa2 authentication structured

I would like to understand the cryptography behind Wpa2. As far as I know, there are 4 messages on the 4-way handshake and three of them are values concatenated with hashes. First, I am trying to ...
1
vote
2answers
84 views

Concerns about use of MAC in my specification

Here is the pseudocode for a routine I am designing: ...
1
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1answer
55 views

Why does UMAC encrypt the output of universal hash function?

UMAC uses a key to choose a random hash function from a family of universal hash functions. The value of the hash function is always encrypted using yet another key, and the resulting ciphertext ...
2
votes
3answers
114 views

Why not put MAC in fixed position and cover padding for MAC-then-encrypt?

The biggest problem with using MtE with a mode where it's known to be secure (CBC) is with the padding, where you can't retrieve the authentication until you know where it is by looking at the padding ...
0
votes
1answer
72 views

Authenticating small packets

I intend to authenticate small packets of data, between 16 and 256 bytes each. For some of them encryption will also be required. This will be used on small micro controllers, with RAM sizes ranging ...
1
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1answer
64 views

Differences between HMAC and HKDF in a specific case

I want to use a key derivation function to derive a key to another one. I think HKDF is the easiest solution in my case. The following picture gives a clear definition of it : ...
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0answers
41 views

Why does OMAC2 exist?

The specification for OMAC has the following to say about OMAC2: For OMAC2, we adopted u−1 instead of u2 as Cst2. It requires one right shift to compute L· u−1 instead of one left shift to compute ...
1
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1answer
51 views

Could this alternative hash based MAC construction be as, or even more secure than an HMAC?

Begin hashing (Key||Message) Encrypt the hash state (or some part of it, such as the first 128 or 256 bits), with the key. Add the encrypted hash state to the ...
0
votes
0answers
91 views

Which of these is a secure MAC?

Let (S,V) be a secure MAC defined over $(K,M,T)$ where $M = \{0,1\}^n$ and $T =\{0,1\}^{128}$. Which of the following is a secure MAC: $S'(k,m) = S(k,m)[0,\ldots,126]\quad and \quad V'(k,m,t) = ...
6
votes
2answers
300 views

Is the HMAC construction really neccessary for a fixed length message?

The HMAC Construction is defined as: Hash( (Key XOR opad) || Hash((Key XOR ipad) || Message) ) This was designed because a simpler construction such as: ...
2
votes
1answer
139 views

Authenticate a short message with redundant encryption instead of using a MAC?

I have a short message that’s exactly 128 bits of length. The message serves as a time-limited authorization token for a database. It contains a permission profile ID (64 bits) and an issue timestamp ...
0
votes
3answers
59 views

FIPS 113 Computer Data Authentication

on the NIST website for Message authentication There is a mention of 2 approved algorithms, i am curious about the first one. the link to FIPS 113, Computer Data Authentication appears to be dead ...
0
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1answer
67 views

Adding a Random component to CBC MAC in order to enlarge the tag space

CBC MAC that is using AES as the underlying block cipher, has tag space of 2^128. If we add a random single block, concatenating it with the tag, and encrypt it again in AES CBC mode, with additional ...
5
votes
1answer
386 views

The difference between MAC algorithms and what to use

I've been looking into message authentication codes and found several ways to create integrity for a message. I know of the following algorithms: HMAC, this can use any cryptograhpic hash function ...
1
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0answers
130 views

Security of basic SHA256 MAC in an authenticate-then-encrypt scheme

I know the following construct is insecure if the MAC as defined below is appended to the encrypted message in an Encrypt then Authenticate (EtA) scheme. $k_1$: encryption key $k_2$: authentication ...
2
votes
1answer
195 views

New to cryptology, studying Message Authentication Codes

I understand the basic operational theory behind MAC, but I'm getting tripped up on some of the finer details. Also the differences between MAC, HMAC and MIC are getting lost on me, including the ...
2
votes
1answer
76 views

Is it secure to transmit a short plaintext with its MAC?

I have a short (32-bit) message that needs to be authenticated. Due to the constraints of my platform, I would like to use Speck32/64 (32-bit block, 64-bit key) with a Matyas-Meyer-Oseas one-way ...
0
votes
1answer
170 views

MAC in SSH packet encryption, benefits to not including it?

What are the benefits to not including MAC in a SSH packet encryption? I understand what the MAC is there for, but if it was not included would there be an advantage? Is the MAC somewhat redundant ...
0
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0answers
45 views

Separate keys for encryption and MAC? [duplicate]

I use HMAC(ciphertext)+ciphertext for authenticated encryption. The same key is used for both MAC and encryption. Is that right? Is using separate keys for MAC and encryption necessary or any good? ...
-3
votes
1answer
122 views

Attacking multi block MAC constructions

For variable-length messages, there are three different ways to generate the tags. $Tag = MAC_k(\Sigma_i m_i)$. $t_i = MAC_k(m_i)$ and $Tag = (t_1, ..., t_l)$. $t_i = MAC_k(i||m_i)$ ...
0
votes
1answer
45 views

Using Permutation polynomial to compute a MAC

Is the following MAC secure? For a block $y_i$ in a file, we defined a MAC as follows: $Mac_i:PRF(k,i) \cdot g^{y_i \cdot r_i} \bmod p$. Where $p$ is a prime number, $g \in \mathbb{G}$,$PRF(k,i)$ is ...