A side-channel attack on implementations of encryption modes that use padding (e.g. ECB, CBC) that uses information leaked during decryption of tampered ciphertext values to derive information about the plaintext.

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Defending hybrid encryption schemes against padding oracle attacks

I intend to use a generic integrated/hybrid encryption scheme for transmitting information between a client and a server. Key encapsulation: a 128-bit symmetric key is generated and asymmetrically ...
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3k views

How does a padding oracle attack work?

I am unsure of how a padding oracle attack works. What I am not getting is how changing one bit at one time allows one to exploit(get keys) ASP.NET machines. Can anyone explain this?
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Bleichenbacher 1998 “Million message attack” on RSA

I have been reading Bleichenbacher's 1998 paper on a forged message attack on RSA. The paper assumes access to an Oracle that takes a ciphertext $c$ and will check the decrypted text for valid PKCS #1 ...
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1answer
197 views

Is it safe to use GZIP to avoid padding related attacks

I am designing a library that supports encrypting some in-memory data using AES in CBC mode. Now I need a padding but it seemed to me that Apple's CommonCrypto library and OpenSSL have different ...
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130 views

Security of (cryptographic) padding compared to other methods for blockcompletion for block ciphers

As said in the heading, I want to know how the security of different padding methods, e.g. ANSI X.923, ISO 10126 and PKCS7, is compared to other methods to reach the needed block size, like ciphertext ...
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491 views

Extract private RSA key from USB cryptographic token using Bardou et al. attack (variant of “million message attack”)

There is a side channel attack on tamper-resistant USB cryptographic tokens using padding-oracle, described by Bardou, Focardi, Kawamoto, Simionato, Steel and Tsay, titled "Efficient padding oracle ...
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Using the same secret key for encryption and authentication in a Encrypt-then-MAC scheme

Is it a weakness to use a single shared secret for protecting messages using a Encrypt-then-MAC scheme? Assuming a system is using AES-256-CBC and a SHA1-HMAC and the same secret key for both ...
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142 views

How to use HMAC for large ciphertexts over TLS

HMAC used to secure chosen cipher-text attacks. if we are encrypting a large file (video) and sending it over TLS for decryption, how server can check MAC for ciphertext when we didn't sent whole of ...
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191 views

Understanding padding oracles - is an attack plausible in my scenario?

I have a scheme that, long story short, uses AES in CBC mode to encrypt third-party credentials for user accounts with a password-derived key. It's been mentioned that the use of CBC mode is a ...
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2answers
127 views

What is an easy method of proving that a cryptographic oracle attack is possible?

Lets say an application is using CBC mode without authentication. The application is generating cipher text. This cipher text can be manipulated by the attacker and then transmitted back to the ...
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1answer
599 views

Shortcuts / practicality of brute forcing block cipher (AES) + ECB with known plaintext

I know the plaintext (26 bytes long) and cryptotext of block cipher (suspected to be AES) in ECB mode. I can generate hundreds or thousands of such samples, but the samples are not arbitrary. What are ...