Design of cryptographic protocols, i.e. ways of using algorithms (primitives) to achieve one or more security goals like integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (maybe together with non-security-related goals). If you ask about a specific protocol, tag with its name instead (or additionally, if ...

learn more… | top users | synonyms

93
votes
6answers
14k views

Should we MAC-then-encrypt or encrypt-then-MAC?

Most of the time, when some data must be encrypted, it must also be protected with a MAC, because encryption protects only against passive attackers. There are some nifty encryption modes which ...
40
votes
7answers
3k views

Guarding against cryptanalytic breakthroughs: combining multiple hash functions

Assume I want to design a protocol (or data format or similar) including some cryptographic hash, and want it to be as future-proof as possible, i.e. I want to avoid that breakthroughs in cryptography ...
9
votes
4answers
690 views

Why should I make my cipher public?

As I understand it, the less people know about the internals of my protocol or cipher, the more secure the protocol is. However Kerckhoffs's principle states that A cryptosystem should be secure ...
18
votes
4answers
1k views

How to fairly select a random number for a game without trusting a third party?

Several people are playing a game with random events and require a way to produce a random number. (Such as dice rolls or a lottery.) Can this be done such that each player has the power to be ...
13
votes
3answers
4k views

Should we sign-then-encrypt, or encrypt-then-sign?

We often want to send messages that are both (a) encrypted, so passive attackers can't discover the plaintext of the message, and (b) signed with a private-key digital signature, so active attackers ...
16
votes
3answers
1k views

Is using slow password hashing on the client side easier attackable than on the server side?

As we know, one should use a slow password hashing algorithm instead of a fast one for storing passwords, to hinder brute force attacks when the database is compromised. The problem with this is that ...
12
votes
1answer
703 views

Why choose an authenticated encryption mode instead of a separate MAC?

What are cryptographic reasons to choose an authenticated-encryption mode of operation (such as GCM) over a traditional encryption mode plus an independent MAC, or vice versa? Assume there is no ...
21
votes
3answers
1k views

Is this password migration strategy secure?

I want to upgrade the security of some existing databases of users' authentication tokens strictly for the purpose of making sure that if the database is stolen, attackers will not be able to guess ...
6
votes
1answer
1k views

Is Truecrypt's multiple/cascading encryption safe?

Is Truecrypt use of cascading encryption safe? Is it useful? Truecrypt is arguably one of the most popular and widely used encryption applications in use today, yet it seems to use a very ...
7
votes
8answers
440 views

Two mutually untrusted parties want to exchange data: how to ensure each one gets the data it needs?

I am trying to come up with what could maybe be a novel algorithm for an application I am writing. Client A has a file fA. Client B has file fB. Each party is untrustworthy and will try to rip off the ...
6
votes
1answer
423 views

A fair peer-based coin-flipping protocol?

I found this question on the game programming site and was intrigued. I came up with an answer off the top of my head but I'm no cryptanalyst so it is probably not water-tight. This is how my idea ...
0
votes
1answer
164 views

How to secure a mental poker protocol? [closed]

I would like to implement a mental poker protocol in a secure fashion. How should I go about that without (preferably) infringing on the Mental Poker Framework patent?
8
votes
3answers
911 views

Is it okay to use a hash of a timestamp as the IV for AES?

The message format includes a datetime field in the clear. Is it okay to also use this field (or some hash thereof) as the initialization vector? In this case, CBC is the mode being used.
1
vote
2answers
365 views

Tools for modelling and analysis of cryptographic protocols

I am designing some cryptographic protocols and I am new to it. Are there any well-known tools that can be used to model and design these protocols? And also verify or analyze their validity? If not ...
6
votes
4answers
212 views

Changing algorithms during encryption

Inspired by "Guarding against cryptanalytic breakthroughs: combining multiple hash functions", I am curious if there is a cryptographic reason to use only one algorithm during encryption. For ...
4
votes
2answers
1k views

Why is TLS susceptible to protocol downgrade attacks?

A recent blog post from Ivan Ristić (expert extraordinaire on all things SSL) says: all major browsers are susceptible to protocol downgrade attacks; an active MITM can simulate failure conditions ...
1
vote
2answers
214 views

Derive a key from public data using a secret master key

Users in my system will be given a device that contains a 128-bit AES user key. The user key will be derived from 64 bits of public data related to the user, which is unique but very predictable (i.e. ...
6
votes
1answer
337 views

Why does SRP-6a use k = H(N, g) instead of the k = 3 in SRP-6?

I've been reading up on the Secure Remote Pasword protocol (SRP). There are a couple different versions of the protocol (the original published version being designated SRP-3, with two subsequent ...
5
votes
1answer
1k views

Is a known plaintext, ciphertext, and public-key a viable attack on RSA?

Assume Alice and Bob are using RSA to create a common session key and Cindy is listening, attempting to obtain the session key. Alice and Bob each have their public- and private-key pairs ...
5
votes
1answer
807 views

RSA-based authentication and key-agreement protocol

An authentication and key-agreement protocol between devices shall mutually demonstrate their identity, and establish a shared random secret $R$ suitable for securing later communications. To that ...
4
votes
2answers
415 views

Diffie-Hellman key agreement with both Server Authentication and Perfect Forward Secrecy

I am trying to find the protocol with the least overhead, which still meets the following requirements: Server Authentication of server identity to client. The client has an authentic copy of the ...
4
votes
2answers
338 views

Provable Encryption

Is it possible to encrypt data in a way that it can be proven that the data is encrypted, without revealing the key? Alice chooses some plaintext, then she encrypts it with a certain scheme. She ...
4
votes
3answers
152 views

Authenticating data generated by a particular build of an open source program

[I was torn between posting here or security.stackexchange.com. In the end, I felt that this was more of a design question, rather than an implementation question and so chose this forum.] My ...
3
votes
2answers
309 views

Is there a way to do fair exchange between two parties who don't trust each other?

Let's suppose we have an Alice who knows a secret key A, and Bob who knows key B. Using their own keys, they each encrypt a message (Alice encrypts $m_A$, Bob encrypts $m_B$) with their own key, and ...
3
votes
1answer
303 views

Blind signature with openssl

I'm trying to understand (to reproduce in practice) how does blinded tokens work. Currently i'm lacking examples. According to Wiki the blinded signature protocol is the same as ordinary signature ...
3
votes
1answer
192 views

Protocol for Randomized Oblivious Transfer?

If we define Oblivious Transfer as following: Alice inputs $(x_0,x_1) \in F^2$, where $F$ is a field, and Bob inputs $b\in\{0,1\}$, then Alice gets a dummy output(for which she knows nothing about ...
2
votes
2answers
198 views

Alice's forgetful banking

Alice has a bank account number, but has forgotten which bank it is for. There are 4 banks, run by Bob, Carlos, David, and Eve. She could find out by going to all of the banks and asking if they have ...
2
votes
3answers
141 views

Combating traffic analysis over request-response protocols

Suppose I am to design a request-response protocol (similar HTTP). For the sake of simplicity let us assume that this is a "chat" protocol where the client can only perform two actions: Contribute a ...
1
vote
1answer
54 views

Proving item association without revealing one of the associated items

I'm a total noob when it comes to cryptography but I believe this falls under the "zero knowledge" category. I have two associated pieces of information: tag — known by both parties. Unique per ...
0
votes
1answer
246 views

Is this scheme a provably fair random number generation?

I have thought up a method for generating random numbers between a client and a server which I hope is fair: The client and server decide on a range in advance, $0$ trough $n-1$. The server ...