Protocol analysis is the detailed analysis of the security of an abstract or concrete cryptographic protocol.

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Signal vs Telegram in terms of protocols?

Some time ago, the question was asked in chat, why MTProto (Telegram's protocol) is supposedly worse than Axolotl (Signal's protocol) as both protocols have been the inventions of their respective ...
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Importance of round complexity in determining the efficiency of an MPC protocol

Literature has different ways of specifying complexity of an MPC protocol: computation complexity that measures the number of (assumed primitive) operations performed by all the parties; ...
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Security of Fernet Construction (wrt non self delimiting tokens and HMAC short key size)

Fernet is a described as a "high level symmetric encryption recipe" (source) that seems to be the default high level encryption scheme in the cryptography python ...
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1answer
147 views

In HMQV, can one use multiple identities with one public key?

The HMQV protocol has 2 "identity" fields $\hat{A}, \hat{B}$ that are used in the dual signature - and it tries to guarantee that any properly-generated session key is only shared by a single $(A, B, \...
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Key Distribution Center Key Protocol Analysis

As shown in the image, why is Circle 1 to be B and Circle 2 to be A? Why is not the opposite, that is, Circle 1 to be A and Circle 2 to be B? like this picture From my understanding, Notation B in ...
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cumulative secrets

Imagine a server with an authentication scheme that utilizes an element of randomness in new sessions (i.e. one that uses the secure remote password protocol). At the end of a successful ...
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1answer
34 views

How robust is my coded output?

I create codes and ciphers and as a hobby and I was wondering if there was any outfit that would 'test' your output to see how resilient it is. Is there a group anywhere that will accept code, try to ...
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17 views

Sigma protocol: witness hiding

I am working on an assignment and I am stuck with the last part of proving witness hiding for the protocol. I have previously proved it is witness indistinguishable, and it has q (primer number ...
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1answer
74 views

A simple client/server authentication protocol

Some days ago I asked for a help to find and correct the problems of an authentication protocol. I closed the post because I was convinced I can correct it but, unfortunately I'm having some troubles. ...
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Security of a lightweight heartbeat protocol

I am implementing a heartbeat protocol so that a server can send notifications to clients. The notifications are not occurring so often, so I don't want to keep an open TCP+TLS session for each client,...
3
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1answer
74 views

How can I formally verify fuzzy commitment scheme based security protocol?

I am currently working on designing a security protocol which involves usage of fuzzy commitment schemes, for. eg Reed-Solomon codes which allows us to tolerate a certain level of error. I was ...
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1answer
77 views

When we turn Random shuffle to Pseudorandom Shuffle

It's well known that a simple but efficient random shuffle algorithm can permute a vector of $n$ elements in $O(n)$ time. In the algorithm, we need to pick a value $U$ uniformly at random where $0\...
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1answer
141 views

Diffie-Hellman when $p$ and $g$ are pre-agreed and hidden from Eve

During a regular Diffie–Hellman public key exchange, Alice and Bob agree to use a prime number $p$ and a base $g$… which are both made public and are therefore also assumed to be known by Eve. Alice ...
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Permuted Hash Table

Suppose we have a hash table, $HT$, consisting of $100$ bins.The hash table uses a hash function $H$ that is public. We all know that given value $a$ we can compute the address in the hash by $H(a)=j$...
3
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1answer
41 views

Updating values authenticated by Merkle Tree

Assume we have 4 values: $v_1,v_2,v_3$ and $v_4$. We construct a Merkle tree on top of them such that the values are leaves of the tree. I send the values and the tree to an untrusted server. But I ...
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1answer
69 views

Secure blinding factor switching at malicious server-side (Switching in One Time pad)

Suppose all the values and operations are defined over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$ where $p$ is a large prime number. Assume all values are non-zero. Here $(z)^{-1}$ denotes multiplicative inverse ...
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When we use one time pad TWICE in two different ways

Assumption and Notations: All the values defined over the field $\mathbb{F}_p$, where $p$ is a large prime number. We denote multiplicative inverse of value $v$ by $v^{-1}$. All values are non-zero ...
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2answers
153 views

Is TLS secure against VM reset attacks?

Is the TLS protocol secure against VM reset attacks? Background: Imagine running cryptographic software inside a virtual machine (VM). A VM reset attack is one where the the state of the software is ...
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When we use permutation and random long sting to hide a message

This question is modified version of this: Can we use merely permutation to hide a message? I have an English name $m=m_1 || m_2 ||..||m_{30}$. I pick a random string $d=d_1 ||..||d_{70}$ I mix ...
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Security issues with self encryption? [duplicate]

I'm thinking about the scenario of using a set of (potentially untrusted) hosts to store (potentially private) files. Think something like distributed backup where you contribute some disk space and ...
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5answers
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Does frequent key change weaken encryption?

Following scenario: We are using OTR for communication between Alice and Bob which means after each successfull message exchange a re-keying happens for both parties leading to new AES-keys for the ...
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2answers
998 views

Why do we implement a protocol?

In general, after we design a secure cryptographic protocol and make sure that it is efficient (e.g. through complexity analysis) we implement it. Questions: Do we implement it for proof of ...
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OTR AKE protocol implementations security

While looking at the different versions of OTR protocol I discovered a strange thing: there is no trace of the patch for the weaknesses that were noted in “Finite-State Security Analysis of OTR ...
3
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1answer
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What is PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_1ST_HALF?

I'm writing a tool to do security posture assessments of SSL/TLS services, and ran into an interesting result. I ran through all defined cipher suites to test which could be negotiated (like sslscan ...
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1answer
97 views

Comparing messages given only the ciphertext

Under RSA protocol I was wondering how a message sent could be verified under the following scenario Alice has a private (encryption key) and public key (decryption key) If Bob sends Alice cipher-...
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Problem with this authentication protocol

Consider such authentication protocol: Alice and Bob share a key. Bob sends alice a nonce. Alice encrypts it with shared key and sends to bob. Now assume Alice was successfully authenticated. ...
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Re-sending captured encrypted data

Let’s assume Bob is some algorithmic stock trading machine. Bob takes commands from Alice, who sends messages to Bob. For example: Alice could be sending a message to Bob to stop trading. But if ...
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1answer
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Does IKEv2 protocol have two modes like IKE

IKE Protocol have 2 modes, that modes have different structure. Does IKEv2 protocol have two modes like IKE.
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Cryptographic Challenge: How to Say Something Confidentially to Snowden?

The Snowden situation raises an intereting cryptograpic problem. At present, how can something be sent confidentially to Snowden? Claim: I have no particular political orientation. The above ...
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authentication protocol questions/security

Disclaimer: I am the only person that uses my software. This is just experimental fun. I previously wrote a server/client that used the secure remote password protocol authentication. I had an idea ...
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1answer
274 views

Simulation-based proofs and universal composability proofs

I recently read Ran Canetti's famous UC paper but I'm still trying to wrap my head around the concepts. I think this answer has me confused a bit, particularly where it says The stand-alone ...
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1answer
78 views

Improving security of (authentication) protocol

I have a basic protocol which tries to authenticate messages going from client to server. Basically it is like this: Imagine I want to send message M to server. Client computes a MAC over the message....
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Is this ECC based messaging method secure?

I developing an encrypted messaging for ZeroNet (aP2P file-based network, website: zeronet.io) and would like to have some guidelines if any of this could work. My first idea: In ZeroNet every user ...
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1answer
205 views

Consequence of a change on the Guillou-Quisquater Protocol

In the Guillou-Quisquater Protocol, the prover convinces the verifier that he knows an $e$-th root of an element $y \in \mathbb{Z}^*_n$ ($p, q, e$ are primes, $n = pq$ and $e$ is coprime with $\varphi(...
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Proving for a single input vs several inputs. Is there any difference?

I am working on a new protocol for pattern matching. While defining the ideal functionality, it is possible to say: Alice sends $p$ and Bob sends $T$ to the ideal functionality. i.e. searching for ...
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110 views

Simplest way for strong cryptography in chat

I am a beginner in cryptography and I am interested for several weeks on this for my chat application. Basically, it is a centralized model. All messages are stored and potentially visible by ...
5
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1answer
113 views

Coin flipping with limited communication between participants

Alice and Bob want to play a coin flipping game. Alice wins if the coin flips head. They choose to trust a independent third party that generates a random beacon (such as NIST). There is no ...
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1answer
159 views

Proving security of TLS handshake with ProVerif

Background For my dissertation I am working on an application protocol for which I require a TLS session. I am looking to achieve Perfect Forward Secrecy, which means I have selected ephemeral Diffie-...
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1answer
165 views

Key Confirmation Attack [Key Distribution Center (KDC)]

Okay this is how I understood it according to this: Alice $A$ establishes a connection to $KDC$ and prepares for session key Exchange $k_{ses}$ $A$ encrypts the request with her key $k_A(A, B)$ ...
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2answers
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Privacy and Integrity in Public Cryptography

I'm trying to figure out which is the best way to get privacy and integrity together in public cryptography. Alice needs to send multiple files $f$ (may be big) to Bob. I've thought: Alice computes ...
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1answer
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Can RSA be securely used for “blind decryption”?

Assume we have the following setup: A client with trusted storage and computing capabilities (e.g. a smartcard) A server with trusted computing and short-term storage capabilities (e.g. RAM + CPU, ...
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Understanding a faulty Needam-Schroeder protocol

Give this mutual-authentication protocol (along with the attack) in which Alice wants to communicate with Bob, I can't understand how the attack works. A chooses $N$ (nonce) and sends to C (trusted ...
3
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1answer
68 views

Is authenticated encryption basically a lockable box?

I recently used a custom construction as a commitment scheme, which was taken from the standard picture you give people while explaining commitment schemes. Basically commitment schemes can be ...
2
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1answer
108 views

What's the principle to design the functionality under UC framework?

Though I can get the basic idea of UC Framework, namely let the environment cannot distinguish the real protocol with the real adversary and the functionality with the simulator, I am still puzzled in ...
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Why hash the message before signing it with RSA?

The diagram below illustrates the process of digitally signing a message with RSA: As diagram shows, the message is first hashed, and the signature is then computed on the hash, rather than on the ...
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Is there any pattern in points on EC?

I read some where in crypto.stackexchange answer (related to EC-SRP protocol) that there is pattern in points on elliptic curves, i.e. if given some points containing mix of correct and wrong points ...
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1answer
211 views

How does ccrypt work?

On many Linux/GNU distributions CCrypt (ccrypt) by Peter Selinger is available as a command line utility to encrypt files. How does the protocol work and is it ...
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1answer
121 views

Fairness in cryptography [closed]

Two users A and B decided to share a file of same size and transfer data bit by bit. And at the end of exchange, A will have B's data and B will have A's data. Assuming, A starts to transfer the ...
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1answer
50 views

Security issues for integrating AAA and OTP services [closed]

What are the main security issues for integrating AAA and OTP services. In our organization with about 1000 clients, we want to integrate the services. What are the main security issues about the ...