What is the impact of a server not fully verifying the data in the Client Finished packet of a TLS connection?
F5 BIG-IP devices suffer from a vulnerability in which not all bytes of the Finished packet in a TLS connection are validated. The sort-of technical description can be found here. F5 don't consider it ...
Here's something that is bugging me recently: suppose that me and my friend establish an OTR session and - as a result of that - DH key exchange is performed. My friend verifies my key, but I cannot ...
I would like to seek confirmation/clarification of the following statements about IKE: IKEv1 aggressive mode is supposed to be “insecure” if used with PSK. But as far as I can see, correct (or more ...
Is MITM attack theoretically possible after public/private key pair exchange is done successfully. Say Alice and Bob have genuine public keys of each other. Is MITM possible further during ...
Suppose the honest parties - Alice and Bob - exchange public key in person/via telephone so that attacker can only eavedrop on the line. Alice has hashed the public key using a collision resistance ...