A primitive or protocol with provable security is accompanied by a mathematical proof that shows how to reduce the security claims about the protocol to a set of assumptions.
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Why is proof-by-reduction needed (for Elgamal proof of security, for example)?
The textbook proof for Elgamal encryption basically reduces to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH).
Elgamal:
$Gen(.): x \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$; $Enc(m,g^x): r \xleftarrow{R} ...
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Sematically Secure McEliece
I am read the Lemma 2 (pp13) in the paper [1]. Here a make a question Why "for any $Hash_z$ and any $Gen$"? The author of paper reply
The reason why "for any $Hash_z$ and any $Gen$" is that if ...
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Questions about the ideal cipher model
I've read that we can study the security of modes of operation by assuming the use of an ideal block cipher. I've also seen a paper suggesting that the ideal cipher model could be something else than ...
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Are there any secure commutative ciphers?
This answer lists two commutative cipher algorithms - Pohlig-Hellman and SRA. However, they don't appear to be too secure.
My question is, here there any commutative ciphers out there that are secure ...
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Setting protocol parameters to achieve concrete security
Background
One issue with modern security proofs is that they are usually asymptotic. In other words, such proofs are usually formulated as follows: For any polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal A$, we ...
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BAN Logic, Problem to Idealize the protocols
I'm studying the BAN logic.
In the application of it, there is a step,where I have to idealize the protocol
that I'm analyzing.
I have problems to make this.
Anyone that has expertise in BAN logic ...
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Conditions for proving that a signcryption scheme is secure
If I'm able to prove that any scheme satisfies confidentiality ad unforgeability conditions, will it be a valid signcryption scheme, without explicit signature and encryption parts ?
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One time Pad Adversary
I like know Why $Pr[\mathsf{PRIV_{EAV}}(\Pi,A,n)=1] = 1/2$, when $\Pi$ is a One Time Pad. I trying:
$$Pr[\mathsf{PRIV_{EAV}}(\Pi,A,n)=1] = Pr[b'=0|b=0]Pr[b=0] + ...
