# Tag Info

2

The traditional MPC definition of correctness has no notion of correctness on the inputs. The traditional MPC correctness property deals with the output, i.e., the protocol is correct if $y$ where $y=f(x_1,x_2,\dots,x_n)$ is guaranteed to be output. What the $x_1,\dots,x_n$ values are is completely up to the inputting party. So, if you want to check that ...

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If the honest parties have commitments to the malicious parties' inputs or [encapsulations generated by honest parties] of those inputs, then the function can be modified to check those. ​ Otherwise, the value computed by the trusted party "taking honest party inputs and modified inputs of corrupted parties" by definition results in a correct output.

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As the previous answer says, they are certainly NOT the same. However, there is certainly a connection between them. Specifically, the covert model just says that there is a deterrent parameter $\epsilon$ and the guarantee is that if the adversary tries to cheat then it will be caught with probability at least $\epsilon$. The question that arises is how ...

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