# Tag Info

0

Xor can help find bits not yet known whether most significant or least significant and help the adversary find more information about both cipher and plain text, especially if a table of potential plain texts and even keys is stored in cinjunction with but wise Xor. Some reading: ...

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It is for the 1st version of 3DES which is only using the same key three times (3DES-EDE1) Which is equivalent to DES (I think they did that so you could use 3DES to exchange with someone using DES). There are 3 different versions (or ways of using DES). EDE3 is the strongest with 3 different keys being used.

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Feistel networks were broken in DES but not triple DES. Some final AES candidates not approved also used Feistel networks $2^{36}$ plain text attacks. Reduction of $2^{16}$ possible keys for single DES: $4^{48/6} = 4^{8} = 2^{16}$. First for a one round Feistel network: $R_0$ and $f (R_O, k_1) = R_1 \oplus L_0$, $k_1$ becomes known. For two round Fiestel: ...

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It looks like there's an error in the test vector. The text of Appendix B.1 states: P1 = “The quic” = 5468652071756663 ... which is incorrect. The hex encoding of The quic is actually 5468652071756963 (note the transposition of the i/69 to an f/66 in the encoding. e.g. encrypting the test vector as intended: $echo -n 'The quick brown fox jump' | ... 1 Note: you should also take into consideration the Expansion table, as it glues together with the Pbox. The simplest thing you would like to want from a Pbox is to provide a good diffusion on the inter-sbox level. That is, a single sbox should have an effect on many sboxes in the next round. This is not sufficient, for example you could have some indepent ... 1 You're missing a component : a padding convention. Yes, if you're trying to reduce a block size, it will reduce the cipher strength. That's why the less-sized blocks are padded/filled to fit the exact size. What to do : pad or fill or both - that is a question. First you need to understand, that the more predictible the message, the less secure the ... 2 I understand that if a block cipher has$k$-bit keys and$n$-bit input/output blocks, then if$k>n$, we can expect one message-ciphertext pair to narrow us down (I think?) to$2^{k−n}\$ possible keys, right? That is approximately correct (if the block cipher with the wrong key acts like a random permutation; this is generally a safe assumption); if ...

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