A primitive or protocol with provable security is accompanied by a mathematical proof that shows how to reduce the security claims about the protocol to a set of assumptions.

learn more… | top users | synonyms

0
votes
2answers
125 views

Why are twofish or other algorithms not NIST approved, are they still safe?

NIST has a total of 3 approved block ciphers on their website: AES, TDES and skipjack. I get why those are on there (though personally I find TDES a bit iffy) but from my understanding Twofish and ...
1
vote
1answer
65 views

Is the reduction from left-or-right IND-CPA to real-or-random IND-CPA tight?

A modern trend in cryptography consists of defining security as rigorously as possible, and then designing schemes which are secure according to those definitions. Proving security comes in the form ...
0
votes
1answer
126 views

How to compare between two cryptographic algorithms in terms of security? [closed]

How to compare between two cryptographic algorithms (e.g. SHA-1 and SipHash) in terms of security? That is, how could one prove that algorithm X is more secure than algorithm Y?
0
votes
1answer
87 views

Hardness of problem related to bilinear pairings

Let $e: \mathbb G_1 \times \mathbb G_1 \rightarrow \mathbb G_T$ be an efficient bilinear pairing. Note that the pairing is symmetric (i.e., Type 1). The problem is, given $g \in \mathbb G_1$ and ...
2
votes
1answer
110 views

Gap problem for Learning With Errors

Informally, a "Gap problem" arises when solving the computational (or search) version using an oracle for the decisional version. This definition of Gap Problem was introduced by Okamoto and ...
7
votes
1answer
459 views

understanding forking lemma

Every time when I read a paper that has digital signature, when it comes to prove the security of a digital signature scheme, many chances that the author will use the forking lemma. The forking ...
1
vote
1answer
53 views

Counter Mode (CTR) and mult-CPA

I am not sure if Counter Mode (CTR) encryption is mult-CPA (chosen-plaintext attack) secure or not.
4
votes
2answers
239 views

Can we say that if $P=NP$ there is no CPA secure public key encryption?

I've learned that public key encryption is based on the problem of Discrete Log (as regard to group theory) which believed to be hard. But, can we say that it doesn't matter on which problem our ...
0
votes
2answers
138 views

How to prove Security of Onion Layers of encryption?

CryptDB has Onion layers of Encryption to provide wider functionality from weaker forms of encryption. How do we prove such things are indeed secure ? Intuitively It seems ok. Are there any parallels ...
1
vote
2answers
103 views

what is PFS game?

when i reading about this paper, in the Setup of SIM section 5.2, it says that "According to the definition of PFS game", i wonder what the definition of PFS game ...
1
vote
1answer
108 views

Hash function as secure as one-time pad?

We know that the one-time pad is provably secure as a cipher to encrypt some data. Is there an algorithm which does the same just as a hash function? Can we get a provably secure hash function? Maybe ...
3
votes
1answer
119 views

Given $g^a, g^b, g^c, g^{1/b}$, is it hard to distinguish $e(g, g)^{abc}$ from a random value?

where $g$ is a group element in bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$. I understand it is very similar to the conventional DBDH problem, but $g^{1/b}$ is also known, possibly making it easier? Does anyone know ...
0
votes
1answer
107 views

Size of a MAC for a quickly checked message?

Let suppose that we have to check a message that was written one second ago. The message is discarded immediately after having being checked. What "minimal" size for such a MAC is secure ? Thank you. ...
2
votes
1answer
71 views

Definition of the Decryption oracle

In the context of public-key encryption, what would be a formal definition of the decryption oracle? I know the informal definition (i.e., a function that is available to the adversary and that ...
1
vote
1answer
207 views

Rock-paper-scissors over network, how to protect from cheating server?

I'm trying to design cryptographic protocol to play Rock-Paper-Scissors with two parties, neither trusting each other, nor trusting server they use for communication, so game is 'provably fair'. So ...
5
votes
0answers
236 views

Why is EdDSA collision-resilient with SHA-512?

In the Bernstein et al. paper about EdDSA, the authors claim EdDSA is resilient against collisions (i.e. it can still be secure even if the hash function used isn't collision-resistant), drawing on a ...
2
votes
2answers
82 views

Formal security of recycled random blinding in a Paillier scheme

This question is a follow-up/variant on a previous question. Supposing that we are trying to generate a large number of (indistinguishable) ciphertexts of a given plaintext and want to avoid the ...
1
vote
1answer
101 views

Protocol composition [closed]

I have been trying to wrap my head around different definitions of protocol security (stand alone, sequential composition, parallel composition, universal composition) and how the proofs of any of ...
2
votes
1answer
66 views

Encrypting decryption key

What's that property called when a scheme is secure even if you encrypt the decryption key? Some schemes have problems when your plaintext is the decryption key (or just the key if symmetric).
2
votes
1answer
101 views

To prove $r \cdot f_1 +f_2 \cdot (s+1)$ is secure

We define the polynomials $r, f_1,f_2,s \in R[x]$. Where $r$ is a random degree 1 polynomial and $s$ is a random polynomial such that: $degree(s)=degree(f_1)=degree(f_2)$, let $R$ be $\mathbb{Z}_p$ ...
4
votes
2answers
155 views

Hamiltonicity proof of knowledge

I'm learning the POK notion and definitions and as a self exercise I wante to prove the statement that the Hamiltonicity protocol is a POK system with knowledge error $1/2$. So the question will be ...
2
votes
1answer
181 views

Flaw in the security definition of *Stateful* Authenticated Encryption?

I'm in search of the correct definition of a stateful authenticated encryption scheme (sAE), and its related security notion. This has been treated several times in the academic literature, however, ...
0
votes
1answer
140 views

Secure double encryption using CPA and CCA

Do you mind if you give me any hints, links or ideas about how to improve the security of double regular encryption and decryption, by using CPA game and CCA game, it sounds interesting question, and ...
1
vote
1answer
73 views

Why is proving “parties' views are simulatable” enough in semi-honest model?

To prove a protocol is secure in semi-honest model, we have to prove: the view of each party, on each possible pair of inputs, can be efficiently simulated based solely on its own input and and ...
1
vote
1answer
72 views

Requirement for the length of a HMAC tag?

I've seen NIST requirements about key length. What about the output lengths ? Is 112 bits enough for the HMAC output length ? Can we truncate the tag to keep only 112 bits ? Thank you
1
vote
0answers
55 views

Efficient proof of knowledge using Wegman-Carter hash

A verifier wants to ensure, with only little exchange of data with other systems, that a large block of data $M$ that the verifier holds is also available to some other system(s). It is not an ...
2
votes
1answer
92 views

Why is this cryptosystem insecure?

Can someone help me see the flaw in this cryptosystem? Note: This is homework and it is due today at 1:30pm. An answer before that is not expected; I'd just like to understand what the flaw is. ...
1
vote
1answer
58 views

Key escrow on indistinguishability games

Does it mean that when PPT attacker is breaking an indistinguishable based (equivalent with semantic security) game with non negligible probability that he is able to infer the secret keys either on ...
4
votes
1answer
97 views

Why does NTRUEncrypt lack a formal security proof?

Is there any particular reason why NTRUEncrypt lacks a formal security proof? That is, a demonstration that it achieves certain security notion (e.g. IND-CPA). I know there is a provable-secure ...
0
votes
1answer
115 views

Is this chat protocol safe?

I am in the design phase of a secure chat application at the moment. I am trying to make this as secure as possible. The Serverprovider should not have access to the messagedata. So my idea was the ...
4
votes
2answers
215 views

CDH problem and Square-DH problem

CDH problem roughly says that choose $U=g^u, V=g^v$ uniformly at random from cyclic group $G$, it's hard to compute $CDH(U,V)=g^{uv}$. Square-DH problem roughly says choose $U=g^u$ uniformly at ...
2
votes
0answers
51 views

Bridging the gap between security proofs and “real-world” security

I've been studying cryptography for a little while. I understand fairly well the nuts and bolts of security proofs, but I'm having trouble reconciling the formal statements of security in these proofs ...
2
votes
1answer
125 views

Is this modified Schnorr signature scheme secure?

Signing Let y = g^x, which is your public/private keypair. Let r = g^v, for random v Let c = H(M) Let z = (v + cx) mod q The signature is the pair (r,z) Verifying g^z = ry^c mod p We further ...
5
votes
3answers
428 views

Security proofs for CBC mode

I'm looking for different approaches to proofs for the security of CBC mode encryption. What are the best sources of information about this subject?
1
vote
0answers
77 views

Privacy-Preserving Protocols and Proofs of Security

While dabbling in privacy-preserving protocols (mainly using Semi-Homomorphic Encryption) and coming up with miscellaneous ideas for comparison tests or other similar primitives, based on obfuscation ...
0
votes
1answer
176 views

Proof for composed signatures

Assumes that we have 3 signature algorithms, $S^A$ with key pair $(sk^A,pk^A)$, $S^B$ with key pair $(sk^B,pk^B)$,$S^C$ with key pair $(sk^C,pk^C)$. We denote by $\epsilon$, $\epsilon'$ and ...
0
votes
0answers
33 views

Hard problems in composite order group even when factorization is known

Composite discrete log problem has been proved to be reducible to hardness of factorization and discrete log on the prime factor groups. Are there any problems apart from that in composite order ...
1
vote
0answers
36 views

What is the restriction on k, for the kth composite residuosity problem to be hard

This paper considers the exponent to be an odd integer. When k = 2, it is called the quadratic residuosity problem (mod n where n is composite) which is hard and can be solved if the factorization of ...
4
votes
1answer
90 views

OCB and GCM security

Is OCB as secure as GCM or CCM ? Since OCB design is quite different from GCM and CCM, I was wondering if the security properties of these latters are satisfied by OCB, as well. Thank you.
5
votes
2answers
578 views

Are there any secure commutative ciphers?

This answer lists two commutative cipher algorithms - Pohlig-Hellman and SRA. However, they don't appear to be too secure. My question is, here there any commutative ciphers out there that are secure ...
3
votes
1answer
290 views

Relation between attack and attack model for signatures

I would like to know: What is the relationship between an attack and an attack model. For example, let $\Pi$ be the Lamport signature scheme. This signature has it's security based on the one-way ...
3
votes
1answer
215 views

Security equivalent to Diffie–Hellman problem?

I've been doing the security proof for one of my Theorem. Basically, given $g^a$, $g^b$, $g^{cb}$, $g$ and $c$ as known values. Is the problem of computing $g^{acb^{-1}}$ equivalent to the Diffie ...
4
votes
1answer
65 views

Are HMACs based on hashes with larger bit-lengths also more secure?

When doing encrypt-then-mac, I can choose to use a hmac as the MAC. For example, I could use a hash like SHA-256 or SHA-512 (by using it as a keyed hash) to create that HMAC. Does it increase ...
5
votes
2answers
502 views

Is SipHash cryptographically secure?

I'm evaluating different hash algorithms for use in my application. One of the kind of algorithms I am looking at are cryptographically secure ones to protect against DOS attacks. SipHash seems ...
4
votes
1answer
201 views

What should I be aware of when implementing algorithms myself?

I plan to build my own crypto library. The project will be primarily for me to learn (and if useful for no other purpose, that is fine). In the past I have implemented a few hashes, and AES quite a ...
1
vote
1answer
132 views

Use ElGamal to solve Diffie-Hellman problem

Say we are able to decrypt a Elgamal ciphertext $c$ using only the public key. Apparantly it is now possible to solve the Diffie-Hellman problem (given $g^a, g^b$ calculate $g^{ab}$). How? I know how ...
2
votes
0answers
86 views

Looking for a detailed example of proof by reduction

I'm looking for a very detailed example of proof by reduction. Say we have two or three protocols (that have been proven secure) and we construct a new protocol. We want to provide a proof of security ...
6
votes
1answer
150 views

What is the “artificial abort” technique?

In the security proof of Brent Waters's paper Efficient Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles, he uses a novel “artificial abort” step on page 6. At this point the simulator is still ...
3
votes
2answers
139 views

Reductionist proofs of decisional problems to computational

Are they any reductionist proofs where an attacker $\mathcal{I}$ for a well established computationally "hard" problem $\mathsf{Π}$ is employing an attacker $\mathcal{A}$ who we assume is able to ...
2
votes
2answers
146 views

how much trust can we place in protocol verifiers? [closed]

I read many papers on authenticated key exchange protocols, and most security proofs are done by the authors. In this method, you can imagine that the efficiency is low. Moreover, even if you have ...