Design of cryptographic protocols, i.e. ways of using algorithms (primitives) to achieve one or more security goals like integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (maybe together with non-security-related goals). If you ask about a specific protocol, tag with its name instead (or additionally, if ...

learn more… | top users | synonyms

2
votes
1answer
129 views

Authenticated Encryption of UDP packets

I am working on a UDP based file transfer protocol. Congestion Control, Resending of packages and other UDP challenges are dealt with - speedtests shows that the protocol is up to 10 times faster than ...
2
votes
1answer
54 views

Design for file transfers to a new party

I'm pondering a problem of how to enable transfers of files from clients to people that does not yet have an application/account/keys yet. Here's my current thought for Alice wanting to send Bob ...
2
votes
1answer
51 views

Is succinct verification of an arbitrary data transformation theoretically possible? Is it feasible? How?

Given input string S, and transformation (i.e. computer program) T, is it possible to provide a succinct proof that another binary string S' is identical to the output T(S)? By "succinct", I ...
2
votes
1answer
47 views

Is there an existing AE protocol with forward secrecy for embedded devices?

I'm working on an embedded device that is connected to a computer over an untrusted channel. According to my threat model I need authentication and encryption on the wire with perfect forward secrecy. ...
2
votes
1answer
84 views

What's the principle to design the functionality under UC framework?

Though I can get the basic idea of UC Framework, namely let the environment cannot distinguish the real protocol with the real adversary and the functionality with the simulator, I am still puzzled in ...
2
votes
2answers
92 views

Is it safe to use a secret salted hash of a public id for client to prove ownership of id to a server that knows salt but does not store ids?

I am writing a peering server - the server assigns randomly generated public IDs to users, and I want users to be able to reclaim their ids in the future, but only to be able to claim ids that they ...
2
votes
1answer
73 views

Symmetric-key login protocol

I'm trying to analyze a login protocol based on symmetric key cryptography. I'm just starting out, so this may very likely be a very bad idea, but nonetheless I'd like to hear your thoughts on it. ...
2
votes
1answer
98 views

Generating shared secret random permutation

There are three blind card game players. Each player does not trust any other, even prejudicing other two players may not be blind, or there may be others in the room, peeking at their cards. In ...
2
votes
1answer
129 views

Can you explain the counter in the Key derivation function of PACE?

I try to understand the PACE-Protocol, especially the Key Derivation Function in ECDH on page 33. Can someone explain me, what the Counter is good for? Often there are iteration counters in KDF - but ...
2
votes
1answer
258 views

Is this new server API authentication protocol secure?

I need a secure protocol to authenticate client side users with my server which has an API. I am devising something more secure particularly to resist active MITM attacks where an attacker may modify ...
2
votes
1answer
252 views

Key exchange and man in the middle issue. Secure solution

I am trying to design MiTM protected key exchange algorithm. For instance I am using RSA asymmetric keys. Alice and Bob respectively have each their own pair of keys. And they should be able to ...
2
votes
1answer
120 views

How can I validate generated session keys in SRP-6a protocol

I have genereted two equal session keys on client and server successfully. But I couldn't understand how each other should validate that they have same session keys. On the client I generated a SHA1 ...
2
votes
1answer
213 views

Comparing plaintext to contents of ciphertext

Given an authenticated mode of encryption, when comparing a plaintext string against the contents of a ciphertext, which approach is typically considered safer? Encrypt the plaintext and compare ...
2
votes
1answer
80 views

Are there any signature schemes that protect against collusion by multiple parties?

Say I want to verify the identity of Alice, but Alice could be colluding with Bob to fool me. Is there any way to verify Alice's identity and also be sure that Bob is not impersonating Alice, e.g. ...
2
votes
1answer
58 views

end-to-end encrypted chat app with symmetric + public key encryption, TLS and cert pinning

A big drawback of end-to-end encrypted messaging services is that, as soon as you lose your device, you lose all your messages. Your private key is gone after all. I was wondering though, wouldn't it ...
2
votes
0answers
34 views

authentication protocol questions/security

Disclaimer: I am the only person that uses my software. This is just experimental fun. I previously wrote a server/client that used the secure remote password protocol authentication. I had an idea ...
2
votes
0answers
49 views

How to force an adversary to call a certain oracle?

Consider there is a protocol in real world, which uses a random oracle $\mathcal{H}$. In the ideal world, after the calling of $\mathcal{H}$ by some parties, intuitively I want the simulator gets some ...
2
votes
0answers
87 views

Avoiding known plaintext attacks with an additional XOR-Layer

Can a cipher that is vulnerable to an known plaintext attack be made secure by adding an additional XOR-encryption? That is: suppose I have an (w.l.o.g. symmetric) encryption algorithm E were the ...
2
votes
0answers
152 views

What are the well known protocols that offer perfect forward secrecy? [closed]

As far as I know these are the well known protocols that offer PFS TLS/SSL (with DHE-RSA, DHE-DSS, ECDHE-RSA or ECDHE-ECDSA) SSH (RFC4253) OTR (Protocol Version 3 Spec) IPsec (with IKEv1 and IKEv2) ...
2
votes
0answers
328 views

Elliptic Curve based blind signature implementation

I want to use Elliptic Curve based blind signature scheme for my research. There is no proper implementation of ECC-based blind signatures. Can someone describe to me which things I need to follow ...
2
votes
0answers
53 views

Common pitfalls of session key activation?

Assume that initiator $I$ and responder $R$ of a key agreement protocol have agreed on new symmetric session keys $K'_{auth}$ and $K'_{enc}$, e.g. by way of Diffie-Hellman and key derivation, possibly ...
2
votes
0answers
91 views

Reliability of a single-pass deniable authentication protocol?

I look for one-pass deniable authentication protocol with a short message payload for my project and find a solution: ...
2
votes
0answers
137 views

Obfuscating point-like functions

There are standard schemes for obfuscating a point function; I'm wondering if we know how to obfuscate a slight generalization of a point function. I'll elaborate more precisely. Definition 1. A ...
2
votes
0answers
129 views

encrypted file sharing protocol

I am trying to design a file exchange protocol for learning purposes, inspired by PGP, but fixing some of its shortcomings. Assuming the machine where the creation and decryption of the file happens ...
2
votes
0answers
194 views

File Encryption (EFS method)

I'm implementing (for learning purposes) a file encryptor, which uses the following method (from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypting_File_System). I have 3 kind of keys: RSA public/private, AES ...
2
votes
0answers
84 views

Why do authors execute a leakage resilient election protocol inside a leak-free phase?

In the paper "Multiparty Computation Secure Against Continual Memory Leakage", on page 1241 (that's page 7 of the PDF) under section 2.3, the authors discuss "The Election Protocol" that they use to ...
2
votes
1answer
244 views

Bit commitment with 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer

I know a protocol for bit commitment using regular OT (Bob has 1/2 chance of learning the bit Alice transferred to him) which goes like this: COMMITMENT PHASE Alice chooses a bit $b$ For ...
2
votes
0answers
122 views

Cryptanalysis not based on method used to encrypt? [closed]

When doing cryptanalysis on RSA or something number theory based, there are various attacks that all seem to involve number theory (Wikipedia: RSA_(algorithm) ~ Attacks_against_plain_RSA). Similarly, ...
2
votes
0answers
92 views

Relaxed trust criterion for mental poker server?

I've read a lot about protocols for mental poker without a trusted server, but I'm interested in the possibility of a faster, more practical protocol that relaxes that criterion a bit and "trusts" a ...
2
votes
0answers
27 views

Encryption with Deduplication [duplicate]

Suppose I have a file server running ZFS with file deduplication enabled, and I have two users that are sharing files: Alice and Carol. If Alice uploads huge_file.tgz to her www/ directory, and Carol ...
2
votes
0answers
2k views

Cryptographic Protocol using NaCl

Why? I wanted to add some security and privacy to a chat-type server for playing various games (with a few things that are done on the server to limit cheating). Going by the "Don't implement ...
2
votes
1answer
269 views

Sigma-protocol for 3SAT problem

I have some questions from previous years exams, I hope you could help me with them. :) Let $g,h$ denote generators of a group $G$ of large prime order $n$ such that $\log_g h$ is unknown to anyone. ...
2
votes
0answers
209 views

Transforming simplest protocol into a Sigma-protocol

I have some questions from previous years exams, I hope you could help me with them. :) Suppose that a protocol satisfies the properties of a $\Sigma$-protocol, except that it is only (plain) ...
2
votes
0answers
126 views

Computer appliance protocol

I build the computer appliance system that consist of software server and multiple controllers. The system I want to build must be pluggable in the sense that when I connect a controller C to the ...
2
votes
0answers
173 views

Setting protocol parameters to achieve concrete security

Background One issue with modern security proofs is that they are usually asymptotic. In other words, such proofs are usually formulated as follows: For any polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal A$, we ...
2
votes
3answers
150 views

Combating traffic analysis over request-response protocols

Suppose I am to design a request-response protocol (similar HTTP). For the sake of simplicity let us assume that this is a "chat" protocol where the client can only perform two actions: Contribute a ...
1
vote
2answers
212 views

What cryptanalysis is possible against two independent keystreams XORed against plaintext?

If a wise person was unsure about which commercial cryptography standards are truly secure from the fascist powers that be, it would seem the obvious option for companies and individuals is to now use ...
1
vote
1answer
166 views

Is creating a own protocol safe or should TLS always be used?

The more I start to learn about cryptography the more I hear it is unsafe to 'create' your own cryptographic protocol. With this I mean combining cryptographic primitives like HMAC, AES and RSA ...
1
vote
3answers
160 views

In cryptographic protocols, what protects against an attacker dropping messages?

In some cryptographic protocols I have seen messages protected for confidentiality, authenticity, replaying attacks, reordering attacks, etc. What protects a protocol from an attacker in a ...
1
vote
1answer
146 views

How to design a secure data container?

I want to design a secure data container that can be used to transfer encrypted data over a public network that can defeat common attacks. Data is already encrypted before entering this container so ...
1
vote
3answers
74 views

RSA message integrity

I wish to send some small data that RSA alone can encrypt, and I send a shared secret along with it. ...
1
vote
2answers
205 views

What are the major flaws and limitations of this hash-based stream cipher design?

K is a 224-bit key. C is a 32-bit counter; it is publicly known. the same value is never used twice. ...
1
vote
2answers
162 views

Contruct a protocol to determine if three secret keys are different, without revealing any of them?

I am trying to find a protocol for this problem: Three persons, $A$, $B$, and $C$, know secret numbers $s_{A}, s_{B}$, and $s_{C}$, respectively. They want to know whether their numbers are all ...
1
vote
2answers
126 views

How can I protect against the failure of a block or symmetric cipher?

Can I protect against the failure of a block or symmetric cipher by chaining different techniques together? If so what implementation details should I be aware of? Are some combination of ciphers ...
1
vote
1answer
135 views

Are formal methods used for cryptographic protocol design?

I decided to learn more about the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocols and found this interesting talk by Cathy Meadows at YouTube. After doing research about how people are using ...
1
vote
1answer
287 views

Rock-paper-scissors over network, how to protect from cheating server?

I'm trying to design cryptographic protocol to play Rock-Paper-Scissors with two parties, neither trusting each other, nor trusting server they use for communication, so game is 'provably fair'. So ...
1
vote
1answer
219 views

Traitor-tracing PRF

I'm looking for a pseudorandom function (PRF) with "traitor-tracing" properties. More specifically, I'd like there to be multiple equivalent keys, so I can give different parties different keys, but ...
1
vote
1answer
113 views

Modular protocol design

What does modular protocol design mean? Why does TLS not have modular protocol design? What protocols have modular design? (IPSec, SSH)
1
vote
1answer
209 views

General-purpose non-interactive multi-party computation protocol

Most of general purpose multi-party computation protocols are highly interactive. Especially the ones with Shamir's secret scheme, as there is a degree reduction step in multiplication that needs the ...
1
vote
2answers
632 views

Derive a key from public data using a secret master key

Users in my system will be given a device that contains a 128-bit AES user key. The user key will be derived from 64 bits of public data related to the user, which is unique but very predictable (i.e. ...