3
votes
2answers
184 views

Is a random oracle controled by the challenger?

When proving a Crypto scheme security under random oracle model, is the random oracle always controlled by the challenger? What if the Hash is only used by the adversary?
4
votes
2answers
249 views

Hash function based on block cipher (and proof of security in the PRP model)

Do there exist proofs of security for primitives like hash functions (based on a block cipher) in the PRP model. I often see proofs in the random oracle model (for hash function based on compression ...
7
votes
4answers
304 views

Automated security protocol verification tool for eCK model

I want a tool that (runs on Win7 and) can perform automated verification of a protocol in the eCK security model as described in Microsoft Research's paper "Stronger Security of Authenticated Key ...
6
votes
1answer
154 views

Is there a security proof for the Triple-DES construction in the ideal cipher model?

Suppose one has an ideal block cipher $E \: : \: \{0,\hspace{-0.04 in}1\hspace{-0.03 in}\}^k \times \{0,\hspace{-0.04 in}1\hspace{-0.03 in}\}^w \: \to \: \{0,\hspace{-0.04 in}1\hspace{-0.03 in}\}^w ...
6
votes
1answer
304 views

understanding forking lemma

Every time when I read a paper that has digital signature, when it comes to prove the security of a digital signature scheme, many chances that the author will use the forking lemma. The forking ...
1
vote
2answers
153 views

Acceptable assumptions when proving security

Considering the output of a cryptographic primitive, like an encryption scheme (CBC, ...), a hash function or even the output of any schemes based on number theoretic assumptions, is it reasonable ...
2
votes
1answer
135 views

Is Guillou-Quisquater existentially unforgeable against adaptive message attack under a random oracle model?

First of all, the Guillou-Quisquater digital signature scheme is: Note everything is $\bmod n$. Message is denoted by $m$. Private key: $s$ Public key: Hash function $H$, $e$, ...
2
votes
1answer
250 views

Why are protocols often proven secure under the random oracle model instead of a hash assumption?

Is this true that whenever you design a protocol using a hash function, you must prove its security under the random oracle? I mean, is it possible to devise a protocol $P$ using a function $H$, and ...
11
votes
2answers
790 views

Random oracle model proofs and programmability

Proving the security of a scheme with the random oracle model (ROM) involves two steps: first you prove that the scheme is secure in an idealized world where a random oracle exists, and then you ...
28
votes
1answer
3k views

What is the “Random Oracle Model” and why is it controversial?

What is the "Random Oracle Model"? Is it an "assumption" akin to the hardness of factoring and discrete log? Or something else? And why do some researchers have a strong distrust of this model?