Design of cryptographic protocols, i.e. ways of using algorithms (primitives) to achieve one or more security goals like integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (maybe together with non-security-related goals). If you ask about a specific protocol, tag with its name instead (or additionally, if ...

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Updating values authenticated by Merkle Tree

Assume we have 4 values: $v_1,v_2,v_3$ and $v_4$. We construct a Merkle tree on top of them such that the values are leaves of the tree. I send the values and the tree to an untrusted server. But I ...
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63 views

When we use one time pad TWICE in two different ways

Assumption and Notations: All the values defined over the field $\mathbb{F}_p$, where $p$ is a large prime number. We denote multiplicative inverse of value $v$ by $v^{-1}$. All values are non-zero ...
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Shamir SS: To associate shares to the public values $x_i$, when the shares are permuted [duplicate]

Suppose we use $(t,n)$ Shamir secret sharing as follows: We share the secret $\beta$ as $S=[s_1,..., s_n]$, where $X=[x_1,...,x_n]$ are the public values. For the sake of simplicity, lets assume ...
3
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1answer
713 views

Is this DIY remote lock protocol secure?

I need your advice on following scheme of exchange protocol between remote lock and key. I'm planning to use following algorithm: Key generates unique value that never repeats (in reality it's just ...
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1answer
79 views

Can we use merely permutation to hide a message?

This question is related to this: When all shares of a secret are given to adversary as a permuted matrix I think the below question is a simplified version of that. Assume we have a 40-bit ...
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19 views

Security issues with self encryption? [duplicate]

I'm thinking about the scenario of using a set of (potentially untrusted) hosts to store (potentially private) files. Think something like distributed backup where you contribute some disk space and ...
3
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1answer
33 views

Is it okay to send an encrypted key using XSalsa20-Poly1305, and send subsequent messages using ChaCha20-Poly1305?

I am looking at a cryptographic protocol in a somewhat unusual environment: the communicating parties can share arbitrarily long secret keys over a secure channel. If forward secrecy is not required, ...
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2answers
582 views

When would you increment a nonce and when not?

K is the shared key for encryption known by _Alice and _Bob. $N_A$ is a nonce created by Alice. The function f is the increment by 1 function. (1) Alice -> Bob: $E_K(N_A)$ So Alice encrypts a nonce ...
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940 views

Why do we implement a protocol?

In general, after we design a secure cryptographic protocol and make sure that it is efficient (e.g. through complexity analysis) we implement it. Questions: Do we implement it for proof of ...
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134 views

Recommendation for lightweight algorithm for partial message encryption

I have designed a specific client and server program, which sends a file from client to server in 32k chunks. I want to encrypt only part of the data. More specifically: in each 32k chunk passing ...
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24 views

OTR AKE protocol implementations security

While looking at the different versions of OTR protocol I discovered a strange thing: there is no trace of the patch for the weaknesses that were noted in “Finite-State Security Analysis of OTR ...
5
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2answers
52 views

Protocol to identify zone of potential agreement without revealing reservation prices and having to trust third parties?

A wants to buy a company from B. Before A and B enter negotiations, they want to make sure that there actually is a zone of potential agreement. Obviously, they don't want to communicate their ...
5
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1answer
76 views

Zero knowledge proof of shared secret

Alice holds a secret $a \in X$. Bob holds a secret $b \in X$. Is there a protocol that lets them compute $f(a, b) = \begin{cases} 1 & \textrm{if } a = b \\ 0 & \textrm{else} \end{cases}$ If ...
3
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1answer
94 views

Encrypt-then-authenticate variant used in IPsec

I am trying to understand the variant of Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA) that is used in IPsec. For this I have looked at this chapter. What I got so far is that the integrity and confidentiality ...
2
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1answer
58 views

end-to-end encrypted chat app with symmetric + public key encryption, TLS and cert pinning

A big drawback of end-to-end encrypted messaging services is that, as soon as you lose your device, you lose all your messages. Your private key is gone after all. I was wondering though, wouldn't it ...
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4answers
740 views

Exchanging encrypted messages, and decrypting without a public key?

I know very little about encryption, but I was hoping someone could shed light on this cipher text exchange scheme I worked out in my head this morning: Bob wants to send Alice a message but doesn't ...
3
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2answers
49 views

Problem with this authentication protocol

Consider such authentication protocol: Alice and Bob share a key. Bob sends alice a nonce. Alice encrypts it with shared key and sends to bob. Now assume Alice was successfully authenticated. ...
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1answer
80 views

What libraries do people use to implement and evaluate cryptography protocols?

I want to implement this credential system: “Anonymous Credentials Light” (PDF). The implementation would involve some zero-knowledge proof and some exponentiation. For some basic group computations ...
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930 views

Signal vs Telegram in terms of protocols?

Some time ago, the question was asked in chat, why MTProto (Telegram's protocol) is supposedly worse than Axolotl (Signal's protocol) as both protocols have been the inventions of their respective ...
5
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1answer
120 views

Zero-Knowledge Proof of a polynomial

I have two secret values $L_1$, $L_2$, and two Pedersen commitments $C_1 = C(L_1)$, $C_2=C(L_2)$. The commitments $C_1$, $C_2$ are public. Given a challenge $c$, I want to output $d = c*L_1+L_2$ and ...
4
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1answer
57 views

Compromise between HMAC and Digital Signature, by encrypting and sending secret key?

For achieving stateless authentication tokens (like JWT), is there a compromise between the performance of HMAC, and public key distribution of Digital Signature? Scenario: Sender is a centralized ...
5
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0answers
112 views

Efficient way to confirm identity

I am working on a multiplayer game. I have a central server which handles all data transmission and coordinates all games. Clients which involved in a single session send requests to do actions to ...
2
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1answer
128 views

Authenticated Encryption of UDP packets

I am working on a UDP based file transfer protocol. Congestion Control, Resending of packages and other UDP challenges are dealt with - speedtests shows that the protocol is up to 10 times faster than ...
5
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2answers
123 views

Data Leakage and Data Switching

I have two secret values $a$ and $b$ (i.e. they are arbitrary values). I mask them as follow: $v_1=r_1a+r_2$ $v_2=r_1(b-a)$ where $r_1$ and $r_2$ are uniformly random values. I send $v_1$ and $v_2$ ...
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2answers
136 views

Security analysis of this one time password based scheme for copy protection

Imagine such protocol. Client and server initially share secret K[0]. When client wants to contact server she sends server K[0] and her ID. Server accepts request, and generated new random K[1] and ...
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1answer
57 views

Information theoretical security of an inefficient Shamir based access structure

I have studied Sharmir's scheme as well as the multiple assignment scheme proposed by M. Ito. My question is if anyone can tell me if the following scheme is theoretically secure: Terms: P = set of ...
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1answer
105 views

Non-deniability of data sent over TLS

Andy is going to connect to a server Selma over TLS. Later, Andy would like to be able to publish everything (the ciphertexts, the plaintexts, all his keys) and prove to a mediator what data he sent ...
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authentication protocol questions/security

Disclaimer: I am the only person that uses my software. This is just experimental fun. I previously wrote a server/client that used the secure remote password protocol authentication. I had an idea ...
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131 views

Santa Claus' secret permutation

This December, $N$ friends play secret santa: they select a random permutation $\sigma$ of $N$ (without fixed point). For Santa Claus, everyone has to bring a gift to the next person in the ...
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3answers
74 views

RSA message integrity

I wish to send some small data that RSA alone can encrypt, and I send a shared secret along with it. ...
2
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1answer
106 views

Message security and also program copy detection

Imagine I have client and server running on different machines, each as a separate software. I want to ensure: message authenticity, integrity and confidentiality at least of messages coming from ...
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1answer
82 views

Authentication protocol which detects client impersonation from another machine

Consider following authentication protocol. Client ClientA knows some initial secret KeyA shared with server. Client also knows IP of legitimate server. Now when client wants to establish connection ...
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1answer
32 views

Perfect Forward Secrecy in PGP/asynchronous email

Looking at the RFC for PGP email/asynchronous chat with PFS here https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brown-pgp-pfs-03 can anyone tell me why the following scheme is no good? Alice and Bob retrieve each ...
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49 views

How to force an adversary to call a certain oracle?

Consider there is a protocol in real world, which uses a random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. In the ideal world, after the calling of $\mathcal{H}$ by some parties, intuitively I want the simulator gets some ...
3
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1answer
44 views

May I use Random Oracle for Inversed Look-up?

Consider there is a protocol in real world calling a random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ for a priavte input $k$. Then in the ideal world, after the calling of $r \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(k)$ by a honest party, ...
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How to use a stream cipher to sign a message?

Are there known constructions which allow to sign a message M (let's say it will be sent as clear text) using a stream cipher C and a symmetric secret key K? So, we have M, C, K and we want to send ...
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1answer
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Improving security of (authentication) protocol

I have a basic protocol which tries to authenticate messages going from client to server. Basically it is like this: Imagine I want to send message M to server. Client computes a MAC over the ...
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37 views

Is this ECC based messaging method secure?

I developing an encrypted messaging for ZeroNet (aP2P file-based network, website: zeronet.io) and would like to have some guidelines if any of this could work. My first idea: In ZeroNet every user ...
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1answer
68 views

Consequence of a change on the Guillou-Quisquater Protocol

In the Guillou-Quisquater Protocol, the prover convinces the verifier that he knows an $e$-th root of an element $y \in \mathbb{Z}^*_n$ ($p, q, e$ are primes, $n = pq$ and $e$ is coprime with ...
5
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1answer
79 views

Do low-entropy fingerprints actually make any sense?

I'm thinking of ZRTP and OTR in particular here. From my understanding, after a Diffie-Hellman session is initiated, the shared secret is then hashed into a 4-digit number, which the two parties can ...
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3answers
233 views

Prevent replay attack without storage

I am designing a set of low-power sensing motes. Each mote will communicate to a central base over RF. I want the mote to be able to authenticate itself with the base, and send its data without being ...
2
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3answers
100 views

Three party coin flipping protocol with only 2 active participants

Is there a coin flipping protocol where: Alice, Bob and Carol don't trust each other, and The coin is flipped only by Alice and Bob, and The result must be trusted by all three participants.
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Salary Negotiation Problem

Imagine Alice is applying for a new job. Alice has an idea of the minimum salary that she is willing to accept—let's call this value A. Bob, the hiring manager for ...
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3answers
667 views

Is it usual for a signed message to contain the public key of the signer?

In protocols/systems which use ECDSA, is it common for the message to contain the public key of the message signer? If not, how do recipients know that the message has been signed by the correct ...
3
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1answer
59 views

Forcing participants to be honest in Secure Multiparty Communication

Alice and Bob engage to compute a secure function f(a,b) where a and b must be present in a ...
4
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1answer
63 views

Is it wise to use HOTP (raw bytes) as a key for HMAC?

Assume I have client and server applications with a shared master secret KEY_SECRET already in place. Also assume that the client and server have an implicit shared ...
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Is it possible and safe to use SAKKE for signing/verification, rather than for encryption?

Is it safe to use the Sakai–Kasahara key encryption algorithm (SAKKE) for signing/verification, rather than for encryption? (Example at bitbucket.org) In particular, I want many Bobs to be able to ...
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2answers
68 views

How do you communicate the hash function used with RSA signing?

When it comes to RSA signing, I understand why you need to hash the data before signing it, but don't you need to communicate what hash algorithm you use to whoever will need to verify the signature? ...
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Simplest way for strong cryptography in chat

I am a beginner in cryptography and I am interested for several weeks on this for my chat application. Basically, it is a centralized model. All messages are stored and potentially visible by ...
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1answer
101 views

Is there a way to optimize a linear scan while preserving anonymity?

I've been wrestling with a problem, and I was hoping if someone else had a bright idea. Here's the problem: I have two sides, Alice and Bob. Alice has a single high entropy string $A$, and Bob has a ...