(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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56 views

Where is CFB-MAC defined?

I can find a couple of descriptions of using CFB mode to create a MAC, but cannot find any standard or papers analyzing its security bounds. Is there a standard for CFB-MAC? Where can I find an ...
3
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1answer
39 views

Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?

There are a number of message authentication codes (MACs) used in practice. They are highly used in practice (f.ex. in TLS), but there's (at least) one application where they can't be used: Full Disk ...
3
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1answer
337 views

Authentication using AES

I need to implement an authentication mechanism in an embedded environment which does not support floating point operations but has an AES accelerator module which allows for encyption/decryption ...
5
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1answer
64 views

Keys in HMAC and NMAC

I'm quite new to this topic and have several questions concerning HMAC and NMAC: Why does NMAC need two keys? How can it be attacked if we just used some sort of initialization vector instead of the ...
3
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2answers
57 views

Does AES(x || x) provide secure message authentication when message fits in a single block?

Suppose I have x = <64 bits of data>. I build a 128 bit block $P = x || x$, and transmit a message $M = AES(K, P)$. The receiver has the same $K$. The ...
1
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1answer
48 views

Ciphertext and tag size and IV transmission with AES in GCM mode

I am completely new to using AES in GCM mode of operation, and I have not a very large background in cryptography as well. I have been playing with OpenSSL trying to encrypt and decrypt some messages. ...
3
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1answer
54 views

Can I reduce the MAC size in TLS?

The MAC size is reduced to 80 bits in truncated_hmac extension , which says "forging of MAC values cannot be done off-line: in TLS, a single failed MAC guess will cause the immediate termination of ...
4
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1answer
74 views

Parallel authentication of encrypted data. What AE type to choose?

I've got a system with a slow data transfer channel. Transferring a message through several channels does increase the transfer speed significatnly. AES-CBC+HMAC is good except that verifying the MAC ...
1
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1answer
72 views

How is wpa2 authentication structured

I would like to understand the cryptography behind Wpa2. As far as I know, there are 4 messages on the 4-way handshake and three of them are values concatenated with hashes. First, I am trying to ...
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2answers
73 views

Concerns about use of MAC in my specification

Here is the pseudocode for a routine I am designing: ...
1
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1answer
48 views

Why does UMAC encrypt the output of universal hash function?

UMAC uses a key to choose a random hash function from a family of universal hash functions. The value of the hash function is always encrypted using yet another key, and the resulting ciphertext ...
2
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3answers
99 views

Why not put MAC in fixed position and cover padding for MAC-then-encrypt?

The biggest problem with using MtE with a mode where it's known to be secure (CBC) is with the padding, where you can't retrieve the authentication until you know where it is by looking at the padding ...
0
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1answer
58 views

Authenticating small packets

I intend to authenticate small packets of data, between 16 and 256 bytes each. For some of them encryption will also be required. This will be used on small micro controllers, with RAM sizes ranging ...
1
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1answer
40 views

Differences between HMAC and HKDF in a specific case

I want to use a key derivation function to derive a key to another one. I think HKDF is the easiest solution in my case. The following picture gives a clear definition of it : ...
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0answers
37 views

Why does OMAC2 exist?

The specification for OMAC has the following to say about OMAC2: For OMAC2, we adopted u−1 instead of u2 as Cst2. It requires one right shift to compute L· u−1 instead of one left shift to compute ...
1
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1answer
37 views

Could this alternative hash based MAC construction be as, or even more secure than an HMAC?

Begin hashing (Key||Message) Encrypt the hash state (or some part of it, such as the first 128 or 256 bits), with the key. Add the encrypted hash state to the ...
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0answers
80 views

Which of these is a secure MAC?

Let (S,V) be a secure MAC defined over $(K,M,T)$ where $M = \{0,1\}^n$ and $T =\{0,1\}^{128}$. Which of the following is a secure MAC: $S'(k,m) = S(k,m)[0,\ldots,126]\quad and \quad V'(k,m,t) = ...
6
votes
2answers
217 views

Is the HMAC construction really neccessary for a fixed length message?

The HMAC Construction is defined as: Hash( (Key XOR opad) || Hash((Key XOR ipad) || Message) ) This was designed because a simpler construction such as: ...
2
votes
1answer
98 views

Authenticate a short message with redundant encryption instead of using a MAC?

I have a short message that’s exactly 128 bits of length. The message serves as a time-limited authorization token for a database. It contains a permission profile ID (64 bits) and an issue timestamp ...
0
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3answers
43 views

FIPS 113 Computer Data Authentication

on the NIST website for Message authentication There is a mention of 2 approved algorithms, i am curious about the first one. the link to FIPS 113, Computer Data Authentication appears to be dead ...
0
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1answer
61 views

Adding a Random component to CBC MAC in order to enlarge the tag space

CBC MAC that is using AES as the underlying block cipher, has tag space of 2^128. If we add a random single block, concatenating it with the tag, and encrypt it again in AES CBC mode, with additional ...
4
votes
1answer
252 views

The difference between MAC algorithms and what to use

I've been looking into message authentication codes and found several ways to create integrity for a message. I know of the following algorithms: HMAC, this can use any cryptograhpic hash function ...
0
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0answers
101 views

Security of basic SHA256 MAC in an authenticate-then-encrypt scheme

I know the following construct is insecure if the MAC as defined below is appended to the encrypted message in an Encrypt then Authenticate (EtA) scheme. $k_1$: encryption key $k_2$: authentication ...
2
votes
1answer
141 views

New to cryptology, studying Message Authentication Codes

I understand the basic operational theory behind MAC, but I'm getting tripped up on some of the finer details. Also the differences between MAC, HMAC and MIC are getting lost on me, including the ...
2
votes
1answer
63 views

Is it secure to transmit a short plaintext with its MAC?

I have a short (32-bit) message that needs to be authenticated. Due to the constraints of my platform, I would like to use Speck32/64 (32-bit block, 64-bit key) with a Matyas-Meyer-Oseas one-way ...
0
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1answer
110 views

MAC in SSH packet encryption, benefits to not including it?

What are the benefits to not including MAC in a SSH packet encryption? I understand what the MAC is there for, but if it was not included would there be an advantage? Is the MAC somewhat redundant ...
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0answers
42 views

Separate keys for encryption and MAC? [duplicate]

I use HMAC(ciphertext)+ciphertext for authenticated encryption. The same key is used for both MAC and encryption. Is that right? Is using separate keys for MAC and encryption necessary or any good? ...
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1answer
117 views

Attacking multi block MAC constructions

For variable-length messages, there are three different ways to generate the tags. $Tag = MAC_k(\Sigma_i m_i)$. $t_i = MAC_k(m_i)$ and $Tag = (t_1, ..., t_l)$. $t_i = MAC_k(i||m_i)$ ...
0
votes
1answer
42 views

Using Permutation polynomial to compute a MAC

Is the following MAC secure? For a block $y_i$ in a file, we defined a MAC as follows: $Mac_i:PRF(k,i) \cdot g^{y_i \cdot r_i} \bmod p$. Where $p$ is a prime number, $g \in \mathbb{G}$,$PRF(k,i)$ is ...
1
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1answer
140 views

Simple message authentication code

I used to figure that message authentication codes function like digital signatures: a hash of a message is calculated and then encrypted with a secret key. To verify the authenticity of a message, ...
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0answers
74 views

chacha20-poly1305 padding and length encoding

The AEAD construction for chacha20-poly1305 described in the IETF proposal [1] encodes message lengths into the text that is to be hashed. The newer proposal [2] goes further and pads associated data ...
2
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0answers
80 views

Performing HMAC with random key before MAC comparison

In Laravel (a PHP framework) I can see that they calculate a HMAC with a random key over the final HMAC before comparison. This additional HMAC calculation is of course performed for both the ...
0
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1answer
96 views

Nonces being used in SSL and MAC to prevent replay attacks

I'm a bit confused in the way nonces are used in these processes to prevent replay attacks. Heres How I think it works during SSL: Nonces are exchanged during stage one of the handshake protocol. ...
0
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1answer
66 views

Integrity protection in wireless sensor networks [closed]

I have done a lab about wireless sensor nodes and got in touch with encryption for the very first time. There are some questions on my sheet, especially on integrity protection (the attacker wants to ...
0
votes
1answer
123 views

CBC with a fixed or random IV

I have two probably quite naive questions: 1) Why, exactly, is it so bad to have a fixed (or predictable) IV in CBC mode? An example would be great! 2) Given 1), why is a random IV better? And if ...
1
vote
1answer
128 views

Why are there no MACs inspired by block cipher modes other than CBC and CFB?

I've been studying message authentication codes and I was wondering why a MAC can only be produced with AES in CBC and CFB mode and why not the other modes such as ECB, OFB and counter. Why are CBC ...
0
votes
1answer
115 views

Size of a MAC for a quickly checked message?

Let suppose that we have to check a message that was written one second ago. The message is discarded immediately after having being checked. What "minimal" size for such a MAC is secure ? Thank you. ...
0
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2answers
50 views

How to use HMAC for authenticating multiple messages

The standard HMAC function, $H(K, m)$, authenticates a single message $m$. Instead, I'd like to authenticate 2 messages, like this: $$H'(K, m_1, m_2)$$ The simplest solution, $H(K, m_1||m_2)$, ...
0
votes
1answer
91 views

Specific example of a MAC in TLS?

This seems like quite a dumb question, but I really don't know if I'm finding a answer anywhere. I understand that if i access a website that is secured with TLS, we exchange ciphersuites and so on, ...
-1
votes
1answer
116 views

HMAC ipad and opad choice

It is written in the HMAC paper that the $ipad=0x36$ and $opad=0x5c$ were chosen such that it maximize the Hamming-Distance of the part of the key used in the inner and outer part of the HMAC process. ...
10
votes
2answers
337 views

Definition of “pepper” in hash functions

I am confused about the notion of "pepper" in the context of storing hashes of users' passwords. Definition 1: A pepper is a secret key Looking around the Internet, for example here or here, a ...
3
votes
2answers
160 views

Can a secret message be securely transmitted within a MAC tag?

A sender wants to transmit an ultra secret code $M$ which could be either 'go', 'stop' or 'wait'. This could be any selection of code words really and adopted for any use such as transmitting short ...
9
votes
2answers
183 views

Why is Poly1305 popular given its 'sudden death' properties?

ECDSA has the undesirable property that if a key pair reuses a nonce in a signing operation, the cryptosystem experiences catastrophic failure in the form of private key leakage. I've heard this ...
1
vote
1answer
142 views

How can CBC-MAC be secure when message length is fixed?

I was doing some self-initiated knowledge gathering about digests, signatures and hmacs and I ran across the fact that you can use CBC as a MAC, but if the message size is not fixed; then it is not ...
3
votes
2answers
116 views

Strange MAC algorithm

I'm working with a payment provider which uses the following algorithm for signing messages: The merchant is securely given a secret key k, known to them and the ...
2
votes
0answers
77 views

Using same key for encryption and ECBC-MAC k2

ECBC-MAC: $E_{k_2}(CBC-MAC_{k_1}(m))$ If we use same key for encryption (CTR or CFB) and k2 (end tag encryption) in ECBC-MAC in encrypt-than-MAC sheme, is it secure?
2
votes
1answer
86 views

Is XCBC where k2 and k3 might be the identical, secure?

XCBC paper says all three keys should be independent. It doesn't say they must always be different. However it seems this is necessary to differentiate padded message and message without padding. ...
2
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2answers
122 views

Is it safe to salt a MAC?

Say that I define a scheme where the salt is public and is MAC-ed with the message: $k = KDF(password, salt)$ $tag = MAC_k(salt || message)$ Is it safe to salt the MAC this way? Assume that the salt ...
0
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1answer
65 views

Efficiently show/prove knowledge of third party secret without leaking information

Say Alice publishes (i.e. all parties in the universe) a key or certificate $x$ and sends a secret $s$ to Bob. Bob then publishes some data $d$ (his identity or a message or smt.) and an ...
5
votes
2answers
260 views

Secure way to derive separate encryption and MAC keys from a single master key?

I want to derive a 256 bit encryption key and a 256 bit MAC key from a single 256 bit master key for an authenticated encryption scheme. I was considering the following construction to derive the two ...