A primitive or protocol with provable security is accompanied by a mathematical proof that shows how to reduce the security claims about the protocol to a set of assumptions.

learn more… | top users | synonyms

0
votes
1answer
69 views

Hash of multiset of values, which lets me compute the hash of the union

Cryptographic hash functions normally take as input a bitstring. I am looking for a hash function that takes as input a finite multiset of values. In other words, given $S \subset \{0,1\}^*$, I want ...
4
votes
2answers
466 views

What is the definition of “security beyond the birthday paradox”?

I'm reading a paper about MACs and I would like to be sure about the meaning of a security beyond the birthday paradox. Is there a definition?
12
votes
1answer
697 views

Does unbalancing a feistel cipher always improve security? Does it improve security at all?

So according to Wikipedia unbalanced feistel ciphers provide greater provable security. Specifically, they state: The Thorp shuffle is an extreme case of an unbalanced Feistel cipher in which one ...
23
votes
2answers
5k views

Why does nobody use (or break) the Camellia Cipher?

If Camellia is of equivalent security and speed to AES, concerns arise. First of all, assuming the above, why is Camellia so rarely used in practice? Why aren't there any breaks in Camellia? Does ...
4
votes
1answer
197 views

Is it safe to assume Salsa20 to be a PRP?

Often in security proofs a certain block cipher is assumed to be a pseudorandom permutation or PRP. I wonder if this goes for stream ciphers as well, and specifically for Salsa20. If limit ourselves ...
2
votes
1answer
164 views

Security of cloud computational protocols in UC Framework?

The universal composability allows one to the analyze security of cryptographic protocols . But it does have some gaps when it comes to analyzing few protocols especially two party cases when there is ...
5
votes
1answer
183 views

Proof that MACing a hash of the message is also a secure MAC

I found a theorem that says: Let $MAC = (S,V)$ be a MAC for short messages over $(K,M,T)$. Let $H: M^{big} → M$. Define $MAC^{big} = (S^{big},V^{big})$ over $(K,M^{big},T)$ as: $S^{big}(k,m) = ...
1
vote
1answer
67 views

Safety when disclosing hashes of secrets used to calculate other secrets

In my application, I am generating a big random number and publishing a SHA256 hash of it. After the hash it published (but not the secret), anyone can submit any number, and the system will calculate ...
2
votes
1answer
147 views

The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali Construction with bad PRGS

I understand that if we have a secure PRG then the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali construction gives us a secure PRF. However, what I've not been able to find much material on is how will the GGM ...
2
votes
1answer
409 views

Why is proof-by-reduction needed (for Elgamal proof of security, for example)?

The textbook proof for Elgamal encryption basically reduces to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH). Elgamal: $Gen(.): x \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$; $Enc(m,g^x): r \xleftarrow{R} ...
4
votes
2answers
256 views

Is this a structural weakness of Feistel networks?

I'm doing a lot of reading about Feistel networks. Something occurred to me a bit ago that I hadn't realized previously, namely that in any Feistel construction there are bits of the plaintext that ...
5
votes
1answer
105 views

Is there any existing analysis for this construction to turn a tweakable blockcipher into a PRF?

I'm basically looking at this construction to turn a tweakable blockcipher $E_c(x)$ taking a key $k$, nonce $n$, counter $c$ (forming tweak $t = c||n$) and an input $x$ into a PRF on an ...
0
votes
1answer
290 views

Is my understanding of CPA indistinguishability experiment correct?

Following are steps to conduct Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) indistinguishibility experiment $PrivK_\mathcal{A,E}^{eav}(n)$. $\mathcal{A}$ is the adversary $\mathcal{E}$ is the encryption scheme ...
3
votes
1answer
720 views

Proof that IND$-CPA implies IND-CPA?

I've read a few papers recently that used a notion of security called "indistinguishability from random bits/strings" under chosen plaintext attack, also called IND\$-CPA. See e.g. ...
2
votes
1answer
277 views

some of my confusions about DDH assumption

The wiki defines the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption as follows: Decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption Consider a (multiplicative) cyclic group $G$ of order $q$, and with generator $g$. The DDH ...
12
votes
3answers
1k views

What is the ideal cipher model?

What is the ideal cipher model? What assumptions does it make about a block cipher? How does it relate to assuming that my block cipher is a pseudo-random permutation (PRP)? When is the ideal ...
2
votes
1answer
140 views

Can you help me understand PFS and wPFS?

Every time I encounter the concepts of PFS (perfect forward secrecy) and wPFS (weak perfect forward secrecy), I feel uncertain about them. My understanding is that: PFS ensures that, if the ...
6
votes
1answer
169 views

Is there a security proof for the Triple-DES construction in the ideal cipher model?

Suppose one has an ideal block cipher $E \: : \: \{0,\hspace{-0.04 in}1\hspace{-0.03 in}\}^k \times \{0,\hspace{-0.04 in}1\hspace{-0.03 in}\}^w \: \to \: \{0,\hspace{-0.04 in}1\hspace{-0.03 in}\}^w ...
3
votes
1answer
104 views

Does there exist a two-pass AKE protocol that is secure in eCK model and also has PFS?

As we can know that the best two-pass AKE protocols with DH message can achieve is the weak form of perfect forward security (wPFS) which guarantees security against the passive adversary. But ...
4
votes
1answer
189 views

Questions about the ideal cipher model

I've read that we can study the security of modes of operation by assuming the use of an ideal block cipher. I've also seen a paper suggesting that the ideal cipher model could be something else than ...
1
vote
0answers
46 views

Conditions for proving that a signcryption scheme is secure

If I'm able to prove that any scheme satisfies confidentiality ad unforgeability conditions, will it be a valid signcryption scheme, without explicit signature and encryption parts ?
-1
votes
2answers
253 views

Perfect Secrecy, two Definitions

I'm reading the proof of the implication "Def 2.1 $\Rightarrow$ Def 2.4" in these slides about Adversarial Indistinguishability and Perfectly-Secret Encryption. I have a doubt in the slide 10. Here it ...
1
vote
1answer
201 views

Indistinguishability attack example

I want solve the next exercise. The author defined the experiment for the cryptosystem $\Pi$, the adversary $A$ and the security parameter $n$ as follows $\mathsf{PRIV_{EAV}}(\Pi,A,n)$ The ...
0
votes
1answer
392 views

Is this scheme a provably fair random number generation?

I have thought up a method for generating random numbers between a client and a server which I hope is fair: The client and server decide on a range in advance, $0$ trough $n-1$. The server ...
1
vote
1answer
74 views

What does “securely realize” mean?

I was wondering what "securely realizes" means. I see this in some cryptographic papers but I don't know what it means for a protocol to "securely realize" a function $F$. Is it just a fancy way of ...
2
votes
1answer
708 views

Question about the definition of a secure PRF

I'm taking a cryptography introduction course, and we're covering the definition of a secure PRF. I understand the test goes as follows: A challenger picks a function $f$ such that $f \leftarrow ...
2
votes
1answer
157 views

Is Guillou-Quisquater existentially unforgeable against adaptive message attack under a random oracle model?

First of all, the Guillou-Quisquater digital signature scheme is: Note everything is $\bmod n$. Message is denoted by $m$. Private key: $s$ Public key: Hash function $H$, $e$, ...
1
vote
1answer
172 views

Why is Blum-Goldwasser not IND-CCA-2 secure?

Consider the Blum-Goldwasser encryption scheme as described on Wikipedia. I was told that it was not IND-CCA-2 secure. I heard there was malleabilty, probably it has to do with XOR-ing. But I do not ...
2
votes
2answers
511 views

What are the differences between proofs based on simulation and proofs based on games?

what are the main pros and cons of proving the "security" of a crypto scheme under simulation proofs instead of game based proofs?
4
votes
2answers
316 views

Is it possible to break a hash-based block cipher?

Let's define the following block cipher: $C_n = M_n \oplus H(k + n)$ where $C_n$ is the nth block of ciphertext, $M_n$ is the nth block of plaintext, $H$ is a cryptographic hash function, and $k$ is ...
2
votes
2answers
151 views

What are the cryptographic assumptions in the Dolev Yao model?

In the Dolev Yao model for interactive protocols, the cryptographic primitive (encryption, for example) is considered as a blackbox. Does blackbox here mean that the primitive is to be considered CPA ...
3
votes
2answers
172 views

Security model for privacy-preserving aggregation scheme.

Suppose that $S=(E,D)$ is an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Now I want to design a protocol $P$ such that given inputs $x_1,x_2,..,x_n$, the adversary $A$ (who can decrypt) can only learn ...
2
votes
1answer
335 views

Why are protocols often proven secure under the random oracle model instead of a hash assumption?

Is this true that whenever you design a protocol using a hash function, you must prove its security under the random oracle? I mean, is it possible to devise a protocol $P$ using a function $H$, and ...
2
votes
2answers
342 views

The security proof for Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption

My question relates to the original KP-ABE paper: http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/vipul/abe.pdf I'm having trouble understanding the proof (pages 10–13) that the scheme is secure in ...
1
vote
0answers
56 views

IND-CPA security scheme [duplicate]

Possible Duplicate: CPA Secure Chosen plaintext scheme The example for IND-CPA secure schemes given is generally: for a random r, $Enc_k(m) =(r|| E_k(r)$ $XOR$ $m)$ where $E$ is a $PRF$ ...
2
votes
1answer
343 views

server side Javascript security

It is accepted that the javascript library lacks the ability to create an adequate PRNG. My understanding that this was mainly due to the limits of a sandboxed browser enviroment that javascript ...
2
votes
1answer
285 views

Exact mathematical definition of simulation based security?

I've been trying to understand cryptographic protocols and how to define their security. The problem is that while I can understand what the intuitive definition says, I have trouble understanding how ...
2
votes
1answer
209 views

Randomized stream cipher using multivariant quadratic equations

This is an idea I had for cipher that I thought might reduce to a known hard problem. It is efficient (compared to something like BBS) in terms of time but not in terms of space. Here's the ...
6
votes
1answer
148 views

How to turn adversary against encryption of zeroes into adversary against random bits?

I recently read the article Nonce-Based Symmetric Encryption by Rogaway, where he presents two different notions of indistinguishability, which he calls ind$ and ind, respectively. Here's the ...
2
votes
0answers
136 views

Setting protocol parameters to achieve concrete security

Background One issue with modern security proofs is that they are usually asymptotic. In other words, such proofs are usually formulated as follows: For any polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal A$, we ...
6
votes
1answer
476 views

Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali Construction

The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali construction allows to build a (cryptographically secure) pseudo-random function from of a (cryptographically secure) pseudo-random generator. More formally, let $G: ...
2
votes
1answer
379 views

Security analysis of a “one-time pad” type hill cipher

Suppose the Hill cipher were modified to something like a one-time pad cipher, where Alice wants to send a message to Bob, and she chooses a key matrix randomly everytime a new message is sent (and ...
6
votes
2answers
197 views

Where is the proof of security of Diffie's cipher?

There is an apparently provably secure cipher that was proposed by Diffie, but enhanced by R.A. Rueppel. The scheme, which was mentioned in Applied Cryptography, works like this: Measure the length ...
5
votes
3answers
2k views

Is a book cipher provably secure?

I've seen ciphers (usually in spy drama shows) that involve taking a book and writing down an index to individual characters. Essentially it's a keyed substitution cipher, where the key is the name ...
5
votes
1answer
181 views

Academic papers on ECDSA security

What are the most authoritative papers on the security analysis of ECDSAs? I`m mainly looking for comparisons of how secure different curves are considered to be, what potential methods are there of ...
29
votes
1answer
4k views

What is the “Random Oracle Model” and why is it controversial?

What is the "Random Oracle Model"? Is it an "assumption" akin to the hardness of factoring and discrete log? Or something else? And why do some researchers have a strong distrust of this model?
8
votes
1answer
312 views

How did the Koblitz/Menezes papers affect the cryptography community?

Two highly-critical papers by Koblitz and Menezes (two well-regarded mathematicians who've contributed to the crypto community) were published years ago: Another Look at “Provable Security” in 2004, ...