(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.
-2
votes
0answers
40 views
Is the likelihood of a birthday collision linear (evenly distributed) for all ciphers? When are they not?
When discussing the Birthday Principal, in combination with the pigeon hole principal, it was argued that an uneven distribution of birthdays (bias for September and any Tuesday of the year) made ...
3
votes
1answer
60 views
When truncating an AES MAC value by “w” , how do I justify that “w” is still negligible?
I'm taking an online class on cryptography at corsera.org / Stanford, and the professor is explaining that it's OK to truncate an AES MAC to $w$ bits as long as $1/2^w$ is still negligible (say $w ...
-3
votes
0answers
86 views
Why is the basic (fixed-length) CBC MAC construction not a secure MAC when it is used on variable-sized messages? [closed]
Why is the basic (fi xed-length) CBC MAC construction not a secure MAC when it is used on variable-sized messages?
3
votes
1answer
147 views
CBC-MAC , fixed length, all blocks returned
CBC-MAC, with fixed length message.
Is it safe to return all ciphered blocks instead of the last?
My intuition says it is less secure, since is gives an attacker more information.
But how could one ...
1
vote
4answers
151 views
Using the output of a stream cipher, how to guarantee the integrity of 4 bytes of data?
I am designing a simple and secure stream communication protocol. My idea was to build each message sent to the wire as:
(message size || clear text || UHASH(message size || clear text)) $\oplus$ ...
1
vote
2answers
67 views
How secure is passing a MAC to Python's random.seed before using random.choice to generate a MAC?
I'd like to use Python's random.choice seeded with a HMAC-SHA1 tag to generate a MAC encoded in a variable set of chars.
...
2
votes
1answer
101 views
How to design a practical and secure MAC scheme?
I am sorry, but I need to introduce some concepts which are not directly related to cryptography to make myself clear, I hope I won't stun you with this ... (I'd rather explain it here than redirect ...
4
votes
2answers
134 views
ChaCha cipher + Poly1305
The Poly1305-AES paper summarizes the MAC as
$$ Poly1305(m, AES_k(n)) = {H_r(m) + AES_k(n)} \mod 2^{128} $$
Can I presume that $+$ here is just meant as a form of 16-byte mixing $H_r(m)$ and ...
2
votes
2answers
280 views
What is the difference between MAC and HMAC?
In reference to this question, what are the "stronger security properties" that HMAC provides over MAC. I got that MAC requires an IV whereas HMAC doesn't. I also understood that MAC may reveal ...
1
vote
2answers
150 views
Deriving HMAC key and cipher key from passphrase? [duplicate]
I'm encrypting a file with AES-256 in CBC mode. I needed to add an HMAC for authentication and validation of the file contents and passphrase, so I used a SHA-256 HMAC over chunks of my file ...
0
votes
0answers
39 views
Padding in PMAC
How does padding in PMAC work? I have been told two stories: Firstly, I have been told that it works similar to CMAC padding, and secondly, I have been told that it does not need padding.
I find the ...
0
votes
0answers
32 views
Security of .net AES implementation and security of a hash MAC
Hello I wanted to ask if there is any review about the security of the AES implementation of the .net Framework?
I found nothing concrete to that question, searching the Internet.
And, but this is a ...
2
votes
1answer
59 views
Using UMAC with stream cypher
I understand that most stream ciphers, due to being applied with a simple XOR, are specially fragile against data tampering, and must be used with some MAC mechanism. So I am investigating the use of ...
-2
votes
1answer
60 views
Cryptographic Primitive Method
Is there any cryptographic primitive bijective (one-to-one and onto) function for creating cryptographic tools like symmetric encryption/decryption, Hash code generator, MAC, HMAC and Random number ...
1
vote
1answer
73 views
Non-cryptographic hash function as MAC for stream ciphers
I understand that for a stream cipher to be useful, there must be a way to verify that the message was not tampered with (bits were flipped by an attacker).
So, instead of using some cryptographic ...
3
votes
2answers
196 views
Why is h(m||k) insecure?
Here is the post that explains the failure for doing h(k||m) and I understand it.
But I don't understand how h(m||k) is subjected to collison attack, or birthday attack. Please explain?
3
votes
1answer
421 views
What are the differences between a digital signature, a MAC and a hash?
A message may be accompanied with a digital signature, a MAC or a message hash, as a proof of some kind.
Which assurances does each primitive provide to the recipient?
What kind of keys are needed?
1
vote
3answers
151 views
Message authentication codes construction
I was reading the paper $[1]$ and came across the scheme that I show below. While I understand the scheme well, I don't understand why they prepend a 0 to the block containing $r$ and a 1 to all other ...
1
vote
1answer
42 views
Secure MAC implies that probability of same tags on different messages is negligible
So let any secure MAC (message authentication code) be given.
Intuitively, I think it is clear that the probability of getting the same tag on two different messages is very small, i.e. negligible. I ...
-4
votes
3answers
147 views
Why shouldn't one build a MAC by XORing multiple message blocks?
I found this simple proposal for a MAC algorithm:
Let the MAC of message M (which consists of message blocks $M_1$,$M_2$, ..., $M_n$)
be the AES encryption with key K of the XOR of all the ...
0
votes
0answers
50 views
why these specific values used to initialize ipad & opad in HMAC [duplicate]
Possible Duplicate:
What do the magic numbers 0x5c and 0x36 in the opad/ipad calc in HMAC do?
I'm reading the book Network Security Essentials written by William Stallings.
in this book,in ...
1
vote
1answer
174 views
How do unkeyed hash functions (for MDCs) provide security?
Unkeyed hash functions are, by definition, hash functions computed without a key. SHA-1 is an example. MDCs (message digest codes) are a subclass of unkeyed hash functions. How are unkeyed hash ...
2
votes
2answers
235 views
Modifications of CBC-MAC
I'm preparing myself to exam, but I have a lot of troubles with rigorous proofs. This post is very long, but this is because I remind here 2 long definitions.
At the beginning I want to remind the ...
1
vote
1answer
105 views
Why do we need extra hashing if we could use simpler scheme?
Lets say that we use init vector IV, key K and HMAC key H. Message is M.
Mode of operation is CBC !!!
We usually encrypt as this
...
10
votes
3answers
254 views
Purpose of outer key in HMAC
From what I know, the HMAC constructions has two strength:
It's resistant to length extensions
Since the key is consumed before the message, the attacker does not know the initial state, preventing ...
4
votes
3answers
148 views
Can I jettison MAC if I already have SHA1(M)?
I'm currently using SSL with AES-CBC and HMAC for a file transfer containing string M. Now suppose Alice already knows SHA1(M) (and the adversary does not), and she downloads M from Bob using only ...
6
votes
3answers
203 views
Why is a MAC needed?
I agree that for certain encryption systems or modes of operation, a MAC is indispensible.
The best example are probably stream ciphers (and therefore also block ciphers in OFB or CTR mode) that ...
0
votes
1answer
512 views
Is MAC better than digital signature?
MACs differ from digital signatures in the sense that MAC values are both generated and verified using a shares secret key. Does this in any way put MAC on a disadvantage as compared to digital ...
1
vote
1answer
380 views
4
votes
2answers
226 views
Is the encryption of a hash a good MAC?
At university we were told that it is a bad idea to implement a MAC by simply concatenating a key with the data to sign and to run it through a hash function (e.g. $s = ...
3
votes
1answer
160 views
Using a derived key for CMAC
Consider the following authenticate-and-encrypt scheme that uses AES-128 in CBC mode for encryption and AES-128 - based CMAC for authentication:
Two keys are derived from the master key k (16 byte): ...
5
votes
1answer
2k views
HMAC vs MAC functions
I've read definitions of MAC and HMAC, but can't say I've completely grasped the differences.
What are principle differences?
When to use one and when the other?(Typical Use Cases)
5
votes
1answer
305 views
Why are MACs in general deterministic, whereas digital signature constructions are randomized?
The fact is I'm not quite sure if my question statement is true, however all the MAC constructions I know of (e.g. CBC-MAC, CMAC, HMAC) are deterministic, whereas many constructions for digital ...
6
votes
2answers
236 views
Attacks of the MAC construction $\mathcal{H}(m||k)$ for common hashes $\mathcal{H}$?
Consider a common practically-collision-resistant Merkle–Damgård hash function $\mathcal{H}$ (e.g. SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, SHA-256, SHA-512). We define a Message Authentication Code $\mathcal{C}$
$$(k,m) ...
6
votes
1answer
545 views
In which situations is a length-extension attack a problem?
A lot of hash functions, including the SHA-2 family(but not the SHA-3 candidates and SHA256d) are vulnerable to length extension attacks. But when is this property a problem?
I guess certain naive ...
2
votes
1answer
89 views
What “Tag Length” should be used for the EAX MAC?
Since EAX is very flexible with regard to the length of the calculated MAC (what they call "tag" is the MAC value right?), and the EAX paper as well as other documentations carefully avoid suggesting ...
9
votes
4answers
424 views
Can you make a hash out of a stream cipher?
A comment on another question made me wonder about something:
Assume you're on a rather constrained platform — say, a low-end embedded device — with no built-in crypto capabilities, ...
0
votes
1answer
139 views
Block ordering and security in a MAC?
To authenticate a message $m = m_1 \,\|\, \dots \,\|\,m_n$ the tag $t := F_k(r) \oplus F_k(m_1) \oplus \dotsb \oplus F_k(m_n)$ is used, where r is uniform random number $(0,1)^n$ and $m=(0,1)^n$. Even ...
1
vote
1answer
248 views
Is this fixed length MAC unforgeable?
Consider the following fixed length MAC for messages of length $\ell(n)=2n-2$ using a pseudorandom function $F$:
On input of a mesage $m_0||m_1$ ($|m_0| = |m_1| = n-1$) and a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$, ...
4
votes
2answers
187 views
Is SHA1 secure with such many inputs Z that Z = constant secret X + variable public Y?
Let me ask whether SHA1 is designed to be secure for the following case.
You compute each SHA1 of many strings,for example 1 million, where each string is a concatenation of X+Y ,
where X is secret ...
4
votes
2answers
213 views
Cost of attacking Mobile OTP with a fake server
You want to obtain a 74-bit secret $K$. There is an oracle that will provide you with the following value for several values of $T$:
...
1
vote
3answers
179 views
Realize a MAC using a Pseudo-random function?
Given a pseudo-random function and assuming that we do not have any other tools,
How can we construct a MAC?
I believe this can be done. Would like to know if there is more than one way of doing ...
3
votes
1answer
176 views
What type of hash functions provides non-malleability of hash digests?
I want to use a hash function for commitments. I don't want an attacker to construct a commitment related to a previously published (but still unopened) commitment.
A simple deterministic commitment ...
3
votes
1answer
178 views
How safe is it to derive MAC key from a hashed password?
Imagine I have a blob that I want to encrypt-then-MAC. Now, what I can realistically ask my users for (out of UX considerations) is just an encryption password. Naturally, I bcrypt original password ...
4
votes
1answer
125 views
What are the consequences of a MAC tag collision?
I've seen some proofs of MAC security that are based on the extremely-unlikely event that two MAC tags collide (ie, they are equal for distinct messages). Suppose that this extremely unlikely event ...
8
votes
1answer
314 views
Is H(k||length||x) a secure MAC construction?
If $H$ is a typical secure hash function, then $(k,x) \mapsto H(k \mid\mid x)$ is not a secure MAC construction, because given a known plaintext $x_1$ and its MAC $m_1$, an attacker can extend $k ...
4
votes
2answers
561 views
What is the purpose of four different secrets shared by client and server in SSL/TLS?
I was looking through the working of SSL V3, and found that a connection state is defined by a set of things, including
client write mac secret,
server write mac secret,
server write key,
client ...
11
votes
2answers
844 views
Why is H(k||x) not a secure MAC construction?
If H(m) is a secure hash function, can't we implement a MAC using H(k||m)?
However, it seems the more widely used MACs, such as NMAC and HMAC (both originally defined in Keying hash functions for ...
6
votes
1answer
1k views
Why is it insecure to use a randomized IV for CBC-MAC instead of an all-zero IV?
A fixed length CBC-MAC uses an all-zero block as the initialization vector.
Suppose that we used a randomized IV instead, and sent the IV along with the tag.
So if the message $m$ will be $m = b_1 || ...
5
votes
2answers
477 views
Encrypt-then-MAC Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity
Does Encrypt-then-MAC provide equal confidentiality, integrity and authenticity as other constructs such as EAX?
If yes, how do I go about using it?
My current understanding is:
E = ...
