I am reading this example: A random oracle is an ideal object. What makes a random oracle convenient for proofs is the part about knowing nothing on the output for a given input if you do not ...
Is Guillou-Quisquater existentially unforgeable against adaptive message attack under a random oracle model?
First of all, the Guillou-Quisquater digital signature scheme is: Note everything is $\bmod n$. Message is denoted by $m$. Private key: $s$ Public key: Hash function $H$, $e$, ...
I was looking for more realistic alternatives to the ROM for describing hash functions in theoretical proofs. I came across the common reference string model (where hash functions can be modeled as ...
Is this true that whenever you design a protocol using a hash function, you must prove its security under the random oracle? I mean, is it possible to devise a protocol $P$ using a function $H$, and ...
There is a profusion of articles proposing signature schemes without random oracles (see for yourself). What does that mean, and why does it matter?
I'm not sure I understand really the implications of proofs of security in the random oracle model. Does a proof of security in ROM translate to a reduction of security of the crypto-system to the ...
1.) Proving the security of a scheme with the ROM takes two steps; first you prove that the sceme is secure in this idealized world where a random oracle exists and then you implement this scheme in ...
What is the "Random Oracle Model"? Is it an "assumption" akin to the hardness of factoring and discrete log? Or something else? And why do some researchers have a strong distrust of this model?