(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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349 views

Secure way to derive separate encryption and MAC keys from a single master key?

I want to derive a 256 bit encryption key and a 256 bit MAC key from a single 256 bit master key for an authenticated encryption scheme. I was considering the following construction to derive the two ...
5
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1answer
621 views

For a one-time pad, which MAC method is information-theoretically secure?

In the the main post about MAC methods it mentions a few methods: Authenticate And Encrypt: The sender computes a MAC of the plaintext, encrypts the plaintext, and then appends the MAC to the ...
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100 views

Is reusing keys for CBC and CBC-MAC secure when using encrypt-then-MAC?

I know reusing keys is a bad idea, especially for CBC and CBC-MAC, but the example for why on Wikipedia seemed to use encrypt-and-MAC. It seems obvious that the last block of encryption will be equal ...
5
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1answer
168 views

How would you encrypt-then-MAC when using pen-and-paper and a Caesar cipher?

I'll probably get shot for asking this, but I've got some kids (aged 8-10) in my neighbourhood that I've been showing/teaching the simple pen-and-paper Caesar cipher and they're successfully playing ...
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1answer
857 views

Has GMAC mode a future outside GCM?

Once gcm has been implemented for providing both encryption & authentication solution , it appears obvious to consider that such implementation can also provide (if required by new user) a Mac ...
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449 views

Cost of attacking Mobile OTP with a fake server

You want to obtain a 74-bit secret $K$. There is an oracle that will provide you with the following value for several values of $T$: ...
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1answer
89 views

Do Carter–Wegman MACs allow key reuse if the MAC tag is kept secret?

Poly1305 (and GHASH) are secure authenticators, but only for one use. Thus, nonce reuse in Poly1305-AES, ChaCha20-Poly1305, and AES-GCM all reveal the authentication key. However, my understanding ...
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1answer
167 views

Fast 128-bit MAC with second preimage resistance?

I have an application that needs a fast 128-bit MAC to guarantee message authenticity in a protocol. I would like to reuse this MAC value as a binding identifier, so that even those who know the key ...
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1k views

How is digital signature different from a message authentication code (MAC)?

I know the definitions of both but can't specifically tell how they are different and if one is better than the other. Please help.
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270 views

HMAC construction based on the combination of two hash functions

I would like an $\operatorname{HMAC}$ that's based on two different hash functions ($H_1$ and $H_2$), so that a break of the combined $\operatorname{HMAC}$ would imply a break of ...
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232 views

Is SHA1 secure with such many inputs Z that Z = constant secret X + variable public Y?

Let me ask whether SHA1 is designed to be secure for the following case. You compute each SHA1 of many strings,for example 1 million, where each string is a concatenation of X+Y , where X is secret ...
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64 views

Strength of $H(k\|H(m))$ as a MAC algorithm

What is the strength of $H(k \| H(m))$ compared to HMAC? Compared to $H(m \| k)$? What is the strength in bits of a given key/output size?
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352 views

How safe is it to derive MAC key from a hashed password?

Imagine I have a blob that I want to encrypt-then-MAC. Now, what I can realistically ask my users for (out of UX considerations) is just an encryption password. Naturally, I bcrypt original password ...
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1answer
493 views

Why are collision attacks important when talking about MAC schemes?

I'm reading Ferguson, Schneier, and Kouno's Cryptography Engineering, and it has a section on MACs. It discusses different types of MACs, but it seems to claim that to acheive 128-bit level security, ...
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1answer
64 views

What is the difference between MACTripleDES and TripleDES?

I was asked to encrypt/decrypt a string using MACTripleDES. Is there any difference between MACTripleDES and TripleDES? If, where exactly is the difference between both?
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1answer
680 views

Is there a generic attack on encrypted CRC32 when used as a MAC?

I am examining a protocol that uses CRC32 as a MAC (see note 1) the weaknesses of this method but I would nevertheless like to see if it is just weak or actually relatively easily to break. The ...
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1answer
195 views

Keyed digest function with odds of collision below the birthday bound?

I wonder if it is possible to devise a function $F(K,S,R_S)\mapsto D$ where: $K$ is some key (I have freedom on $K$, it could even be generated by a trusted party); $S$ is in $\{0,1\}^s$, say ...
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727 views

What is the definition of “security beyond the birthday paradox”?

I'm reading a paper about MACs and I would like to be sure about the meaning of a security beyond the birthday paradox. Is there a definition?
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569 views

Using a derived key for CMAC

Consider the following authenticate-and-encrypt scheme that uses AES-128 in CBC mode for encryption and AES-128 - based CMAC for authentication: Two keys are derived from the master key k (16 byte): ...
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1answer
50 views

Prove that the following MAC is insecure

I am trying to prove that the following MAC is insecure, but I don't know how to exploit the properties of the pseudorandom function $F$ involved: Gen generates a uniform $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$. To ...
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1answer
247 views

How to design a practical and secure MAC scheme?

I am sorry, but I need to introduce some concepts which are not directly related to cryptography to make myself clear, I hope I won't stun you with this ... (I'd rather explain it here than redirect ...
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1answer
68 views

Is it wise to use HOTP (raw bytes) as a key for HMAC?

Assume I have client and server applications with a shared master secret KEY_SECRET already in place. Also assume that the client and server have an implicit shared ...
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1answer
112 views

Parallel authentication of encrypted data. What AE type to choose?

I've got a system with a slow data transfer channel. Transferring a message through several channels does increase the transfer speed significatnly. AES-CBC+HMAC is good except that verifying the MAC ...
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54 views

Authenticated encryption with Enc-Sign-Mac

I've given a CPA secure private key encryption scheme, an unforgeable private key MAC scheme and an unforgeable public key signature scheme. I want to combine them to protect confidentiality, ...
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1answer
841 views

Authentication using AES

I need to implement an authentication mechanism in an embedded environment which does not support floating point operations but has an AES accelerator module which allows for encyption/decryption ...
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2answers
501 views

AES-ECB as an authentication mechanism

ECB is considered to be insecure when used for confidentiality because identical plaintext result with identical ciphertext. But what if we use ECB for authentication? Assume A wants to transmit an ...
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545 views

Why can't we use the first block of AES-CBC as MAC

As per topic, why can't we use the first block as MAC instead of using the last block? what's the rationale?
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387 views

Security issues of a MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC approach?

Encrypt-then-MAC does provide ciphertext integrity, but no plaintext integrity. With MAC-then-Encrypt it’s the other way around: Plaintext integrity but no ciphertext integrity. What comes to mind is ...
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1answer
990 views

CBC-MAC , fixed length, all blocks returned

CBC-MAC, with fixed length message. Is it safe to return all ciphered blocks instead of the last? My intuition says it is less secure, since is gives an attacker more information. But how could one ...
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127 views

Strange MAC algorithm

I'm working with a payment provider which uses the following algorithm for signing messages: The merchant is securely given a secret key k, known to them and the ...
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341 views

Does encrypting a hash of the message yield a secure MAC?

Is $mac = enc(hash(x))$ a secure MAC for hash = SHA256 and enc AES in CBC mode or ECB mode. Normally AES-CBC is malleable. But in this case I use a hash function for the one-way property. For ...
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1answer
244 views

Non-cryptographic hash function as MAC for stream ciphers

I understand that for a stream cipher to be useful, there must be a way to verify that the message was not tampered with (bits were flipped by an attacker). So, instead of using some cryptographic ...
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2answers
269 views

Is there a companion algorithm for OTP to ensure integrity and/or authentication?

One-Time Padding is (theoretically) perfect encryption algorithm. Let's assume that these problems are solved: Fast generation of independent and identically distributed random variables Perfect key ...
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1answer
65 views

Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?

There are a number of message authentication codes (MACs) used in practice. They are highly used in practice (f.ex. in TLS), but there's (at least) one application where they can't be used: Full Disk ...
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1answer
220 views

When is it safe to not use authenticated encryption?

I have read the post Why should I use Authenticated Encryption instead of just encryption? When is it safe to not use authenticated encryption? I assumed hard drive volume encryption or per file ...
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1answer
450 views

Should HMAC or NMAC or plain Keccak be used for a secure MAC?

After some digging around in the HMAC spec I found this (paraphrased): Step 1: If the length of Key equals the block size of the hash function (512 bits/64 Bytes for SHA-256), set the key equal ...
3
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1answer
207 views

When truncating an AES MAC value by “w” , how do I justify that “w” is still negligible?

I'm taking an online class on cryptography at corsera.org / Stanford, and the professor is explaining that it's OK to truncate an AES MAC to $w$ bits as long as $1/2^w$ is still negligible (say $w ...
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1answer
403 views

What type of hash functions provides non-malleability of hash digests?

I want to use a hash function for commitments. I don't want an attacker to construct a commitment related to a previously published (but still unopened) commitment. A simple deterministic commitment ...
3
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1answer
20 views

Encrypt-then-MAC when encrypting data in multiple blocks

Given a stream cipher such as ChaCha20 and a MAC such as Poly1305, how do we handle data that comes in chunks in the encrypt-then-MAC scheme ? For example, the plaintext is 530 bytes long. We read ...
3
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1answer
103 views

Encrypt-then-authenticate variant used in IPsec

I am trying to understand the variant of Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA) that is used in IPsec. For this I have looked at this chapter. What I got so far is that the integrity and confidentiality ...
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1answer
1k views

What are options to compute DES retail MAC (aka ISO 9797-1 mode 3) under PKCS#11?

The DES retail MAC, also known as ISO 9797-1 mode 3 with DES, computes the MAC of a block of data using a 16-byte (112 bit) key. It can be seen as CBC-MAC using simple DES with the first half of the ...
3
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1answer
263 views

Derive both MAC and AES keys from same PBKDF2?

When doing password-based encryption, is it OK to create one instance of PBKDF2 from the password, and then use it to create both the AES key and the MAC key? (Or should a new instance of PBKDF2 be ...
3
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1answer
623 views

Advantages/disadvantages of different message numbering schemes

For a stream of packets, where each packet is individually encrypted with a block cipher, it's desirable to have each encrypted packet only valid for that position in the stream. A message number ...
3
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1answer
435 views

Can i modify data “protected” by a CRC16?

There are 100 bytes with a CRC16. However I only know the first 50. I want to change byte 5 from a known value X to another value Y, and fix up the CRC16 to be valid - without knowing bytes 50-100. ...
3
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1answer
97 views

Padding in PMAC

How does padding in PMAC work? I have been told two stories: Firstly, I have been told that it works similar to CMAC padding, and secondly, I have been told that it does not need padding. I find the ...
3
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1answer
218 views

What “Tag Length” should be used for the EAX MAC?

Since EAX is very flexible with regard to the length of the calculated MAC (what they call "tag" is the MAC value right?), and the EAX paper as well as other documentations carefully avoid suggesting ...
3
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2answers
2k views

ANSI X9.9 Cryptography Standards

I'm trying to create a ISO8583 Rev93 message. What is the standard way of generating MAC key in ANSI X9.9 DES-CBC encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the ...
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2answers
184 views

What is the function of the secret key “r” in Poly1305?

Poly1305-AES uses two per-connection keys $k$ (for AES) and $r$ (for Poly1305's compression function) and a per-message nonce n to execute. I've read the original paper on the implementation, and I ...
3
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1answer
110 views

OMAC : Padding on empty string

I started to implement some MAC since last week with the specifications given here. I'm currently testing the OMAC (one-key CBC) with test vectors. In the OMAC specifications at page 4, they explain ...
3
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1answer
83 views

Should I use distinct MACs for each user, or should I use a *direction* flag when communicating?

Alice and Bob want to communicate using a stream cipher. At the beggining, they create a session key $K_s$ and exchange it via some secure channel (using some asymmetric algorithm). After every ...