(or message authentication code), a short piece of information used to authenticate a message, and the algorithm to create and check such information, using a secret key.

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59 views

Why reveal MAC-keys after using them?

As far as my understanding goes MACs are used to determine whether the received message comes from a source that has access to a MAC-key which is known by both parties. Some crypto protocols reveal ...
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149 views

Why does HMAC use two different keys?

Suppose $H$ is a hash function; why is $H(k||H(k||m))$ not secure? See this HMAC definition. In there, indeed two keys are used and the mac algorithm is $H(k_1 ||H(k_2 ||m))$ . Why don't we use ...
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94 views

Performing HMAC with random key before MAC comparison

In Laravel (a PHP framework) I can see that they calculate a HMAC with a random key over the final HMAC before comparison. This additional HMAC calculation is of course performed for both the ...
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99 views

Using same key for encryption and ECBC-MAC k2

ECBC-MAC: $E_{k_2}(CBC-MAC_{k_1}(m))$ If we use same key for encryption (CTR or CFB) and k2 (end tag encryption) in ECBC-MAC in encrypt-than-MAC sheme, is it secure?
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52 views

ECIES: Purpose of optional shared information?

According to Wikipedia the ECIES algorithm has two optional shared information $S_1$ and $S_2$. They are used as follows: Generate a random shared secret $Z$ according to ECIES, which will never be ...
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12 views

Do Wegman-Carter authenticators allow key reuse if the authenticator result is kept secret?

Poly1305 (and GHASH) are secure authenticators, but only for one use. Thus, nonce reuse in Poly1305-AES, ChaCha20-Poly1305, and AES-GCM all reveal the authentication key. However, my understanding ...
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41 views

Why does OMAC2 exist?

The specification for OMAC has the following to say about OMAC2: For OMAC2, we adopted u−1 instead of u2 as Cst2. It requires one right shift to compute L· u−1 instead of one left shift to compute ...
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130 views

Security of basic SHA256 MAC in an authenticate-then-encrypt scheme

I know the following construct is insecure if the MAC as defined below is appended to the encrypted message in an Encrypt then Authenticate (EtA) scheme. $k_1$: encryption key $k_2$: authentication ...
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160 views

CBC MAC and DES combined question?

Suppose that we want to develop a MAC scheme which is as secure as Triple-DES CBC-MAC and at the same time as efficient as Single-DES CBC-MAC. We come up with the following idea: Except the last ...
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161 views

Security of .net AES implementation and security of a hash MAC

My question rather splits into two sections: Is AES correctly and security implemented in the .net Framework? Are there any reviews of implementation mistakes that would weaken the security of AES ...
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53 views

Detecting Software Changes - Verifying untampered code

This question assumes an environment devoid of any internet connections, the software in questions operates in a non-connected environment on a single machine. I have a piece of software that may be ...
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37 views

Non CPA on custom MAC

While preparing for a crypto exam there is a task we don't really understand: task Let $E_K$ be a permutation $\{0,1\}^b \rightarrow \{0,1\}^b$ defined by a blockcipher with the key $K$. Let $M = ...
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91 views

Which of these is a secure MAC?

Let (S,V) be a secure MAC defined over $(K,M,T)$ where $M = \{0,1\}^n$ and $T =\{0,1\}^{128}$. Which of the following is a secure MAC: $S'(k,m) = S(k,m)[0,\ldots,126]\quad and \quad V'(k,m,t) = ...