New answers tagged cryptanalysis
In such terms, I suppose you should to find GCD of two numbers Key1 and Key2. It seems that with big probability it will give to you one of the prime number which was generated by compromised generator. Pollard`s method is very hard, and I doubt, that you can successfully apply it in the case.
Speaking in statistical terms, this is the difference between the law of large numbers and the "law of small numbers" (e.g. see Poisson distribution). Short texts are not statistically significant, or more detailed: If you assume statistical independent letters (not true in general, but can be used as simplification), for short texts the variance will be ...
"In terms of the frequency of letters, how is it possible to have different frequent letters when the length of the text I'm analyzing is shorter?" Well, if you analize the famous "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog" you can't expect a frequency analysis to perfect match with big texts analysis. It would be like making a Voting Intent ...
Letter frequency checks how often a letter appears in your text. Depending on your text, the frequency of letters will change. If your text is short and has the name "Alex" in it a lot, it will make the frequency of the letter X much higher than average. Generally when discussing the expected letter frequency, people refer to the average letter frequency ...
NN/ML is pretty useless for cryptanalysis, but surprisingly useful for building cryptosystems. It turns out that you can build a trapdoor permutation on the assumption that learning (in an ML sense) certain classes of functions is computationally hard. An example of this is Regev's seminal paper on lattices and the learning-with-errors assumption.
Whenever you're trying to attack a scheme that is [algebraically] relatively simple like this one, a sensible first step is to write out everything you know. Now, considering the information you've been given, try and substitute things into oneanother, and see where this leads you. Let $(m,c)$ be the first 1024 bits of the plaintext-ciphertext pair. Now, ...
To answer point 2: No. When using a good encryption scheme, one aims to prove that the ciphertext is only negligibly different from random data. As such, without breaking the encryption scheme completely no information (for example the entropy) of the plaintext is leaked.
No, this does not weaken ed25519 in any way. Known plaintext will not have any effect on a signature algorithm, if it did it would make that algorithm completely useless.
Tweak per message offers good security like IV per message . Basically a tweakable block cipher with same tweak for all messages is same as non-tweakable block cipher. It is deterministic in nature and not considered secure enough in itself. You need to apply a mode of encryption that has been designed for non-tweakable block ciphers to make it secure.
The short answer: Tweaks and IVs play very different roles, so it's not really meaningful to compare them. If you view an encryption algorithm as a black box that takes, say, an IV and a plaintext and produces a ciphertext, there aren't any tweaks in sight. It's not until you break open the black box and look inside that you might start seeing tweaks (and ...
This obviously is not an encryption but a simple coding with Base64 coding: The decoded text message is: Steganography is the art and science of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one, apart from the sender and intended recipient, suspects the existence of the message, a form of security through obscurity. The word steganography is of ...
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