New answers tagged authentication
Hint: Try chosen-plaintext attacks. Show that it is possible to use this attack to find the encryption of any block of your choice.
Zero knowledge property here is simulator availability that produces indistinguishable protocol transcript. In other words, proving party can deny being ever engaged in a protocol. One would use Pedersen commitments to avoid leaking any information about his secret.
From y you don't get any information about x, because of the 'mod p' part, which makes the result y random.
A zero-knowledge proof is a protocol by which the Prover demonstrate to the Verifier that he knows the solution to a given problem, without giving to the Verifier any additional information about the solution -- that is, no information that the Verifier could not already obtain alone. In the case of the discrete logarithm, the y value is not part of what the ...
If your environment was fully compromised you could at no point actually decrypt your data, defeating the purpose. So I’m going to assume the user only uses an authentic client and the client’s memory is protected during execution. Generate a private/public keypair. Store the public key on the server, encrypt the private key with the user’s passphrase and ...
Public-key cryptography is not sufficiently computationally burdensome to where other approaches must be used for authentication protocols. Note though that what you describe is not actually public-key based. The verification of the MAC requires Dave and Bob to both have a shared key. Also, note that a random component must be included in some manner in all ...
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