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The threat model of password storage is that of server compromision, where the attacker gain access to the database and server code. The attacker can then run the code to test password candidates, possibly making modifications, porting to faster platform, etc. The attacker will not bother computing the fake hash and fake salt. So this scheme is twice as ...


2

Probably because a simple cascade would only be stronger against some attacks, while opening the door to more implementation bugs. While bcrypt and scrypt are (password based) key-derivation functions, much of what is in the answers to this question about combining hash functions applies here. Different constructions give preimage resistance and PRF-ness, ...


2

I would advise against this. When implementing slow-hashing (such as bcrypt or scrypt), it's usually recommended to select as high a work-factor as is tolerable (in relation to how much time the user is willing to wait, and/or how much strain you're willing to put on your server). Assuming you're working within this constraint, using two distinct slow ...


1

Mostly similar questions than this are about scrypt and PBKDF2. Shortly: No. The execution time for slow-hashing (password-based key derivation) must be as long as you can afford (i.e. as long as your users are willing to wait for password derivation). If you use two functions, one taking another as input the time will normally grow, and you get less ...



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