Design of cryptographic protocols, i.e. ways of using algorithms (primitives) to achieve one or more security goals like integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (maybe together with non-security-related goals). If you ask about a specific protocol, tag with its name instead (or additionally, if ...

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Protocol to generate Client Certificates at the start of a SSL session automatically?

A more secure form of 'cookie' could be created for SSL communications through the following method. The client generates and requests the server to sign a certificate. Then the client authenticates ...
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229 views

Is the following symmetric design secure?

Assume: $O$ be a reversible random permutation oracle on a finite set and $O^{-1}$ the inverse permutation (pretty much equivalent to a random permutation: What is the difference between a bijective ...
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1answer
841 views

If you had to implement the BGN Cryptosystem, how would you do it?

If you had to implement BGN, how would you do it? I'm looking for an implementation of the public-key cryptosystem due to Boneh, Goh, and Nissim (aka BGN), or at least some suggestions on ...
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388 views

Provable Encryption

Is it possible to encrypt data in a way that it can be proven that the data is encrypted, without revealing the key? Alice chooses some plaintext, then she encrypts it with a certain scheme. She ...
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330 views

EC ElGamal versus static+ephemeral ECDH

A client application needs to encrypt a UDP datagram for a server with known EC public key $P$. Performing a full ECDH key exchange would defeat the benefit of using UDP as a connectionless protocol. ...
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190 views

Ways to make a “doomsday” cryptocurrency which becomes untradable

As a social experiment (not a money-making scheme), I'm interested in developing a crazy cryptocurrency which, by its very design, will become worthless and untradable after a certain point. Ideally, ...
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89 views

Diffie-Hellman when $p$ and $g$ are pre-agreed and hidden from Eve

During a regular Diffie–Hellman public key exchange, Alice and Bob agree to use a prime number $p$ and a base $g$… which are both made public and are therefore also assumed to be known by Eve. Alice ...
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436 views

Perfect Forward Secrecy with Pre-shared Key

I've recently been looking at how to do perfect forward secrecy on a unidirectional connection (server can only push messages to client, client cannot respond). What I've come up with is the idea of ...
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3answers
338 views

What crypto system allows for 3 parties: Party 1 who makes an assertion, Party 2 mutates the assertion, Party 3 validates it

I'm looking for the cryptographic equivalent of a Drivers license where the issuer can be verified, the issuer doesn't need to know who you showed the drivers license to, but also allows ...
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1answer
902 views

Efficient and stateless anti-forgery method

One use of an anti-forgery token is to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. The attacker doesn't need to sniff the wire in order to carry out a CSRF attack. This attack relays on the ...
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1answer
102 views

OTT service using FPE

Would it be possible to create an Over-The-Top communication utility that will encrypt voice using format preserving encryption (voice clear-text to audio encrypted stream) and send that over an ...
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1answer
191 views

Implementing CD serial key system

I am trying to create a system where to unlock the application one needs to enter a serial code. I have read many articles on the theme but there are two problems bugging me. One is, If I have a ...
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167 views

Private set intersection, using a semi-trusted server

Alice has a set $S$ of words. Bob has a set $T$ of words. They want to compute the intersection $S \cap T$ of their words, with the help of a semi-trusted third party Trent. Trent runs a central ...
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449 views

How to choose keys for a block cipher?

AES and DES are block ciphers. Mathematically, its the mapping from plaintext space to ciphertext space using the keys i.e. $\{{0,1}\}^k$ x $\{{0,1}\}^l \longrightarrow \{{0,1}\}^l$ I know that these ...
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582 views

Diffie-Hellman key agreement with both Server Authentication and Perfect Forward Secrecy

I am trying to find the protocol with the least overhead, which still meets the following requirements: Server Authentication of server identity to client. The client has an authentic copy of the ...
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835 views

Is this authenticated one-way communication protocol secure?

I am looking to see if this one-way communication protocol is secure. Assume Alice wants to send Bob a message (and doesn't need Bob to reply in the same session/channel - think email). Bob knows ...
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2answers
171 views

Generating non-repeating N-bit IVs, which are indistinguishable from randomness

I'm implementing a protocol which needs a 64-bit IV for every encrypted packet. The cipher in use (AES-GCM, more or less as specified in RFC 4106) does not require that these IVs are random, only ...
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142 views

Private Messaging

Suppose Alice and Bob wants to send messages through Sue without revealing to Eve that the exchange took place. Slightly more formally, I don't want Eve to have any advantage telling if Alice is ...
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317 views

Why does the SRP-6 calculation of B include a multiplier k = 3?

In SRP-6 $B$ is calculated as $B=kv+ g^b, k=3$. What is the purpose of $k$, and why was it fixed as $3$? (In SRP-6a, this value $3$ is replaced by $k = H(N,g)$, but this question is about SRP-6.)
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497 views

Efficient Symmetric Mutual Entity Authentication Protocol

I am looking for an Authentication protocol for access control. Let's say both the client and server would share a symmetric secret (256 bit key) and the client wants to access the server. Access ...
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1answer
283 views

Undecrypt using the OpenSSL EVP API?

I'm writing a client-server encryption scheme for homework, and I've stumbled upon what might be a fatal blow to my current implementation. When using AES-256-CBC on the two sides, it's important ...
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1answer
108 views

Is there any serious discussion about using blinding intermediaries in digital currency scenarios?

A digital currency system like Lucre (OpenTransaction) creates a coin by a mint blind signing the output of a hash function, which the payer then unblinds and pairs with the input to the has function. ...
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182 views

Allowing multiple password reset tokens, and a question on random number predictability

I have a few requirements for a password reset system, along with some questions at the end as to its security. Requirements The aim is to provide a password reset mechanism satisfying the following ...
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251 views

AES-CTR with ephemeral keys vs IV

Let's say that we have a key exchange of some sort, which leaves A and B sharing the long-term secret $S$. Then, A and B want to use AES-CTR for the communication, which leaves us with several ...
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8answers
687 views

Does a public key absolutely need to be used to initiate an encrypted session?

I am a software developer working on an application with the .NET platform. This application needs to provide a secure connection and encrypt all data between the client and the server. It is a ...
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1k views

Increased CRC collision probability when adding bits to input message

The Scenario I have a message string I need to transport over a wireless network that may be unreliable. This message string is about 100 bits long, and is packaged with an 8-bit CRC. When the ...
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556 views

How to avoid a chicken and egg scenario with encrypting passwords?

I am working on application that allows users to upload files containing company data and then share those files with a list of other users that have specific roles within the system. I want to ...
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1k views

How do public key rings work in cryptographic applications?

I am wondering if there are any links to articles or resources available online, or explanations that you can give, that would help me to understand the concept of a public key ring, and why I might ...
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601 views

Is there a symmetric-key cryptography based on key establishment techniques?

Most of the current key exchange techniques are based on public-key cryptography. Are there any key exchange/establishment techniques based on symmetric-key cryptography too? In my setup primary ...
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2answers
451 views

How can I encrypt more than 64 bit with the Data Encryption Standard?

The Data Encryption Algorithm is designed to encipher and decipher blocks of data consisting of 64 bits under control of a 56-bit key. If my data is more than 64 bits, (suppose 66 or 67 bits), will ...
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2answers
541 views

What was the problem in the SSL version 2.0?

What is the main reason (attacks) the appearance of the protocol SSL version 2.0 to replace version 3.0?
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3answers
556 views

A proof-of-work random number generation system for Pokémon [closed]

(The original question that was here was considered too confusing, unclear, and rambling. You can still view it in the edit history, but the content is no longer useful by itself, and cannot be ...
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267 views

Zero-knowledge proof of a product

I have non-negative integers $x,y,z$. I'm going to give you commitments $C(x),C(y),C(z)$ to them. Then, I would like to prove in zero knowledge that $xy=z$. I can choose the commitment scheme to ...
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325 views

Third-party security issues with Shamir's secret sharing scheme

In Shamir's secret sharing scheme, we are trusting a third party who generates the secret polynomial. How can we ensure security here when we are involving a third party?
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850 views

Proper Way to Encrypt Data with Two Keys?

I'm going to develop a system that will have two keys. One supplied and generated by the system that's specific to an individual user and one from the user. I plan on using AES. Does it make sense ...
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297 views

What challenge should I use in a challenge-response proof-of-work?

In order to guard against denial-of-service attacks, I want to require clients to do some work (more work than the server does fulfilling the request) before talking to them. Client connects Server ...
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3answers
235 views

Does ECIES imply authenticity?

Assume: Alice and Bob both generate separate EC keypairs Alice obtains Bob's public key, and together with her private key creates a shared secret key Alice encrypts a message using the shared key ...
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1answer
139 views

How can two (or more) parties share and agree upon a common random seed?

I really don't know how to call this simple problem: Two (or more) parties need to establish a common (non-secret) value to be used as a seed for a deterministic RNG. The only requirement is that each ...
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433 views

Is there a way to do fair exchange between two parties who don't trust each other?

Let's suppose we have an Alice who knows a secret key A, and Bob who knows key B. Using their own keys, they each encrypt a message (Alice encrypts $m_A$, Bob encrypts $m_B$) with their own key, and ...
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386 views

Untraceable communication protocol

I am doing a research about secure communication protocols. I would be interested to know whether a protocol exists such that it grants that the two end-points taking part to the communication cannot ...
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1answer
129 views

Does there exist a two-pass AKE protocol that is secure in eCK model and also has PFS?

As we can know that the best two-pass AKE protocols with DH message can achieve is the weak form of perfect forward security (wPFS) which guarantees security against the passive adversary. But ...
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1answer
394 views

Why are protocols often proven secure under the random oracle model instead of a hash assumption?

Is this true that whenever you design a protocol using a hash function, you must prove its security under the random oracle? I mean, is it possible to devise a protocol $P$ using a function $H$, and ...
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1answer
246 views

Protocol for Randomized Oblivious Transfer?

If we define Oblivious Transfer as following: Alice inputs $(x_0,x_1) \in F^2$, where $F$ is a field, and Bob inputs $b\in\{0,1\}$, then Alice gets a dummy output(for which she knows nothing about ...
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117 views

Coding of unsigned int to prevent guessing next ID

Suppose we are assigning records an unsigned integer ID from a N-bit space (say 32-bit) in a sequential manner. Is there a way we can code this ID before showing it to the public such that someone ...
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165 views

Encryption for a short packet size

I have an 8051 microcontroller with a radio that can send packets with up to 32 bytes and I want to have the messages encrypted. It is a sensor network so I really only want to send one packet per ...
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3answers
175 views

Verifying DER encoded DSA/ECDSA signature with extra content?

Having a DSA/ECDSA signature which is supposed to be DER encoded as an ASN.1 sequence of $r$ and $s$ (as described in the RFC), and being given some bytes which are ...
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3answers
292 views

Existing works on pre-computing ElGamal ephermal keys

I was playing around with a problem in e-voting schemes that use additive homomorphic encryption to tally votes, namely that at the end of the day somebody (or somebodies, if the secret material has ...
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288 views

How to prove that someone encrypted a specific (large) chunk of data

Alice encrypts her data with HER secret key. Then she sends the encrypted data to Bob who should encrypt it with HIS secret key. Caroline should then eventually get this double encrypted data. ...
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1answer
150 views

Zero-knowledge proof for committing a choice?

Let's say there are 100 choices (which are publicly known), each represented as a different string, and today you have to choose one of them. You need not reveal what that choice is right now, though. ...
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266 views

Is the following authentication protocol insecure?

I am a student taking cryptography this semester. I was just wondering why can't we use this simple protocol? Alice → Open Connection → Bob Alice ← Cert$_b$ ← Bob Alice → {K$_{AB}$}$_{Bob}$ → Bob ...