Cryptography that will remain secure should large-scale quantum computing become feasible. Based on hard problems with no known polynomial-time quantum algorithm (e.g., Shor's algorithm).
-1
votes
1answer
39 views
Sematically Secure McEliece
I am read the Lemma 2 (pp13) in the paper [1]. Here a make a question Why "for any $Hash_z$ and any $Gen$"? The author of paper reply
The reason why "for any $Hash_z$ and any $Gen$" is that if ...
1
vote
0answers
55 views
PKC McEliece + $S$ + $P$
I am trying implement the McEliece crytosystem in SAGE. My question is How I will be able to choose the appropriate matrix $S$ and $P$?. I ask this because when I trying obtain the vector $\hat{m}=mS$ ...
1
vote
0answers
80 views
Are hash trees an alternative, quantum-resistant signature scheme which can replace RSA?
Can hash trees can provide quantum resistant signatures to replace RSA for signing securely? What is the key size and how many times can we use same key?
-1
votes
0answers
36 views
Adaptative chosen ciphertext security McEliece
I am read the paper and I found the follow Lemma2 (pp. 13)
Suposse that there exists, for any $Hash_z$ and any $Gen$, an algorithm $A$ ...
My question is Why "for any $Hash_z$ and any $Gen$"? Are ...
