(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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Nonces being used in SSL and MAC to prevent replay attacks

I'm a bit confused in the way nonces are used in these processes to prevent replay attacks. Heres How I think it works during SSL: Nonces are exchanged during stage one of the handshake protocol. ...
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1answer
83 views

Integrity protection in wireless sensor networks [closed]

I have done a lab about wireless sensor nodes and got in touch with encryption for the very first time. There are some questions on my sheet, especially on integrity protection (the attacker wants to ...
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1answer
208 views

CBC with a fixed or random IV

I have two probably quite naive questions: 1) Why, exactly, is it so bad to have a fixed (or predictable) IV in CBC mode? An example would be great! 2) Given 1), why is a random IV better? And if ...
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1answer
194 views

Why are there no MACs inspired by block cipher modes other than CBC and CFB?

I've been studying message authentication codes and I was wondering why a MAC can only be produced with AES in CBC and CFB mode and why not the other modes such as ECB, OFB and counter. Why are CBC ...
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1answer
122 views

Size of a MAC for a quickly checked message?

Let suppose that we have to check a message that was written one second ago. The message is discarded immediately after having being checked. What "minimal" size for such a MAC is secure ? Thank you. ...
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58 views

How to use HMAC for authenticating multiple messages

The standard HMAC function, $H(K, m)$, authenticates a single message $m$. Instead, I'd like to authenticate 2 messages, like this: $$H'(K, m_1, m_2)$$ The simplest solution, $H(K, m_1||m_2)$, ...
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1answer
119 views

Specific example of a MAC in TLS?

This seems like quite a dumb question, but I really don't know if I'm finding a answer anywhere. I understand that if i access a website that is secured with TLS, we exchange ciphersuites and so on, ...
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1answer
298 views

HMAC ipad and opad choice

It is written in the HMAC paper that the $ipad=0x36$ and $opad=0x5c$ were chosen such that it maximize the Hamming-Distance of the part of the key used in the inner and outer part of the HMAC process. ...
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2answers
424 views

Definition of “pepper” in hash functions

I am confused about the notion of "pepper" in the context of storing hashes of users' passwords. Definition 1: A pepper is a secret key Looking around the Internet, for example here or here, a ...
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2answers
173 views

Can a secret message be securely transmitted within a MAC tag?

A sender wants to transmit an ultra secret code $M$ which could be either 'go', 'stop' or 'wait'. This could be any selection of code words really and adopted for any use such as transmitting short ...
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3answers
251 views

Why is Poly1305 popular given its 'sudden death' properties?

ECDSA has the undesirable property that if a key pair reuses a nonce in a signing operation, the cryptosystem experiences catastrophic failure in the form of private key leakage. I've heard this ...
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1answer
243 views

How can CBC-MAC be secure when message length is fixed?

I was doing some self-initiated knowledge gathering about digests, signatures and hmacs and I ran across the fact that you can use CBC as a MAC, but if the message size is not fixed; then it is not ...
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2answers
121 views

Strange MAC algorithm

I'm working with a payment provider which uses the following algorithm for signing messages: The merchant is securely given a secret key k, known to them and the ...
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0answers
99 views

Using same key for encryption and ECBC-MAC k2

ECBC-MAC: $E_{k_2}(CBC-MAC_{k_1}(m))$ If we use same key for encryption (CTR or CFB) and k2 (end tag encryption) in ECBC-MAC in encrypt-than-MAC sheme, is it secure?
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1answer
105 views

Is XCBC where k2 and k3 might be the identical, secure?

XCBC paper says all three keys should be independent. It doesn't say they must always be different. However it seems this is necessary to differentiate padded message and message without padding. ...
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2answers
131 views

Is it safe to salt a MAC?

Say that I define a scheme where the salt is public and is MAC-ed with the message: $k = KDF(password, salt)$ $tag = MAC_k(salt || message)$ Is it safe to salt the MAC this way? Assume that the salt ...
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1answer
68 views

Efficiently show/prove knowledge of third party secret without leaking information

Say Alice publishes (i.e. all parties in the universe) a key or certificate $x$ and sends a secret $s$ to Bob. Bob then publishes some data $d$ (his identity or a message or smt.) and an ...
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2answers
306 views

Secure way to derive separate encryption and MAC keys from a single master key?

I want to derive a 256 bit encryption key and a 256 bit MAC key from a single 256 bit master key for an authenticated encryption scheme. I was considering the following construction to derive the two ...
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0answers
52 views

ECIES: Purpose of optional shared information?

According to Wikipedia the ECIES algorithm has two optional shared information $S_1$ and $S_2$. They are used as follows: Generate a random shared secret $Z$ according to ECIES, which will never be ...
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1answer
120 views

ECIES: Purpose of MAC?

Assumptions: $A$ wants to communicate with $B$ $A$ knows a public key $P_B$ which is trusted by a third party and belongs to $B$ $A$ knows the address of someone who pretends to be $B$ $A$ wants ...
3
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1answer
1k views

What are options to compute DES retail MAC (aka ISO 9797-1 mode 3) under PKCS#11?

The DES retail MAC, also known as ISO 9797-1 mode 3 with DES, computes the MAC of a block of data using a 16-byte (112 bit) key. It can be seen as CBC-MAC using simple DES with the first half of the ...
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2answers
459 views

AES-ECB as an authentication mechanism

ECB is considered to be insecure when used for confidentiality because identical plaintext result with identical ciphertext. But what if we use ECB for authentication? Assume A wants to transmit an ...
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1answer
850 views

How is HMAC hashed message decrypted on the receiver side

We know that MAC algorithm and key are used in both sender and receiver side to get the matching MAC tages to prove that the data is authentic. Now in HMAC we know that, it makes use of crytographic ...
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1answer
69 views

Is MAC algorithm same at both sender and receiver end

The MAC algortihm which is used along with a secret key to generate a MAC tag on the sender end ,is it same at the receiver end also who again uses a MAC algorithm to generate a tag? If yes, then how ...
3
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1answer
242 views

Regular MACs vs Carter-Wegman MAC

Carter-Wegman MAC variants (VMAC, UMAC etc) are known to be very fast and efficient when compared to MAC algorithms that are based on block ciphers and compression functions (like HMAC, CMAC etc). ...
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1answer
86 views

Parallel variant of Carter-Wegman MAC with incremental property

Is there any variant of the Carter-Wegman MAC algorithm that is fast, parallel and has the property of incremental crypto?
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490 views

Block-cipher based vs Hash based MAC

When it comes to MAC algorithms one can have many choices. CBC-MAC, CMAC, PMAC etc are some MAC algorithms that rely on block ciphers (ex AES) to generate a MAC. On the other hand HMAC is very popular ...
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2answers
361 views

Security issues of a MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC approach?

Encrypt-then-MAC does provide ciphertext integrity, but no plaintext integrity. With MAC-then-Encrypt it’s the other way around: Plaintext integrity but no ciphertext integrity. What comes to mind is ...
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1answer
173 views

Is MAC-then-encrypt with stream ciphers secure?

While thinking about this recent question about a hash-then encrypt design, I reread the MAC-encrypt vs. encrypt-MAC question and noticed this answer quoting a paper showing that MAC-then-encrypt is ...
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2answers
301 views

Why is MAC using nonce+message+hash(nonce+message+identifier) not the standard?

Given that we know that nonce + message + hash(nonce + message + mac-key) all inside the encryption makes it possible to detect if any bits of the message have been ...
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1answer
195 views

MAC using a modified CBC mode of operation

I'd like to know whether the following modified CBC-MAC is secure (given a fixed IV). Source: an old course on Network Security Are there some obvious attacks I can't see?
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1answer
572 views

Is there a generic attack on encrypted CRC32 when used as a MAC?

I am examining a protocol that uses CRC32 as a MAC (see note 1) the weaknesses of this method but I would nevertheless like to see if it is just weak or actually relatively easily to break. The ...
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1answer
788 views

Using GMAC for Authentication without encrypting the message

I am pretty new to cryptography and have a sample of GCM mode of operation for AES. PFB the code ...
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1answer
165 views

Is a keyed PRF a MAC?

I remember I read that a MAC can be considered as a PRF. Can a variable-length input keyed-PRF be considered as a MAC?
6
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1answer
378 views

Is HMAC needed for a SHA-3 based MAC?

HMAC does nested hashing in order to prevent Length Extension Attacks. Given that you use the SHA-3 hash (which is resistant against length extension attacks), would you still need to go through that ...
2
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2answers
240 views

Choice of MAC and handling it correctly

I have recently learned that Encrypt-then-MAC is recommended when using symmetric encryption. I have two closely related questions related to that, which is why I am posting them as one: Looking ...
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4answers
2k views

Why is plain-hash-then-encrypt not a secure MAC?

It seems that even in MAC-then-encrypt systems like SSL, something like HMAC is used rather than a plain hash. Why? Suppose we use some stream cipher; then why can't we use $Encrypt(m | H(m))$ as ...
6
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2answers
530 views

Does data authenticity always, implicitly, provide data integrity?

Does a scheme which provides data authenticity (e.g. HMAC or RSA signature) always implicitly provide integrity? It seems, to me at least, that it must by necessity. However, I have seen ...
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1answer
474 views

How is padding oracle attack mitigated by encrypt-then-MAC?

Let us suppose Alice sends a message to Bob. As far as I know, the most popular scheme of MAC-then-encrypt is as follows: Alice computes the HMAC of the plaintext using her private key, and then ...
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1answer
74 views

Security assessment between $g^{a_ix_i+r_i}$ and $g^{x_i+r_i}$ [closed]

Imagine a tagging system whose security requirements imply to learn nothing from the tag about the encoded value. We consider a plaintext space $X \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a group $\mathbb{G}$ where ...
10
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1answer
640 views

Cryptographically secure keyed rolling hash function

I could not find any mention on the Internet of a proven/known cryptographically secure keyed rolling hash function (ie rolling MAC). Has the question been studied, is it possible to build one ? By ...
3
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1answer
215 views

When is it safe to not use authenticated encryption?

I have read the post Why should I use Authenticated Encryption instead of just encryption? When is it safe to not use authenticated encryption? I assumed hard drive volume encryption or per file ...
3
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1answer
231 views

Why must IV be sent with each packet?

I was reading about Encrypt-then-MAC and everywhere I go it seems people include the IV with the ciphertext generated for each message then MAC that and send all the information concatenated. Why do ...
2
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1answer
240 views

How can I validate my implementation of Ansi 9.19?

I implemented an Ansi 9.19 mac generator in java, but now I don't know how to validate its functionality. I couldn't find any sample of a {plain text,key,mac} on the internet, and I want to know if ...
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0answers
160 views

CBC MAC and DES combined question?

Suppose that we want to develop a MAC scheme which is as secure as Triple-DES CBC-MAC and at the same time as efficient as Single-DES CBC-MAC. We come up with the following idea: Except the last ...
9
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1answer
209 views

Can Skein be used as a secure MAC in format H(k || m)?

Can Skein be used as a secure MAC in format H(k || m)? I understand it can work with HMAC, but it is fine as a one-pass MAC in the format above and resists length extension attacks. Is this ...
3
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1answer
397 views

Should HMAC or NMAC or plain Keccak be used for a secure MAC?

After some digging around in the HMAC spec I found this (paraphrased): Step 1: If the length of Key equals the block size of the hash function (512 bits/64 Bytes for SHA-256), set the key equal ...
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149 views

Why does HMAC use two different keys?

Suppose $H$ is a hash function; why is $H(k||H(k||m))$ not secure? See this HMAC definition. In there, indeed two keys are used and the mac algorithm is $H(k_1 ||H(k_2 ||m))$ . Why don't we use ...
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1answer
2k views

Use cases for CMAC vs. HMAC?

Both can be used to verify the integrity of a message. Assuming you have the needed primitives available to you (i.e. the code space of needing both a cipher and a hash function isn't prohibitive), is ...
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1answer
73 views

MAC security and adversaries with memory

The usual definition of MAC security is (roughly) that there is no "efficient" adversary that has non-negligible advantage in the "MAC game" where the MAC game is as follows: the challenger chooses a ...