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20

It's meaningless nonsense. I would be inclined to avoid spending any money with these people. If you scroll down on this page, you'll find a table labelled key size vs. time to crack, according to which their $2 \times 256$ bit encryption takes $3.31 \times 10^{112}$ years to crack, making it (apparently) superior to ordinary $256$-bit encryption (which can ...


17

In short: You must authenticate the IV. Which particular attacks apply if you don't depends on the block cipher mode; I will give two common examples. In CTR mode, an attacker who fiddles with the IV can forge authenticated messages, but the content of the corresponding plaintext is beyond his control (since he doesn't know the key). Depending on the ...


16

CBC does not perform authentication This property makes it less suitable for places where authentication is required, basically any transport protocol. TLS uses CBC, but by default performs authentication over the plain text instead of the ciphertext, which opened up a host of attacks. CBC can be used here, but it is error prone and may require an ...


16

We can't implement "AES 512 key size" because AES is defined for key sizes $k\in\{128,192,256\}$ bits only; much like we can't make a bicycle with 3 wheels. I see no reason why we would want to define an AES variant with 512-bit key size (since AES-128 is safe enough for anything foreseeable most current applications except those that require huge security ...


14

In complete honesty: if you have to ask this question, it's overwhelmingly unlikely that you have actually succeeded in breaking the security of AES. At best, you may have discovered a well-known attack against misuse of particular block cipher modes; for instance, plaintext recovery with a chosen-ciphertext attack against ECB, or blind manipulation of the ...


9

Assuming you really had broken AES or another frequently used algorithm that is thought to be secure, the first step would be to prove it. Write the code for the attack. Verify that it works on randomly generated data of the kind it requires. If it can break some challenge (e.g. these), do it. Post the results to the challenger or show the results ...


9

Both an AES-128 key (as defined by FIPS 197), and a TDES Keying Option 2 key (as defined by FIPS SP-800-67) are 128-bit bitstrings. Similarly, both an AES-192 key and a TDES Keying Option 1 key are 192-bit bitstrings. The differences are: In AES, all bits of a key matter to the result; in TDES, 1 bit out of 8 (the lower-order bit of each byte in ...


8

It looks like, given your adversary model, things should be secure. HMAC as a randomness extractor has been shown to be good, especially when we can assume the hash function is collision resistant. That paper also has some results which tell how you could guard against the collision resistance being broken (basically use a hash function with larger output ...


8

There are several scenarios where you wouldn’t want to use AES in CBC mode. In CBC mode, each block is dependent on a previous one. As @fgrieu nicely hinted at in his comment, using CBC means that if you have a large, encrypted file and you only want to update/change/modify a tiny fraction of it, you would have to follow the decrypt-modify-encrypt path each ...


8

I would like to ask if that is true for every AES CTR mode implementation?, Doesn't have to be. You can store the nonce anywhere. You could even send it to the recipient via a different channel (e.g., email the ciphertext and use SMS to transmit the nonce). Storing it at the beginning has its advantages. For example, if streaming the data, you can ...


7

First, the fact that the data is "easy" to guess (in the sense that an attacker has a one-in-2^32 or a one-in-2^64 chance of guessing correctly) doesn't mean much if the attacker has no way of checking if his guess is correct. Or at least, it's not a problem with the cryptography. Second, even if he does have that ability, the problem of protecting your ...


7

I assume you mean AES-GCM. Nonces must be unique for any use of a key. Given that $n = H(k)$ is constant for constant key $k$, this implies that such a nonce may only be used once, ever. Nonce reuse is particularly catastrophic in GCM mode (as with any other CTR-based mode), as it causes the keystream to be identical. Essentially, you wind up with two (or ...


7

DES is slow in software because it was designed back in the early 70's even before the 8086 processor existed, and uses several bit oriented operations that are just not implemented efficiently in a processor with a word oriented instruction set. Its intended product was ASIC hardware designs, in which DES runs quickly. DES hardware processors are quite ...


6

There is no uniform permutation; there is a permutation uniformly chosen from the set of all possible permutations over $Z_2^{128}$. It is evident that AES is not a uniformly chosen permutation, since its permutation is fixed for any key. One can consider a family $\{AES_K\}$ of AES permutations under all possible keys $K$. Even if the key is chosen ...


6

It mainly depends on how the algorithm was selected. If it was selected by a public competition like for AES, then it is likely to be secure. If it was forced in by the NSA such as Dual-EC random number generator, then you may have some doubts. Other questions you may want to ask yourself are: Is this an "original" algorithm or was the problem that it ...


6

If you look at the algorithm description, you see that, at a high-level, the encryption algorithm looks like this: addRoundKey(0); for (int i = 1; i < rounds; i ++) { subBytes(); shiftRows(); mixColumns(); addRoundKey(i); } ...


6

AES-CTR is a stream cipher, of a particular kind where the keystream is obtained by encryption of a counter. So the question reduces to: what are drawbacks of AES-CTR compared to other stream ciphers? The main ones compared to ChaCha20 are: Without hardware support, AES can fail to cache-timing attacks. Without hardware support, AES is slower. Without ...


6

DES is slow compared to AES including in hardware because for comparable security we must use 3DES, which triples the number of rounds per block, to 48 for 3DES versus 10, 12, or 14 for AES; DES's block size is 64 bits, half of AES's 128 bit; so when encrypting a sizable block of data, 3DES does more rounds that AES by a factor of 96/10, 96/12, or 96/14; ...


5

You basically want a full disk encryption mode for a block cipher; XTS mode seems to be the current standard. In your case each "disk block" is actually a file offset. Note that using a stream cipher or counter mode is NOT secure if the data is ever modified in the file, as it would violate the cardinal sin of using the same key and initialization vector to ...


5

CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) Message authentication (via CBC-MAC) is done on the plaintext not the ciphertext. (This is generally not a desireable feature.) On the encrypt operation, the encryption and MAC could happen in parallel, but generally do not (typically because there is just one AES engine in a chip, just one AES thread at a time, etc.). Similar ...


5

If you want strict indistinguishability, then yes, you need to store the IV (initial counter) somewhere. However, there are some relaxed modes that are used in practice for things like disk encryption, where it is often very useful to decrypt things "in the middle" like you say. For instance, XEX uses a counter which is derived from the sector and offset ...


5

AES-NI is just a fast way for the processor to execute the calculations of AES. Normally the computer has to calculate every single step of the AES key schedule and the rounds as a single instruction: Substitute it with the S-boxes, shift the rows, mix the columns, XOR the round key. This is called a software implementation. Every instruction has to be done ...


5

First, it's not said that AES is unbreakable, merely that none of the currently known attacks reduce the computational cost to a point where it's feasible. The current best attack on AES-128 takes 2^126.1 operations, if we had a computer (or cluster) several million times more efficient than any current computer and could operate at the thermodynamic ...


5

I add my whitebox AES implementation on GitHub in: C++ Java C++ version implements both Chow's (mixing bijections, input/output encodings, external encodings) and Karroumi's (dual AES in each column) whitebox AES scheme plus Billet's key recovery attack on both schemes. Java implements Chow's scheme only. PS: Due to low reputation I post links to ...


5

There are two things here: Encryption uses mode of operation, and not "AES alone". Some of them are randomized by an initialization vector - that means the encryption of the same text under the same algorithm is still randomized and not deterministic. The encryption methods take care of that. You only need the correct key to decrypt. Passwords are not ...


5

This begs the question, why would you in any real-world circumstance wish to reduce the difficulty for an attacker to break your cryptosystem? To answer your question practically, the only reasonable way I can think of to accomplish this is to simply reduce the entropy in the key. At 100%, all 128 bits of the key are used. At 50%, 64 bits of the key are ...


5

The most likely rationale to change the AES design is political. It's a NIST standard, designed in Western Europe. It's a bad idea! How much scrutiny has it received? Almost none. How much will it receive? Almost none. Bad idea.


5

At a high level, the major flaw is that you are rolling your own crypto protocol. You should strongly consider using a standardized protocol like DTLS. Some specific problems: Symmetric key distribution is left unspecified. Keys must be changed occasionally to thwart distinguishers. No way to recover from symmetric key compromise. Your message ...


4

Encrypting big amounts of data is no problem for block cipher - if you remember a few important things. You can't encrypt plaintext which is bigger than the block size. You need to do some addition work. Most cipher operation modes first divide the plaintext into blocks of the size of the cipher. Now you can do different things: How about just encrypting ...


4

The sum of PRPs is a secure PRF. That paper gives as a security bound for a sum of two independent PRPs $q^3/2^{2n-1}$, where $q$ is the number of queries and $n$ the block size (i.e. 128 for AES). That means that your construction, correctly used, is more secure than a single PRP, for which the bound is $q^2/2^n$. If you wanted to give an adversary an ...



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