I'm reading through a DH implementation, and I think I found a potential hole. Public $p$ and $g$ values are properly selected. A candidate secret value $\bar a$ is pseudo-randomly selected such ...
Stopping timing attacks on AES: Why is it important to prevent the OS from interrupting the AES computation?
I read the paper Cache-timing attacks on AES (by Daniel J. Bernstein), but I don't seem to understand everything. The author dedicates a long section on how to prevent the OS to interrupt an AES ...
I'm just interested in cryptography, so please don't expect me to be an expert. ;) I recently read about AES cache timing attacks and found it very interesting. I read the article Cache-timing attacks ...
I have a question about attacks on the implementation of cryptographic code that are enabled by compilation and compiler-optimisations. I am aware of this. Would anyone be able to point me to other ...
Is there a point where increasing the complexity of an encryption algorithm will make it easier to break using a timing attack? Or is there no connection here at all?
There are several known methods for implementing AES in constant time using SIMD operations, mostly based around fast byte shuffling (for instance Hamburg and Kasper/Schwabe). Are there any similar ...