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8

Let's get terminology right. If you talk of "unknown s" then s is not a salt; when some piece of data is secret, we call it a key. And your "hash function" is then a MAC. In the context of "password hashing", such things are sometimes called "peppering" (as always, technical terminology is, at its core, a collection of bad puns). If your MAC is correct ...


5

Points 3 and 4 are a secure way of storing the input to bcrypt (with appropriate choice of parameters for bcrypt). Points 1 and 2 aren't necessary but don't harm: they would add a small amount of extra computation for an attacker is possession of the password database that wants to do a dictionary attack; the attacker wouldn't be able to straight-out use ...


4

Instead of that home-grown scheme, I would use PBKDF2 instead if you simply are sold on the idea of iterated hash schemes. It uses an such a scheme, although not exactly the one you have described, and is well-studied and considered secure. However, PBKDF2 doesn't offer many advantages over bcrypt, as PBKDF2 is still vulnerable to GPU and FPGA/ASIC ...


4

The scrypt function is specifically designed to hinder such attempts by raising the resource demands of the algorithm. Specifically, the algorithm is designed to use a large amount of memory compared to other password-based KDFs, making the size and the cost of a hardware implementation much more expensive, and therefore limiting the amount of paralleling ...


3

The threat model of password storage is that of server compromision, where the attacker gain access to the database and server code. The attacker can then run the code to test password candidates, possibly making modifications, porting to faster platform, etc. The attacker will not bother computing the fake hash and fake salt. So this scheme is twice as ...


3

You have two algorithms, $A$ and $B$, that claim to compute two (essentially) injective, hard-to-invert and costly-to-compute functions $F$ and $G$. Your fear is that either of the algorithms instead compute functions $F'$ and $G'$, that may be neither injective, hard-to-invert, nor costly-to-compute. This may happen because of programming mistakes or (these ...


3

To begin with, I see four potential problems with your key file. The work factor (8) is probably too low. If we presume you pick your pass phrase by selecting $c$ words at random from a list of $2^{13}$ distinct words (e.g. correct horse battery staple) you get a pass phrase with $13c$ bits of entropy. (AFAIK the dictionary used by Diceware only barely ...


3

According to http://www.oid-info.com/ bcrypt has no official OID. You could register a private enterprise number with IANA and assign your own OID for your purpose. But that's going to make interaction with 3rd party application more complicated. Or you could use PBKDF2 instead of bcrypt. PBKDF2 is a public-key cryptography standards. Libraries such as ...


3

What I did in one of my password generators is that given a secret key $K$, public data $\text{Pub}$, I first generate a solid "master key" $K_m$ via key-stretching the secret key using PBKDF2 (any other key derivation function would work, I just happened to have that lying around): $$K_m = PBKDF2(K, \text{salt, iterations, } \cdots)$$ And then derive ...


2

First, separate the idea of "salt" from "hash". Salting is no more than a process applied to the message in a known way, such as appending the salt value to the end of the original data, yielding a "salted" message that differs from the original message. The hash algorithm is then performed using the salted message as input, yielding a digest value. A ...


2

Okay, for key derivation in the browser you will be using third party libs. If you want to be the absolute top of the line then scrypt (potential lib to consider) is your best bet with a medium to high work factor based on what your users are going to be using. Bcrypt works but is not memory hard so take that into consideration. (Even 5MB of memory usage ...


2

I would advise against this. When implementing slow-hashing (such as bcrypt or scrypt), it's usually recommended to select as high a work-factor as is tolerable (in relation to how much time the user is willing to wait, and/or how much strain you're willing to put on your server). Assuming you're working within this constraint, using two distinct slow ...


1

Mostly similar questions than this are about scrypt and PBKDF2. Shortly: No. The execution time for slow-hashing (password-based key derivation) must be as long as you can afford (i.e. as long as your users are willing to wait for password derivation). If you use two functions, one taking another as input the time will normally grow, and you get less ...


1

Why isn't this best practice? Because it adds needless complexity. It solves a problem we don't have. The odds of a cryptanalytic breakthrough that yields a shortcut attack on bcrypt or PBKDF2 is... slim to none. It's very unlikely that the mathematics of bcrypt/PBKDF2 are going to be the weakest link in your system. So, why don't we do this? Because ...


1

Usernames A hashed username is fine; a nice idea for the security paranoid actually. If all username records use the same salt, then a rainbow attack is theoretically possible - as is knowing that a user has X pieces of secured information (plus timestamps etc). But you need a single salt per table if the username is the tuple selection mechanism. Secret ...


1

The random number generation routine must have supreme randomness, special care should be taken to ensure this. The larger concern is the decryption of the keyfile should in no way reveal the key to even authorized users. The password entropy concerns have been well voiced. Depending on the frequency of key changes, you may require > 112 bits of entropy. ...


1

You can't. The best you can do is something like PBKDF2 or scrypt or bcrypt. But they won't generate a strong cryptographic key. If you start with a weak password or weak passphrase, and derive a cryptographic key from it, the result will inevitably be not very strong. Functions like PBKDF2 or scrypt or bcrypt are not a silver bullet. They make things a ...


1

What's your motivation for slow-hashing on the client-side? It may well be slower than if performed server side (if you're referring to a browser-based application, and the hashing is done with javascript, then it will certainly be slower, even more so if it's a mobile device) it doesn't provide any extra security, the credential(s) (password, hash of ...


1

The scheme you described above has some flaws. Because you aren't seeding the hash input each iteration, you are really increasing your chance of getting collisions. This is a great example of why you should try to avoid implementing these things yourself. It's really easy to overlook something subtle that undermines your system's security. As previously ...


1

In the first part of your question, you appear to be describing a password hashing scheme. A common (or, at least, commonly recommended) way to construct such schemes is based on a message authentication code (MAC). Specifically, let $\operatorname{MAC}_K(m)$ be a message authentication code with key $K$ and message $m$, and let $H(s,r) = d = (r, c)$, ...


1

If I understand the question correctly, you got an unknown value $s$, and known values $d$ and $r$, such that, for some one way function $H$, $H(s,r) = d$. You want to find both a function $G:\{0,1\}^*\times\{0,1\}^*\to \{0,1\}^*$ and a function $V:\{0,1\}^*\times\{0,1\}^*\to \{0,1\}$ such that for any $x$, $V(G(d,r'),s) = V(d,s) = 1$. Technically, at ...



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