A model used in cryptographic security proofs, in which concrete primitives such as hash functions are replaced with a "random oracle": a hypothetical black box that maps its inputs to truly random outputs, but in such a way that the same input always yields the same output.
What is the "Random Oracle Model"? Is it an "assumption" akin to the hardness of factoring and discrete log? Or something else? And why do some researchers have a strong distrust of this model?
Every time when I read a paper that has digital signature, when it comes to prove the security of a digital signature scheme, many chances that the author will use the forking lemma. The forking ...
1.) Proving the security of a scheme with the ROM takes two steps; first you prove that the sceme is secure in this idealized world where a random oracle exists and then you implement this scheme in ...
I want a tool that (runs on Win7 and) can perform automated verification of a protocol in the eCK security model as described in Microsoft Research's paper "Stronger Security of Authenticated Key ...
I'm not sure I understand really the implications of proofs of security in the random oracle model. Does a proof of security in ROM translate to a reduction of security of the crypto-system to the ...
Assume $S$ be a finite set $O$ be a random oracle from $S$ to $S$, such that $O$ is bijective $f$ be a random permutation of $S$ Is there any difference between $O$ and $f$? Does it makes any ...