(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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548 views

Has GMAC mode a future outside GCM?

Once gcm has been implemented for providing both encryption & authentication solution , it appears obvious to consider that such implementation can also provide (if required by new user) a Mac ...
4
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756 views

GCM vs CTR+HMAC tradeoffs

So these days I see everyone using AES-GCM. What are its advantages over simple CTR+HMAC modes? Is it speed? Or ciphertext length? And what are the security tradeoffs, both in terms of practical ...
4
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473 views

Is there a generic attack on encrypted CRC32 when used as a MAC?

I am examining a protocol that uses CRC32 as a MAC (see note 1) the weaknesses of this method but I would nevertheless like to see if it is just weak or actually relatively easily to break. The ...
4
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1answer
187 views

Keyed digest function with odds of collision below the birthday bound?

I wonder if it is possible to devise a function $F(K,S,R_S)\mapsto D$ where: $K$ is some key (I have freedom on $K$, it could even be generated by a trusted party); $S$ is in $\{0,1\}^s$, say ...
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2answers
539 views

What is the definition of “security beyond the birthday paradox”?

I'm reading a paper about MACs and I would like to be sure about the meaning of a security beyond the birthday paradox. Is there a definition?
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406 views

Using a derived key for CMAC

Consider the following authenticate-and-encrypt scheme that uses AES-128 in CBC mode for encryption and AES-128 - based CMAC for authentication: Two keys are derived from the master key k (16 byte): ...
4
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1answer
213 views

How to design a practical and secure MAC scheme?

I am sorry, but I need to introduce some concepts which are not directly related to cryptography to make myself clear, I hope I won't stun you with this ... (I'd rather explain it here than redirect ...
4
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1answer
71 views

Parallel authentication of encrypted data. What AE type to choose?

I've got a system with a slow data transfer channel. Transferring a message through several channels does increase the transfer speed significatnly. AES-CBC+HMAC is good except that verifying the MAC ...
3
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2answers
390 views

AES-ECB as an authentication mechanism

ECB is considered to be insecure when used for confidentiality because identical plaintext result with identical ciphertext. But what if we use ECB for authentication? Assume A wants to transmit an ...
3
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1answer
855 views

CBC-MAC , fixed length, all blocks returned

CBC-MAC, with fixed length message. Is it safe to return all ciphered blocks instead of the last? My intuition says it is less secure, since is gives an attacker more information. But how could one ...
3
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2answers
116 views

Strange MAC algorithm

I'm working with a payment provider which uses the following algorithm for signing messages: The merchant is securely given a secret key k, known to them and the ...
3
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2answers
320 views

Security issues of a MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC approach?

Encrypt-then-MAC does provide ciphertext integrity, but no plaintext integrity. With MAC-then-Encrypt it’s the other way around: Plaintext integrity but no ciphertext integrity. What comes to mind is ...
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2answers
295 views

Does encrypting a hash of the message yield a secure MAC?

Is $mac = enc(hash(x))$ a secure MAC for hash = SHA256 and enc AES in CBC mode or ECB mode. Normally AES-CBC is malleable. But in this case I use a hash function for the one-way property. For ...
3
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1answer
213 views

Non-cryptographic hash function as MAC for stream ciphers

I understand that for a stream cipher to be useful, there must be a way to verify that the message was not tampered with (bits were flipped by an attacker). So, instead of using some cryptographic ...
3
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1answer
301 views

How safe is it to derive MAC key from a hashed password?

Imagine I have a blob that I want to encrypt-then-MAC. Now, what I can realistically ask my users for (out of UX considerations) is just an encryption password. Naturally, I bcrypt original password ...
3
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2answers
243 views

Is there a companion algorithm for OTP to ensure integrity and/or authentication?

One-Time Padding is (theoretically) perfect encryption algorithm. Let's assume that these problems are solved: Fast generation of independent and identically distributed random variables Perfect key ...
3
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1answer
197 views

When is it safe to not use authenticated encryption?

I have read the post Why should I use Authenticated Encryption instead of just encryption? When is it safe to not use authenticated encryption? I assumed hard drive volume encryption or per file ...
3
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1answer
299 views

Should HMAC or NMAC or plain Keccak be used for a secure MAC?

After some digging around in the HMAC spec I found this (paraphrased): Step 1: If the length of Key equals the block size of the hash function (512 bits/64 Bytes for SHA-256), set the key equal ...
3
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1answer
151 views

When truncating an AES MAC value by “w” , how do I justify that “w” is still negligible?

I'm taking an online class on cryptography at corsera.org / Stanford, and the professor is explaining that it's OK to truncate an AES MAC to $w$ bits as long as $1/2^w$ is still negligible (say $w ...
3
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1answer
360 views

What type of hash functions provides non-malleability of hash digests?

I want to use a hash function for commitments. I don't want an attacker to construct a commitment related to a previously published (but still unopened) commitment. A simple deterministic commitment ...
3
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1answer
618 views

What are options to compute DES retail MAC (aka ISO 9797-1 mode 3) under PKCS#11?

The DES retail MAC, also known as ISO 9797-1 mode 3 with DES, computes the MAC of a block of data using a 16-byte (112 bit) key. It can be seen as CBC-MAC using simple DES with the first half of the ...
3
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1answer
454 views

Using GMAC for Authentication without encrypting the message

I am pretty new to cryptography and have a sample of GCM mode of operation for AES. PFB the code ...
3
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1answer
399 views

Advantages/disadvantages of different message numbering schemes

For a stream of packets, where each packet is individually encrypted with a block cipher, it's desirable to have each encrypted packet only valid for that position in the stream. A message number ...
3
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1answer
324 views

Can i modify data “protected” by a CRC16?

There are 100 bytes with a CRC16. However I only know the first 50. I want to change byte 5 from a known value X to another value Y, and fix up the CRC16 to be valid - without knowing bytes 50-100. ...
3
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1answer
164 views

What “Tag Length” should be used for the EAX MAC?

Since EAX is very flexible with regard to the length of the calculated MAC (what they call "tag" is the MAC value right?), and the EAX paper as well as other documentations carefully avoid suggesting ...
3
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1answer
181 views

Regular MACs vs Carter-Wegman MAC

Carter-Wegman MAC variants (VMAC, UMAC etc) are known to be very fast and efficient when compared to MAC algorithms that are based on block ciphers and compression functions (like HMAC, CMAC etc). ...
3
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2answers
141 views

What is the function of the secret key “r” in Poly1305?

Poly1305-AES uses two per-connection keys $k$ (for AES) and $r$ (for Poly1305's compression function) and a per-message nonce n to execute. I've read the original paper on the implementation, and I ...
3
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1answer
101 views

OMAC : Padding on empty string

I started to implement some MAC since last week with the specifications given here. I'm currently testing the OMAC (one-key CBC) with test vectors. In the OMAC specifications at page 4, they explain ...
3
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1answer
76 views

Should I use distinct MACs for each user, or should I use a *direction* flag when communicating?

Alice and Bob want to communicate using a stream cipher. At the beggining, they create a session key $K_s$ and exchange it via some secure channel (using some asymmetric algorithm). After every ...
3
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1answer
82 views

Padding in PMAC

How does padding in PMAC work? I have been told two stories: Firstly, I have been told that it works similar to CMAC padding, and secondly, I have been told that it does not need padding. I find the ...
3
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1answer
1k views

ANSI X9.9 Cryptography Standards

I'm trying to create a ISO8583 Rev93 message. What is the standard way of generating MAC key in ANSI X9.9 DES-CBC encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the ...
3
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2answers
56 views

Does AES(x || x) provide secure message authentication when message fits in a single block?

Suppose I have x = <64 bits of data>. I build a 128 bit block $P = x || x$, and transmit a message $M = AES(K, P)$. The receiver has the same $K$. The ...
3
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1answer
49 views

Can I reduce the MAC size in TLS?

The MAC size is reduced to 80 bits in truncated_hmac extension , which says "forging of MAC values cannot be done off-line: in TLS, a single failed MAC guess will cause the immediate termination of ...
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2answers
158 views

Can a secret message be securely transmitted within a MAC tag?

A sender wants to transmit an ultra secret code $M$ which could be either 'go', 'stop' or 'wait'. This could be any selection of code words really and adopted for any use such as transmitting short ...
3
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1answer
215 views

Why must IV be sent with each packet?

I was reading about Encrypt-then-MAC and everywhere I go it seems people include the IV with the ciphertext generated for each message then MAC that and send all the information concatenated. Why do ...
3
votes
1answer
277 views

Is this an acceptable authenticated encryption?

After much deliberation, I've decided to use a normal Encrypt-then-MAC scheme instead of an authenticated encryption mode such as GCM as authenticated encryption primitive. This is due to the lack of ...
3
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0answers
97 views

HMAC definition by using only one key

Suppose $H$ is a hash function; why is $H(k||H(k||m))$ not secure? See this HMAC definition. In there, indeed two keys are used and the mac algorithm is $H(k_1 ||H(k_2 ||m))$ . Why don't we use ...
2
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1answer
162 views

Authentication using AES

I need to implement an authentication mechanism in an embedded environment which does not support floating point operations but has an AES accelerator module which allows for encyption/decryption ...
2
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2answers
238 views

Choice of MAC and handling it correctly

I have recently learned that Encrypt-then-MAC is recommended when using symmetric encryption. I have two closely related questions related to that, which is why I am posting them as one: Looking ...
2
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3answers
245 views

Message authentication codes construction

I was reading the paper $[1]$ and came across the scheme that I show below. While I understand the scheme well, I don't understand why they prepend a 0 to the block containing $r$ and a 1 to all other ...
2
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2answers
242 views

Why is MAC using nonce+message+hash(nonce+message+identifier) not the standard?

Given that we know that nonce + message + hash(nonce + message + mac-key) all inside the encryption makes it possible to detect if any bits of the message have been ...
2
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1answer
163 views

Why do we need extra hashing if we could use simpler scheme?

Lets say that we use init vector IV, key K and HMAC key H. Message is M. Mode of operation is CBC !!! We usually encrypt this way: ...
2
votes
2answers
316 views

Encrypting and MACing different data with same key

It's a well-known best practice to not use one key to both encrypt and MAC data. In my application, there are instances where I MAC a piece of data without having encrypted it first. Do I still need a ...
2
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2answers
507 views

Modifications of CBC-MAC

I'm preparing myself to exam, but I have a lot of troubles with rigorous proofs. This post is very long, but this is because I remind here 2 long definitions. At the beginning I want to remind the ...
2
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3answers
318 views

Realize a MAC using a Pseudo-random function?

Given a pseudo-random function and assuming that we do not have any other tools, How can we construct a MAC? I believe this can be done. Would like to know if there is more than one way of doing ...
2
votes
1answer
282 views

Why is this MAC based on secure PRF with ordering and randomization insecure?

Is this MAC secure: To authenticate a message $m=m_1||\ldots||m_l$ where $m_i \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, choose $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ at random, compute $$t:=F_k(r)\oplus F_k(\langle 1\rangle || ...
2
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1answer
95 views

Is it possible to generate a message using the mac and the key?

Say that you have the Key and the MAC value that was generated from the Key using CBC. Is it possible to generate a message with just the mac and the key? If so, how would you do it?
2
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1answer
78 views

Is XCBC where k2 and k3 might be the identical, secure?

XCBC paper says all three keys should be independent. It doesn't say they must always be different. However it seems this is necessary to differentiate padded message and message without padding. ...
2
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2answers
119 views

Is it safe to salt a MAC?

Say that I define a scheme where the salt is public and is MAC-ed with the message: $k = KDF(password, salt)$ $tag = MAC_k(salt || message)$ Is it safe to salt the MAC this way? Assume that the salt ...
2
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1answer
314 views

How is padding oracle attack mitigated by encrypt-then-MAC?

Let us suppose Alice sends a message to Bob. As far as I know, the most popular scheme of MAC-then-encrypt is as follows: Alice computes the HMAC of the plaintext using her private key, and then ...