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If all the components share the same certificate, then they share the same private key. This raises the two following points: When a secret is shared by more than two people, can it still be considered really secret ? Secrecy dilutes fairly fast. If all components share the same secret value, then breakage of any single component reveals the private keys ...

To sign a message $M$ under RSA, one should NOT build the signature as $\mathcal{Sign}(M)=M^d\bmod N$, for several reasons: either that limits to messages $M$ in range $[0..N-1]$, or that allows forgeries of the form $\hat M=M+k\cdot N$, because $\mathcal{Sign}(\hat M)=\mathcal{Sign}(M)$; that allows forgeries of the form $\hat M=R^e\cdot\prod{M_j}^{a_j}$ ...

Such certificates are basically just an implementation of digital signatures. One certificate is used to sign the data using a private key, and a corresponding verification certificate is given to the user along with the signature and the data. The user uses the verification certificate to verify that the file matches its signature. You can't reverse ...

I am not sure to fully understand your question, but what you can do is the following: take $r=2^{512}$, and compute $p=r+\delta$ and $q=r-\delta^\prime$ such that $p$ and $q$ are prime numbers, and $0\leq \delta, \delta^\prime < 2^{32}$. Then you have an RSA key at you disposal that can be broken by a brute force search on $\delta$, which should take ...

1. Was I right? Pretty much. I want to add something to help clarify though: The Verisign public key in his store is of the Verisign CA (It is also stored in the form of a certificate). Also I think this process would qualify at decryption, no? 2. Verisign creates the digital signature over my certificate data. Which data? I'm not really sure what you ...

In Theory In theory, either method works and has its advantages and disadvantages. Sending the entire chain up to the root means the other party (e.g., web browser) has everything they need to do the validation. A disadvantage is that more bandwidth is used. Sending only the one certificate could yield better bandwidth usage (the verifying party still has ...

Time stamps are also signatures; see for instance RFC 3161 which is the most commonly used time stamp format. In particular, such time stamps also rely on certificates (the TSA certificate), and thus also expire. So you need regular time stamping; whenever the latest time stamp is about to expire (but before expiration), you need to obtain a new time stamp ...

It would seem that the answer is no. If the TSA's private key is compromised (and thus revoked), the time stamp signature cannot be trusted as whoever compromised it could sign documents with old time stamps. Surely users would want to be warned before accepting a time stamp signature from a compromised certificate. It seems then if this is your threat ...