(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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Is it possible to find a preimage for a reduced size hash?

Given a message $M$ and a 256 bit key $K$, perform HMAC($K$, $M$) with a 256 bit hash function resulting in: $a$ = ...
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4answers
292 views

Using the output of a stream cipher, how to guarantee the integrity of 4 bytes of data?

I am designing a simple and secure stream communication protocol. My idea was to build each message sent to the wire as: (message size || clear text || UHASH(message size || clear text)) $\oplus$ ...
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2answers
182 views

How secure is passing a MAC to Python's random.seed before using random.choice to generate a MAC?

I'd like to use Python's random.choice seeded with a HMAC-SHA1 tag to generate a MAC encoded in a variable set of chars. ...
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61 views

Secure MAC implies that probability of same tags on different messages is negligible

So let any secure MAC (message authentication code) be given. Intuitively, I think it is clear that the probability of getting the same tag on two different messages is very small, i.e. negligible. I ...
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285 views

How do unkeyed hash functions (for MDCs) provide security?

Unkeyed hash functions are, by definition, hash functions computed without a key. SHA-1 is an example. MDCs (message digest codes) are a subclass of unkeyed hash functions. How are unkeyed hash ...
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465 views

Is this fixed length MAC unforgeable?

Consider the following fixed length MAC for messages of length $\ell(n)=2n-2$ using a pseudorandom function $F$: On input of a mesage $m_0||m_1$ ($|m_0| = |m_1| = n-1$) and a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$, ...
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142 views

Derive both MAC and AES keys from same PBKDF2?

When doing password-based encryption, is it OK to create one instance of PBKDF2 from the password, and then use it to create both the AES key and the MAC key? (Or should a new instance of PBKDF2 be ...
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189 views

Block ordering and security in a MAC?

To authenticate a message $m = m_1 \,\|\, \dots \,\|\,m_n$ the tag $t := F_k(r) \oplus F_k(m_1) \oplus \dotsb \oplus F_k(m_n)$ is used, where r is uniform random number $(0,1)^n$ and $m=(0,1)^n$. Even ...
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CBC MAC and DES combined question?

Suppose that we want to develop a MAC scheme which is as secure as Triple-DES CBC-MAC and at the same time as efficient as Single-DES CBC-MAC. We come up with the following idea: Except the last ...
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115 views

For a one-time pad, which MAC method is information-theoretically secure?

In the the main post about MAC methods it mentions a few methods: Authenticate And Encrypt: The sender computes a MAC of the plaintext, encrypts the plaintext, and then appends the MAC to the ...
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61 views

Why don't we use H(m||k) as a MAC? [duplicate]

HMAC seems a bit complicated. Why can't we use $H(m||k)$ as a MAC? Unlike $H(k||m)$, length extension attacks won't work. Is there some other obvious attack?
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Security of .net AES implementation and security of a hash MAC

My question rather splits into two sections: Is AES correctly and security implemented in the .net Framework? Are there any reviews of implementation mistakes that would weaken the security of AES ...
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198 views

What block cipher is used for CBC-MAC?

What block cipher is used for CBC-MAC? DES, AES, 3DES? Or it doesn't matter?
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1answer
98 views

AES CBC MAC splicing attack

I'm trying to implement AES CBC MAC splicing attack in Python, the idea is: given a message M, its tag Tm (MAC(M) = T), a new message N and its tag Tn we build a message such as: M||N = (M1, ..., Mn, ...
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2k views

Is MAC better than digital signature?

MACs differ from digital signatures in the sense that MAC values are both generated and verified using a shares secret key. Does this in any way put MAC on a disadvantage as compared to digital ...
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63 views

Composing hashes and/or MACs

Suppose I have n hash/MAC functions, of which n-1 are extremely insecure, leaving only one that is in fact cryptographically secure. If I use all of them on a message and the XOR them together the ...
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2answers
558 views

Deriving HMAC key and cipher key from passphrase? [duplicate]

I'm encrypting a file with AES-256 in CBC mode. I needed to add an HMAC for authentication and validation of the file contents and passphrase, so I used a SHA-256 HMAC over chunks of my file ...
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1answer
100 views

Why is appending the key to a mesage and then hashing that insecure if the hash isn't weakly collision resistant? [duplicate]

Suppose I have H(M|K) and that H is not weakly collision resistant. If I have a message mac pair (M,MAC), how is it possible to find another message mac pair (M2,MAC2)? My thinking for this problem is ...
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62 views

How do they implement MAC in TLS?

I recently read questions about "MAC then Encrypt/Encrypt then MAC" which made me curious about how they actually use the algorithm. MAC only calculated once either case (according to what I read). ...
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122 views

Cryptographic Primitive Method

Is there any cryptographic primitive bijective (one-to-one and onto) function for creating cryptographic tools like symmetric encryption/decryption, Hash code generator, MAC, HMAC and Random number ...
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93 views

Attacking both authenticity and secrecy in authenticated encryption modes

looks like NIST only approved GCM mode for authenticated encryption and other modes don't have any approval or a good implementation available. Is that possible a weakness in $GHASH$ compromise ...