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6

SSL was designed long ago when encrypt-then-MAC wasn't that popular yet. Even TLS 1.2, published in 2008, is pretty old by now, and while encrypt-then-MAC was preferred by then, the practical risks were underestimated for a long time. Padding oracles attacks became well known after several high profile attacks in 2010. With stream ciphers, MAC-then-encrypt ...


4

In summary: Yes, HMAC is the way to go for construction of a MAC from an arbitrary concrete iterated hash. We have no constructive argument of security of the MAC constructs in the question; we even have a concrete attack when using some otherwise apparently fine hashes. I consider a hash constructed by iterating a compression function $F$ as ...


3

I would think these numbers would have been put on the google search engine, and yield (probably) many hits. This assumption is wrong. Certificate serial numbers are not indexed by common search engines, nor are they typically posted to any HTML site. Frankly, I'm not sure why you would assume they'd be indexed. The Wordpress certificate is used for ...


2

Having a client (ex. your web browser) use zero-knowledge proofs to authenticate itself to a server only makes sense if the server knows about the client's public key in advance, and if the client keeps the same private key forever. So you could have the client-side generate a keypair when you register your account, and the server records your public key ...


1

Given your ideal setup, I don't think you need anything else than plaintext authentication. The only thing could be if the server at the end of the TLS link is not the one managing the authentication (in which case you do not necessarily want to reveal to it your password).


1

I'm going to agree with @fgrieu's marvelous post above in a back-handed way. My answer is: No, you don't have to use an HMAC. Do it anyway. As you noted, some hashes, sush as SHA-3 (especially in its Keccak form), Skein (which I was a team member on), and others will work just fine. In the case of Skein, there is a one-pass Skein-MAC that has a proof of ...


1

Security The level of security is likely to depend on the cryptographic primitives - the actual hash function and cipher - used. It is very likely that you can construct a function that is insecure, e.g. where the cipher is used for both the hash function an encryption. So you need to prove that the hash function and the encryption primitive are not ...


1

Your scheme is secure under the assumption that AES is a pseudo-random permutation (PRP): In fact, message authentication codes (MACs) are theoretically modelled as pseudo-random functions (PRFs), and any PRP is also a PRF. Therefore, your usage of single-block AES essentially is a MAC. In the case that only a very small subset of the possible blocks is ...


1

SRP does DH key exchange with authentication, and has the capability to also authenticate the server as well (though usually the server is authenticated by keeping the verifier secret). If the key is generated strictly from a password and salt, with the salt stored on the server, you can do a dictionary attack on the verifier (e.g. if the server is ...



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