Design of cryptographic protocols, i.e. ways of using algorithms (primitives) to achieve one or more security goals like integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (maybe together with non-security-related goals). If you ask about a specific protocol, tag with its name instead (or additionally, if ...

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Coin flipping with limited communication between participants

Alice and Bob want to play a coin flipping game. Alice wins if the coin flips head. They choose to trust a independent third party that generates a random beacon (such as NIST). There is no ...
3
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2answers
60 views

Re-sending captured encrypted data

Let’s assume Bob is some algorithmic stock trading machine. Bob takes commands from Alice, who sends messages to Bob. For example: Alice could be sending a message to Bob to stop trading. But if ...
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0answers
53 views

What is the lightweight key exchange protocol of choice?

Assume I have to implement a secure channel protocol by myself. Assume further that for some obscure reasons (library restrictions?) I can't use any of the pre-made libraries for SSH, TLS and such. ...
2
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1answer
53 views

Design for file transfers to a new party

I'm pondering a problem of how to enable transfers of files from clients to people that does not yet have an application/account/keys yet. Here's my current thought for Alice wanting to send Bob ...
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2answers
112 views

HMAC key storage for a web app?

If one is going to use an HMAC, I.E: http://php.net/manual/en/function.hash-hmac.php, where exactly are they storing the key? Without some sort of secure storage (i.e not in a local file or code), I ...
4
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1answer
69 views

Is there a cryptographic protocol that let's me prove someone has a large binary?

I'm working on a system that has a P2P component. When an individual downloads a binary and decides to mirror it, they advertise themselves in a providers set. The binaries can range from 1-1000MB. I ...
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2answers
73 views

PKCS#7 message content

I am using a vendor library that signs a text producing a PKCS#7 message. I'm not sure of the content of this message. Does a pkcs#7 message have to contain the signed message, the certificate, the ...
2
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1answer
51 views

Is succinct verification of an arbitrary data transformation theoretically possible? Is it feasible? How?

Given input string S, and transformation (i.e. computer program) T, is it possible to provide a succinct proof that another binary string S' is identical to the output T(S)? By "succinct", I ...
2
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1answer
160 views

Forward-secure static-ephemeral ECDH key agreement protocol

The question is whether the following simple key agreement protocol design has good security properties, and how it can or should be improved. Assumptions Alice is a persistent entity with a static ...
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2answers
214 views

Authenticating code securely and generating a certificate

I'm working on a product with strong security. Essentially there is an App, downloaded from the iTunes App Store. When the App starts up, it generates a strong RSA keypair and stores it in the ...
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0answers
25 views

Authenticate encrypted seed for KEM + AEAD hybrid cryptosystem

Say I want to encrypt something using RSA / KEM and an authenticated cipher. I encrypt using the following scheme: generate random seed z using ...
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1answer
84 views

How To prove Any Change to $v=a\cdot y+b$ maks $y=(a)^{−1}\cdot (v−b)$ Uni. random value [closed]

This question is related to data integrity. Let a finite field be $\mathbb{F}_p$, where $p$ is a prime number. I have a fixed value $y$ and two uniformly random values $a$ and $b$. Hypothesis: ...
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1answer
71 views

Could eVoting on the bitcoin blockchain be done?

I'm basically a crypto noob (and not an english native), so please be indulgent :) I thought about if you could realize an eVoting system with bitcoin. I see 2 major requirements: each citizen ...
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2answers
77 views

qkd - Does BB84 rely on a prearranged code?

First of all, sorry if the title is not that clear, I'll provide an in-depth explanation behind my question. So, basically I was reading about quantum cryptography and came across BB84. The protocol ...
1
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1answer
44 views

Authenticating with a document

Hope you're having a nice day. I need to implement an authentication system between a "document" (it's not exactly a document, but an object without any computing capacity, only able to store ...
2
votes
1answer
47 views

Is there an existing AE protocol with forward secrecy for embedded devices?

I'm working on an embedded device that is connected to a computer over an untrusted channel. According to my threat model I need authentication and encryption on the wire with perfect forward secrecy. ...
2
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2answers
98 views

Client login without sending a password

I would love to have a system where the password is never send in plaintext (even with TLS) to authenticate a user. I've come up with this protocol, but I'd rather use something proven. Registration: ...
3
votes
1answer
125 views

public key cryptography and authentication for cross-platform network application

I'm developing network based application for control and telemetry on Linux based embedded system. I'm using ZMQ network library and Google Protocol Buffers serialization library for communication ...
4
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2answers
208 views

Why must we generate the signature before any compression being done at PGP?

I have done some research on PGP and I found out there are of two reasons why we must generate the signature before doing any compression. Yet, I am not sure I really understand them both. One ...
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0answers
46 views

Details related to the ZIP algorithm used in PGP message encryption? [closed]

I am very new to PGP. PGP encryption works with hash function, asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption and a zip algorithm (LZ77). What I know is that the zip algorithm is used to reduce the ...
1
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1answer
139 views

Proving security of TLS handshake with ProVerif

Background For my dissertation I am working on an application protocol for which I require a TLS session. I am looking to achieve Perfect Forward Secrecy, which means I have selected ephemeral ...
5
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0answers
209 views

What is the original SKID3 protocol?

While searching for a mutual authentication protocol I often stumbled upon SKID3. However I encountered different variations of it. The basic structure is the following: (1) A --> B: rA (2) B --> ...
1
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1answer
108 views

Cryptography in wireless medium

How do I implement asymmetric key algorithm into wireless medium using NS 2.35? For example: node $A$ is a sender and $B$ is a receiver. Now, $A$ is sending a packet using $B$s public key ...
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0answers
66 views

Why does encryption in STS protocol protect against identity attacks?

The basic STS protocol contains encryption of the signature as shown in Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Station-to-Station_protocol If we would like to defend against MITM attack, this ...
0
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1answer
174 views

Is this hypothetical key-exchange secure?

I've thought about the following (generic) key-agreement protocol. The only weaknesses I could have found are missing freshness guaranteees. As for the notions: $E^1_K(P)$ is the symmetric encryption ...
2
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2answers
718 views

AES + CBC encryption for a stream of UDP packets

I am developing an application that is based on UDP, and I need to send a stream of packets. As you can imagine, packets can get lost or corrupted. I need to make sure that the content of those ...
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1answer
64 views

Does anyone still use BAN or GNY logic in practice?

I want to implement a simple protocol, and I'd like to verify it through BAN or GNY logic. I would assume that if these logics are still used that there would be some programs available that would ...
2
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1answer
104 views

Eavesdropping experiment with private key

I am extremely new to cryptography, still trying to learn basics. I got stuck in the following example of an eavesdropping experiment with a private key. $$\begin{array} {|r|r r r|r|} \hline C & ...
2
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1answer
84 views

What's the principle to design the functionality under UC framework?

Though I can get the basic idea of UC Framework, namely let the environment cannot distinguish the real protocol with the real adversary and the functionality with the simulator, I am still puzzled in ...
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0answers
44 views

AM protocol for 2 distinct objects

Prover is going to convince verifier that 2 objects are distinct, do you know any Arthur-Merlin protocol for this problem?
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3answers
86 views

Is it possible to encrypt a message's destination as well as its content?

I have imagined a way to break through any kind of censorship but since I don't have enough professional knowledge of cryptography I don't know whether it is feasible or not. If there is a method ...
0
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1answer
53 views

Share two secrets between two parties

Alice has a secret A, Bob has a secret B. They have a secure channel and a MAC. They each want to know the other's secret, but don't particularly want to give up their own. However, neither will not ...
2
votes
2answers
290 views

Why does TLS do Authenticate-then-Encrypt instead of Encrypt-then-Authenticate?

Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA) seems to generally be considered the better option, compared to Authenticate-then-Encrypt (AtE) (see this Crypto.SE question, for example). The people writing the RFC ...
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3answers
324 views

How to prove that someone encrypted a specific (large) chunk of data

Alice encrypts her data with HER secret key. Then she sends the encrypted data to Bob who should encrypt it with HIS secret key. Caroline should then eventually get this double encrypted data. ...
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2answers
101 views

Does this chat protocol exist?

I want to implement a secure chat via mobile. I´ld like to know if the following protocol for key agreement – which can use any asymmetric encryption – exists. Suppose Alice and Bob are two clients ...
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0answers
49 views

Role of trusted party in the Ideal model in Malicious case

Imagine there is a protocol supporting outosurced multi party computation. There are three parties involved in the protocol: client $A$, client $B$ and a server. Client $A$ and $B$ send their private ...
2
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0answers
87 views

Avoiding known plaintext attacks with an additional XOR-Layer

Can a cipher that is vulnerable to an known plaintext attack be made secure by adding an additional XOR-encryption? That is: suppose I have an (w.l.o.g. symmetric) encryption algorithm E were the ...
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1answer
74 views

Malicious party security model: When one party is corrupted at a time

Consider we have three parties,namely client $A$, client $B$ and a server. Client $B$ and the server can be malicious, but we do not allow the adversary to simultaneously corrupt the server and ...
0
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2answers
46 views

Why does spiped use both nonces and ephemeral keys?

Colin Percival's spiped utility uses a pre-shared key and Diffie-Hellman with ephemeral keys to provide forward secrecy. The protocol is summarized in the ...
2
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2answers
92 views

Is it safe to use a secret salted hash of a public id for client to prove ownership of id to a server that knows salt but does not store ids?

I am writing a peering server - the server assigns randomly generated public IDs to users, and I want users to be able to reclaim their ids in the future, but only to be able to claim ids that they ...
8
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4answers
291 views

Alice and Bob's crush

Suppose Alice and Bob both want to determine whether the other has a crush on him/her, but they only wish to share the information if the crush is mutual. Is there a cryptographic protocol that makes ...
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0answers
39 views

How to Exchange Random Coin Flips between Two Untrusted Parties [duplicate]

I'm not sure if this belongs here, but my friend and I were wondering if there was a good algorithm to exchange random coin flips to make some random decision between two untrusted parties without the ...
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0answers
44 views

Protocols with deliberate errors

This question is motivated by discussion cocerning “The Two Sheriffs” puzzle, see (1) and (2). Are there any public key protocols where Alice and Bob intentionally insert errors in their messages? ...
0
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1answer
66 views

Rationale of “r” AES key use in OTR version 3 AKE protocol?

I just tried to review & understand AKE (Authenticated Key Exchange) protocol as defined in OTR secure messaging protocol version 3 here , and aiming to achieve Perfect Forward Secrecy I am a ...
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0answers
87 views

Standards/RFCs for non-Diffie-Hellman perfect forward secrecy?

Some time has passed since PFS introduction and we now have secure&proven asymmetric ciphers that can generate strong keys very efficiently (elliptic RSA variants and/or QD-Mceliece can generate ...
3
votes
2answers
128 views

Coding of unsigned int to prevent guessing next ID

Suppose we are assigning records an unsigned integer ID from a N-bit space (say 32-bit) in a sequential manner. Is there a way we can code this ID before showing it to the public such that someone ...
3
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2answers
111 views

What practical uses can random hash collisions be put to?

Using magic, I've built a machine that instantly generates hash collisions. To try it out, I set the dial to SHA256 and typed in "e7cf3ef4f17c3999a94f2c6f612e8a888e5b1026878e4e19398b23bd38ec221a". I ...
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0answers
50 views

Encryption with a known plaintext

I'm building an application where users can be a part of groups, and can obtain and distribute URLs from the group page that allow anyone who clicks on them to join said group. Groups should not ...
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1answer
166 views

Is creating a own protocol safe or should TLS always be used?

The more I start to learn about cryptography the more I hear it is unsafe to 'create' your own cryptographic protocol. With this I mean combining cryptographic primitives like HMAC, AES and RSA ...
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1answer
156 views

What is the advantage of using the socialist millionaire protocol to authenticate vs HMACing some random number?

Say Alice and Bob have a shared secret $s$. Alice and Bob establish an encrypted channel and verify that it hasn't been MitM'ed by exchanging $r_1$ and $r_2$, where $r_1$ and $r_2$ are randomly ...