# Tag Info

3

No, it is not safe to authenticate the BIOS in that way. CRC should be used as checksum only, i.e. to avoid random bit flips. For larger random changes you should use CRC32 at the minimum. If you want to protect against malicious change you need a cryptographically secure hash. the reason for this is that any attacker can create a malicious BIOS that ...

2

Answering the question in your title (and not addressing your proposed alternative which I don't quite understand) there is a zero knowledge proof of password protocol "SRP" which is fast and effective. SRP does not seem to have been given as wide publicity as it should get. Having implemented it, and being an advocate of its use, I don't really understand ...

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I am a little confused about why it is believed to be secure against quantum attacks, couldn't the hash function be attacked? Yes, the attacker could attack the hash function, for example, by trying to find a second preimage (and there are known Merkle Signature Schemes where we can show that forging a signature can be reduced to the second preimage ...

2

Essentially, instead of checking against a (salted) hash of a password, you suggest using the hash (since you can choose hashing = keygen) as a key to encrypt a kind of test value. The main question is whether this adds or reduces security. If you store the hash/key directly, the chance of a randomly chosen password hashing to the same value is $2^{-n}$, ...

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in diffie-hellman key exchange algorithm vulnerability's is good defined by RSA lab : "The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack, an opponent Carol intercepts Alice's public value and sends her own public value to Bob. When Bob transmits his public value, Carol substitutes it with her own and sends it to ...

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This is far from secure, assuming a passphrase that a human can remember. The main thing you have to note is that an offline brute force attack on the password can be carried out. This is because the server can guess the password and follow the same procedure and see if decryption works. It is possible to buy a machine that computes billions of hashes a ...

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I'll first assume $\phi$ is known, which would be the situation in RSA at key selection. A common method could be to select (odd) $\mu$ at random in some appropriate interval until $\gcd(\mu,\phi)=1$ is satisfied. In the context of RSA, it is fine (if we ignore performance an interoperability issues) to choose an RSA exponent at random in $[3\dots\phi-3]$ ...

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