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Usually what you call "information theoretic hardness" is denoted as statistical indistinguishability. And it is pretty much black and white only: Two distributions are distinguishable or not. When you ask "how much harder", you already drift into the area of computational indistinguishability. There are plenty of ressources for that keyword, including most ...


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If we count a single application of a reduction function as 0.5 calculation [...] That does not seem to be an assumption made in the paper? I would expect the reduction function to take much less time than a hash/cipher, so discounting them completely is a good enough approximation. That gives the value in the paper. If you count it as 0.5, then it would ...


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Also, differential attacks can be useful in the design of a cipher to strike the right balance between performance (e.g., number of rounds) and security. Let's assume DES initially had 10 rounds and the designers performed a differential attack on that setup. They would have found that 10 rounds were not buying enough resistance against that type of attack ...


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Anyone who begins to develop an attack on primitive XYZ is probably not aware beforehand of what the computational complexity of their attack will turn out to be. Then, the attack is developed and computational complexity becomes known. Just because DES isn't broken by the attack in question does not mean no other ciphers will be. And just because the ...


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Differential cryptanalysis is a very powerful technique that permitted highly practical attacks on many ciphers that were not designed to resist it (e.g. FEAL-4). DES, as it turns out, was designed to be pretty resistant to it, which is why it requires an essentially impractical amount of chosen plaintexts to implement a differential attack on DES. ...



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