Design of cryptographic protocols, i.e. ways of using algorithms (primitives) to achieve one or more security goals like integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (maybe together with non-security-related goals). If you ask about a specific protocol, tag with its name instead (or additionally, if ...

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114 views

What does this step in this protocol for the Yao's Millionaire Problem mean?

I was reading “An Efficient Protocol for Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem” (Ioannidis and Grama 2003). In the proposed protocol in section three, it is written: (Step 4) For every $i$, $1 \le i \le d$, ...
2
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0answers
162 views

What would make it impossible to deny that decryption of a package has taken place?

I'm part of a team designing a system where a user have to be able to read a certain package, if he has preformed an action or series of actions that makes it legal for him to do so. The tricky part ...
4
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2answers
194 views

Is the following symmetric design secure?

Assume: $O$ be a reversible random permutation oracle on a finite set and $O^{-1}$ the inverse permutation (pretty much equivalent to a random permutation: What is the difference between a bijective ...
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1answer
122 views

Secure function evaluation

Consider 3 parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie. Suppose each party has a bit as input, i.e. Alice, Bob and Charlie hold $a, b, c \in \{0, 1\}$ respectively. Show how construct a scheme with which ...
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1answer
1k views

Is a known plaintext, ciphertext, and public-key a viable attack on RSA?

Assume Alice and Bob are using RSA to create a common session key and Cindy is listening, attempting to obtain the session key. Alice and Bob each have their public- and private-key pairs ...
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83 views

Could MITM securely identify identity?

Consider protocol like QUIC or MinimaLT which are essentially layer4 replacement for TCP/UDP (riding on top of UDP currently because of fear of random firewalls dropping new L4 protocol). From crypto ...
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3answers
1k views

Is this password migration strategy secure?

I want to upgrade the security of some existing databases of users' authentication tokens strictly for the purpose of making sure that if the database is stolen, attackers will not be able to guess ...
7
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1answer
191 views

Are there any differences in operation between existing Diffie-Hellman specifications?

Are there any differences in operation between existing Diffie-Hellman specifications, especially those within the RSA PKCS#3, ANSI X9.42 and RFC 2631 standards?
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1answer
116 views

How can two (or more) parties share and agree upon a common random seed?

I really don't know how to call this simple problem: Two (or more) parties need to establish a common (non-secret) value to be used as a seed for a deterministic RNG. The only requirement is that each ...
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1answer
192 views

Security of RSA-substitution-RSA

Following on from here, I am unconvinced that encrypting twice with RSA is a waste of time: doesn't it depend on what is placed in-between the two encryptions?. What would happen if a permutation was ...
2
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1answer
184 views

Transparent cipher

I'm trying to implement this protocol: Alice has her permanent key $K_1$. She computes $E(K_1, P)$. She wants to share $P$ with Bob, Carol and Dave. For each of them she: 2.1. Generates $K_2$. ...
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1answer
78 views

How to design a secure data container?

I want to design a secure data container that can be used to transfer encrypted data over a public network that can defeat common attacks. Data is already encrypted before entering this container so ...
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2answers
198 views

Alice's forgetful banking

Alice has a bank account number, but has forgotten which bank it is for. There are 4 banks, run by Bob, Carlos, David, and Eve. She could find out by going to all of the banks and asking if they have ...
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7answers
3k views

Guarding against cryptanalytic breakthroughs: combining multiple hash functions

Assume I want to design a protocol (or data format or similar) including some cryptographic hash, and want it to be as future-proof as possible, i.e. I want to avoid that breakthroughs in cryptography ...
2
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1answer
177 views

ID-based key exchange protocol with PFS

The traditional authenticated DH protocol with PFS against active adversaries, ensures that the compromise of both party's long-term private keys after the session is completed will not help the ...
2
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1answer
462 views

If you had to implement the BGN Cryptosystem, how would you do it?

If you had to implement BGN, how would you do it? I'm looking for an implementation of the public-key cryptosystem due to Boneh, Goh, and Nissim (aka BGN), or at least some suggestions on ...
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4answers
366 views

Is there a symmetric-key cryptography based on key establishment techniques?

Most of the current key exchange techniques are based on public-key cryptography. Are there any key exchange/establishment techniques based on symmetric-key cryptography too? In my setup primary ...
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2answers
152 views

Can you distinguish encryption methods from the output?

Suppose that you see all IP communication packets between two computers for a day, as they pass through a connecting router, and this amounts to 10MB. You additionally know that all data transmission ...
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1answer
107 views

Efficiency of computing $e(P,Q)$ Vs $g^a \pmod{p}$?

The definition of $e$ can be seen here. I want to know the accurate comparison of efficiency between $e(\cdot,\cdot)$ and $g^a \pmod{p}$. If computing $e(P,Q)$ is less efficient than computing $g^a ...
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1answer
191 views

Protocol for Randomized Oblivious Transfer?

If we define Oblivious Transfer as following: Alice inputs $(x_0,x_1) \in F^2$, where $F$ is a field, and Bob inputs $b\in\{0,1\}$, then Alice gets a dummy output(for which she knows nothing about ...
2
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1answer
107 views

Security of cloud computational protocols in UC Framework?

The universal composability allows one to the analyze security of cryptographic protocols . But it does have some gaps when it comes to analyzing few protocols especially two party cases when there is ...
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0answers
109 views

Cryptanalysis not based on method used to encrypt? [closed]

When doing cryptanalysis on RSA or something number theory based, there are various attacks that all seem to involve number theory (Wikipedia: RSA_(algorithm) ~ Attacks_against_plain_RSA). Similarly, ...
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4answers
684 views

Why should I make my cipher public?

As I understand it, the less people know about the internals of my protocol or cipher, the more secure the protocol is. However Kerckhoffs's principle states that A cryptosystem should be secure ...
2
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1answer
185 views

How do TLS 1.1 and 1.2 generate IVs (initialization vectors) for each record?

According to RFC 4346 Explicit IVs [CBCATT] describes a chosen plaintext attack on TLS that depends on knowing the IV for a record. Previous versions of TLS [TLS1.0] used the CBC ...
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2answers
199 views

Is this a secure multiparty protocol? [closed]

I am facing the following situation and I am trying to break down the problem into some specific cryptographic primitives: There is a function $F$ that takes as input a bit string and produces a ...
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1answer
164 views

how to mathematically prove a key exchange algorithm [closed]

I want to know the basic methodology that can be used to prove that a key exchange algorithm is secure. I am not asking about any specific algorithm. I want to know what should be proven and how to ...
4
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3answers
290 views

What crypto system allows for 3 parties: Party 1 who makes an assertion, Party 2 mutates the assertion, Party 3 validates it

I'm looking for the cryptographic equivalent of a Drivers license where the issuer can be verified, the issuer doesn't need to know who you showed the drivers license to, but also allows ...
4
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2answers
334 views

Provable Encryption

Is it possible to encrypt data in a way that it can be proven that the data is encrypted, without revealing the key? Alice chooses some plaintext, then she encrypts it with a certain scheme. She ...
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2answers
1k views

Why is TLS susceptible to protocol downgrade attacks?

A recent blog post from Ivan Ristić (expert extraordinaire on all things SSL) says: all major browsers are susceptible to protocol downgrade attacks; an active MITM can simulate failure conditions ...
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3answers
306 views

Can we design a public-key infrastructure without certificate authorities?

In a recent essay, Bruce Schneier tasks the engineering community with redesigning and rebuilding the vulnerable parts of the Internet's backbone. We need to figure out how to re-engineer the ...
4
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1answer
183 views

How to choose keys for a block cipher?

AES and DES are block ciphers. Mathematically, its the mapping from plaintext space to ciphertext space using the keys i.e. $\{{0,1}\}^k$ x $\{{0,1}\}^l \longrightarrow \{{0,1}\}^l$ I know that these ...
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1answer
135 views

General-purpose non-interactive multi-party computation protocol

Most of general purpose multi-party computation protocols are highly interactive. Especially the ones with Shamir's secret scheme, as there is a degree reduction step in multiplication that needs the ...
2
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1answer
59 views

Should I use distinct MACs for each user, or should I use a *direction* flag when communicating?

Alice and Bob want to communicate using a stream cipher. At the beggining, they create a session key $K_s$ and exchange it via some secure channel (using some asymmetric algorithm). After every ...
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3answers
1k views

Is using slow password hashing on the client side easier attackable than on the server side?

As we know, one should use a slow password hashing algorithm instead of a fast one for storing passwords, to hinder brute force attacks when the database is compromised. The problem with this is that ...
8
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1answer
148 views

Any problems with this secure time synchronization scheme?

I have a time authority and I want to securely set a client's time to this authority's time/date within a precision of $\delta$ seconds. The authority's public key is known to the client. This was my ...
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1answer
101 views

The “Square Root” Solution of Oblivious RAM Simulation

I am reading the paper Software Protection and Simulation on Oblivious RAMs by Oded Goldreich and Rafail Ostrovsky. And I wonder about the description of the "Square Root" solution of oblivious RAM ...
10
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1answer
602 views

Why do new versions of TLS use an explicit IV for CBC suites?

SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 used an insecure scheme to generate implicit IVs when encrypting records in CBC mode: They used the last part of the previous record, a value that can be predicted by the attacker. ...
6
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1answer
136 views

How to construct a yes/no election protocol, such that only the result is revealed?

Can we use a threshold scheme to construct a (yes/no)-election protocol, such that every voter can give a positive or negative vote or he can abstain, and such that only the result of the election is ...
3
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1answer
89 views

Does there exist a two-pass AKE protocol that is secure in eCK model and also has PFS?

As we can know that the best two-pass AKE protocols with DH message can achieve is the weak form of perfect forward security (wPFS) which guarantees security against the passive adversary. But ...
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2answers
208 views

Derive a key from public data using a secret master key

Users in my system will be given a device that contains a 128-bit AES user key. The user key will be derived from 64 bits of public data related to the user, which is unique but very predictable (i.e. ...
4
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3answers
187 views

Secret sharing scheme with possibility to change the secret

Here's a scenario I want to handle with a secret sharing scheme: Alice wants to share the secret $S$ with Bob, Charlie and Dave. Alice generates private shares based on $S$ for Bob, Charlie and ...
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2answers
202 views

How can Alice prove that a message has not been tampered with?

In terms of the usual suspects. The problem I have is that Alice wants to send Bob a message M, which gives Bob permission to perform some actions. However Alice wants to verify, from time to ...
2
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1answer
208 views

Is the SILC protocol still used?

I'm looking into implementing a private SILC server for friends (and possibly their friends). And after visiting the Wikipedia entry for SILC protocol, it seems all the official pages linked at the ...
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1answer
109 views

Tor's integrity verification system?

I am trying to understand the design of Tor(onion router). I am reading the original paper on the 2nd generation onion routing system. Where, under integrity checking on streams, they say, "When Alice ...
4
votes
2answers
414 views

Diffie-Hellman key agreement with both Server Authentication and Perfect Forward Secrecy

I am trying to find the protocol with the least overhead, which still meets the following requirements: Server Authentication of server identity to client. The client has an authentic copy of the ...
3
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0answers
114 views

Designing a protocol to record attendance to lectures

Scenario: a class that is not mandatory. The teacher wants a protocol that will satisfy the following requirements: It must record each student's attendance. A student X should not be able to say ...
3
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3answers
377 views

Proper Way to Encrypt Data with Two Keys?

I'm going to develop a system that will have two keys. One supplied and generated by the system that's specific to an individual user and one from the user. I plan on using AES. Does it make sense ...
2
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1answer
175 views

synchronization of counters in HOTP

How is synchronization of counter values achieved in the HOTP protocol? As I understand it, the server increments its counter value only if a match (of the OTP value) is found. What happens at ...
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1answer
137 views

Is this a sensible cryptographic protocol intending to reduce the impact of compromised security?

I'm in the process of designing a cryptographic protocol which will reduce the impact an attacker will have if they gained root access to a server storing data. The basic crux of it is that keys ...
3
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2answers
308 views

Is there a way to do fair exchange between two parties who don't trust each other?

Let's suppose we have an Alice who knows a secret key A, and Bob who knows key B. Using their own keys, they each encrypt a message (Alice encrypts $m_A$, Bob encrypts $m_B$) with their own key, and ...