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As a linux user, I would recommend gpg (GnuPG, for windows gpg4win): version info (gpg --version): gpg (GnuPG) 2.1.4 libgcrypt 1.6.3 Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to ...


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This [Carter-Wegman] MAC is not, in general, secure in the quantum setting This is true; however we need to ask "what is this setting, and is it a realistic one?" This setting is one where the adversary can ask queries that are composed of a superposition of quantum states, and the oracle returns the superposition of the answers. In other words, the ...


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Actually, a post-quantum security is truly achieveable in a cipher-combo only. So - take a look at AES-finalist-candidates, like Serpent, and use it too or just it, but in 512 bit keys. Here is the starting point for you : enter link description here


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Well, not all of the AES-candidates have been considered good. In fact one of them even got broken at the presentation (within 20min!). I'll list any (non-author) occurence of algoriths I'm aware of. Note: This list doesn't claim to be complete and may be extended by other people. Now for a list of algorithms, for which I know there're an option SAFER, ...


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You really want to authenticate, what use is confidentiality if some random intruder can pretend to be either host or client, or can insert themselves in the middle of the conversation? No need to break the encryption, you'd just give away the keys. If you need to protect the data from being seen, you also need to protect from more active attacks. There ...


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No. First, you've exposed a padding oracle by using unauthenticated AES. Secondly, you've not authenticated the devices: it's easy to mount a man in the middle attack. Thirdly, I don't understand the role of changing parameters all the time in your protocol.


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Yes this would work as stated by you. Explanation: If you're using a library supporting ECB (which you are actually using in this example) you can input the whole 32 bytes of plaintext and will receive the corresponding 32 bytes of ciphertext. Splitting the operation into two calls doesn't make any difference for libraries as internally they do nothing ...


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Cipher Feedback mode turns the block cipher (AES) into a self-synchronizing stream cipher which feeds back the full ciphertext block as the next IV. If you encrypt something smaller than a multiple of the block size, it will not use all of the block cipher output to create the ciphertext, just the amount it needs. Therefore there is not a padding ...


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First of all, AES is like an alias for a winner of a contest that has started in 1997 and finishes in 2000 with the announcement of Rijndael's win. A nice document to learn AES is the link given by Richie Frame in the comments of this question. Trying to do an small summary, there are two main families of symmetric ciphers and Rijndael is a member of the ...


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You benchmarked a highly optimized AES implementation against a reference implementation of CLEFIA: * NOTICE * This reference code is written for a clear understanding of the CLEFIA * blockcipher algorithm based on the specification of CLEFIA. * Therefore, this code does not include any optimizations for * high-speed or low-cost implementations or any ...


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It you need a deterministically derived key for AES, the DRBG algorithms of NIST SP 800-90A are suitable, and their output is directly usable as an AES key. An example use case is when computing an AES session key from a longer-term master key, and the nonce corresponding to that session. AES will expand its key (128, 192 or 256-bit) to 128-bit subkeys (one ...


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I would prefer to use standardized (like FIPS 140-2) secure random generator, since the whole point is to secure the encryption key. Of course, you might want to check this website for reference: http://www.cryptosys.net/rng_algorithms.html


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Padding oracle attacks are targeting servers, where the padding oracle attack is performed to attack the encrypted connection between client and server. You use encryption only internally, without an external interface, so yes you are right: There is no interface, where an external attacker could perform this attack. However, your entire setup is flawed ...


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The authentication tag is defined as an output parameter in GCM (see section 7, step 7 of NIST SP 800-38D). In all the API's I've encountered it's appended to the ciphertext. Where it is actually placed is up to the protocol designer. The protocol designer may well consider the place behind the ciphertext as ad hoc default though. The name "tag" of course ...


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Actually, you are right and the paper is wrong. They omitted the fact that they used a different generator and/or vector than the AES s-box. This is why you are not getting the same results. I ran a brute force generation of all APA s-boxes, and none of them starting with $0x8C$ continued with the results of the paper. It is probable they used two ...


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ECB is possibly the wrong choice for your application, you more likely want CBC or some other mode. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Electronic_Codebook_.28ECB.29 in particular the picture of the Tux penguin for an example of why ECB does not work with duplicated data. So now the question is why you would have duplicated ...



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